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120 he has a feeling towards it, or that he thinks it to be right; and so too, when we say that he disapproves it, we may mean either that he has a certain feeling towards it, or that he thinks it to be wrong. But yet it is quite plain that to have a feeling towards an action, no matter what feeling we take, is a different thing from judging it to be right or wrong. Even if we were to adopt one of the views just rejected and to say that to judge an action to be right or wrong is the same thing as to judge that we have a feeling towards it, it would still follow that to make the judgment is something different from merely having the feeling; for a man may certainly have a feeling, without thinking that he has it; or think that he has it, without having it. We must, therefore, distinguish between the theory that to say that an action is right or wrong is the same thing as to say that somebody has some kind of feeling towards it, and the theory that it is the same thing as to say that somebody thinks it to be right or wrong.

This latter theory, however, may be held in the same three different forms, as the