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 propositions, but whence he gets a right quietly to take them for granted I should be glad to be informed.

(3.) But let us suppose the possibility of a finite subject alone in a material universe, and then let us look at Mr. Sidgwick’s views from the ground of common sense.

On this ground I say (a) for myself, I can not imagine myself into the position of this solitary sentient, and doubt if the author, or any one else, can do so. (b) Passing this by, we come to the assertion that such a supposed being would consider itself to have some rational end, some ultimate good, something right and reasonable as such, for which to live. All I can say here is that, so far as I can imagine myself absolutely alone in a material world, I do not think it would occur to me that I had anything to live for. (c) Supposing however that, being forced so to continue, I did avoid pain and get pleasure, it would not occur to me to say that therefore I was realizing an ‘intrinsically and objectively desirable,’ the ‘end of Reason,’ the ‘absolutely Good or Desirable.’

Surely common sense must see that, to find what end we ought to pursue in the human life we live, by seeing what would be left us to pursue in an unimaginable and inhuman predicament, is not common sense at all, but simply bad metaphysics. No doubt a mere quantity is no more than the sum of its units, and to find the value of each unit no doubt you must isolate it by division. But tacitly to assume that the moral world is a mere sum of units, whose value can be found separately, is really nothing but an enormous piece of dogmatism.

Starting from these preconceptions as to the nature of the individual, we have to get to the conclusion that the pleasure of all is the end for each, which problem we have seen above is insoluble. Mr. Sidgwick has an argument whereby he ‘suppresses Egoism,’ which, so far as I can take it in, is as follows:—

(1) We do, as a fact, desire objects other than our pleasures. But (2) Our private pleasure is for us the sole ultimate or rational desirable. But (3) Our private pleasure as such is not rational. Therefore (4) It is rational for us to desire something other than it. And because (5) Pleasure is the only thing we can desire (?); therefore

(This is, of course, not Mr. Sidgwick’s statement, but my understanding, or very likely my misunderstanding, of him; so I shall not examine it in this form.)

He takes from Utilitarianism the pleasure of all as my end, whether I happen to want it or not He takes from the popular interpretation of the moral consciousness the desire for ‘the right and reasonable as such.’ These seem to go well together, and we say, ‘I am to desire the pleasure of all as right and reasonable as such.’ This assertion being emphatically repudiated, it is necessary to prove it. How to do this? As before, isolate a man, and you will see that he perceives intuitively that it is right and reasonable for him to pursue