Page:Essays on the Constitution of the United States, published during its discussion by the people 1787-1788.djvu/246

 234 A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not the most proper tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the legislatures of the several states, who will doubt- less appoint persons of wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britian try impeachments and are also a branch of the legislature. 3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons in cases of high treason, but the congress. It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment, so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his pardon. 4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineli- gible to any other office during the time for which they are elected members of that body. This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on both sides, and it was settled in convention on full dis- cussion and deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is eligible to any office that shall have been instituted or the emoluments increased while he was a member. 5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after certain periods. But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great motiv^e to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in offices, on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for usefulness in office — but if their services are not acceptable they may be left out at any new election. 6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the members present in each branch of congress. (234)