Page:Essays in Historical Criticism.djvu/91

 In the first case we have Dr. Eells' personal recollections after twenty-three years, and in the second case after forty years, of an event about which we want precise knowledge. The defenders of the Whitman story generally take the ground: Here is the personal testimony of Gushing Eells, who was on the ground at the time, and who, as every one knows, was an honest man. You cannot have better evidence than this. It is decisive.

This contention requires us to accept Cushing Eells' memory as an instrument of equal precision with a contemporary written record, and such, at bottom, has been the demand made by the defence in the Whitman question for twenty years. It is this that has prolonged the discussion. The two sides cannot get on common ground,—the common ground of the accepted principles of modern historical criticism. Before Cushing Eells' statements can be accepted as history the comparative accuracy of his memory as a record must be ascertained. The gauge or criterion in this case must be Elkanah Walker's letter of Oct. 3, 1842, which Cushing Eells endorsed as a correct record (pp. 57–58), Elkanah Walker's diary, and Mrs. Whitman's letters (pp. 56–59). These contemporary records agree, and Cushing Eells agreed with them at the time. The degree of his divergence from those contemporary records is the measure of the divergence of his affidavit from the true history of the occurrence, whether through fallibility of memory, human enough in any case, through the subtle influence of suggestion, or for less pardonable reasons.

If we compare his two statements we find that the affidavit