Page:Ethical Studies (reprint 1911).djvu/53

 conclusions follow on most important matters, I will venture to say something. Absolute compulsion, we saw above, is the production in a man of a state of mind or body, without his actual will and against his actual or presumable will; and I compel, when with intent I produce this state in another. Relative compulsion rests on the belief in conditional absolute compulsion. In this sense I try to compel, when I cause another to believe that in the case of a certain event taking (or not taking) place, a certain state, against his will, will be produced in him through my agency. Relative compulsion is influence by holding forth of absolute compulsion. It is not mere warning, nor again mere command, but it is a threat; for the compulsion is, directly or indirectly, to issue from my will. This last point is of the essence of the matter; and it is here that we think Mr. Stephen went quite wrong (p. 125, etc.), and not keeping in mind the distinction between ‘warning’ and ‘threat,’ so failed further to distinguish ‘persuasion’ from ‘force.’ Of course, in one sense of the word ‘force,’ persuasion is ‘force,’ but not in the sense of ‘compulsion.’ If I say, ‘Cross the stream now, or the rising water will break the bridge, and you will be forced to remain,’ that is warning; and if, further, I try to convince the man’s intellect that the fact is as I state it, with a view perhaps so to influence his conduct, that is persuasion. But if I say, ‘Cross now, or I will have the bridge broken,’ that is threat. It is an attempt at relative compulsion, because it is the holding forth of conditional absolute compulsion, which is to be the result of my will. So if a priest (see Mr. Stephen) says, ‘If you do this, it is my conviction or my fear that you will be lost,’ that is warning. It is holding forth of painful consequences not to be the result of the will of the warner: (in fact, you may ‘warn’ of what certainly and unconditionally will be; e.g., if an imaginary priest thought you were one of the massa damnata, he might conceivably tell you so). And if the priest by reasoning tried to bring the fact of these consequences home to you, that would be persuasion. But if the priest says, ‘If you do this, I, or what I represent, will take such order that you will, or may be, lost: what we do will, or may, depend on what you do; and what we do will, or may, make a difference in your future prospects,’ then that is a threat and an attempt at relative compulsion. Persuasion is the bringing about a change in the beliefs or opinions of a man (with or without a view to an answering change in his conduct), by considerations addressed to his understanding; such considerations to put before his mind (as facts) actual or possible facts, existing or to exist. This, I think, will be clear to the reader on reflection. The argumentum baculinum and the ‘persuaders’ of the horseman are jokes; the