Page:Ethical Theory of Hegel (1921).djvu/55

 each of which is substantial, and each of which is necessary to make the others what they are. They interact, and achieve their own being only in determining others and in being determined by these others. Each thing is part of a system, and has no character except in so far as it reacts on other things and is in turn reacted on by them—only by going out of itself and establishing other things has it a private or inward nature of its own. This is the highest principle of essence, and in it the difficulties come to a head. The contradiction which infects the whole realm is this: the factors of its categories have a private independent nature, and at the same time involve a reference to something other than themselves. Thus the ‘thing’ is the mere medium of its attributes, but it involves a reference to these attributes and to the concrete detail which lies outside the mere unity of ‘togetherness’. Similarly, substance is the original, the underived, that which is in itself; but it involves a reference to the particular differences of the attributes which inhere in it. In reciprocity the contradiction is acute; for the only private being of each term is the reference beyond itself to other factors of the system; its nature is to establish them. Consequently, it is always easy to attack any content of knowledge which is erected on this plan and to dissipate its structure to the winds by setting the aspects against one another. There are no relations without terms, the criticism says, and the only terms offered are nothing but relations.

This point of view may be clearer if we consider a concrete instance of it; and we may take as an example Spencer’s criticism of altruistic Hedonism. ‘The sympathetic nature gets pleasure by giving pleasure; and the proposition is that if the general happiness is the object of pursuit, each will be made happy by witnessing others’ happiness. But what in such case constitutes the happiness of others? These others are also by the hypothesis pursuers and receivers of altruistic pleasure. The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is to depend on the display of pleasures by others; which is again to depend on the display of pleasures by others; and so on perpetually. Where, then, is the pleasure to begin? Obviously