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 is reached by man, so that his thought, even while confined, by the necessity of its original structure, to the level of the relative and the conditioned, may be exercised on the objects of a religious faith, that precisely meets the wants of the human intelligence as well as of the human conscience.

The comment on Reid’s essay on “The Liberty of Moral Agents,” is the part of the notes and dissertations that is most nearly related to the theory of religion and morality. Some account of it, and estimate of its value, as a contribution to the ceaseless controversy of metaphysicians and theologians on the mysterious topic of responsible agency, may interest those of our readers who are inclined to pay attention to the quæstiones vexatce of the nature, possibility, and explanation of free-will. We must, however, restrict our reference to this subject within very narrow limits, having already more than exhausted our space.

Sir William Hamilton, in common with his predecessors of the old Scottish school—Reid and Stewart—is a firm defender of the possibility of free-will. He maintains that the reality of a power or liberty, to will what we will, is testified to us indirectly, if not directly, by the experience of our own consciousness, and that the possession of it is essential to all activity of which the modes are properly objects of praise or blame. Such freedom is the root of man’s personality, and constitutes his power of self-control over the desires and affections that have been inserted in his mind and committed to his government.