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182 (a) Thales, having sometimes blamed the care taken about domestic affairs, and to get rich, was charged with talking like the fox, since he himself could not succeed therein. The desire came to him to test this, as a pastime; and having, to that end, brought down his knowledge to the service of profit and gain, he set up a commerce which in a year drew in such wealth that those most experienced in that business could scarcely in their whole lives do the like.

(c) As to what Aristotle tells us of some persons who called both this man and Anaxagoras and their like, sages and not prudent men, since they did not pay enough heed to matters of more utility, — though I do not clearly conceive this verbal distinction, — it offers no excuse for these persons; and in view of the low and necessitous lot with which they content themselves, we should rather be justified in declaring them to be neither sages nor prudent men.

(a) I leave this first reason, and think it better worth while to say that this ill-repute comes from their wretched method in their studies, and that, considering the way in which we are instructed, it is no wonder that neither scholars nor masters become more able, although they may make themselves more learned. In truth, the care and outlay of our fathers aim only at furnishing our heads with learning; concerning good judgement and virtue there is little thought. (c) Cry out to our people, of one passer-by, “Oh, the learned man!” and of another, “Oh, the excellent man!” they will not fail to turn their eyes and their respect toward the first. There should be a third exclamation: “Oh, the blockheads!” (a) We readily ask ourselves: “Does he know Greek or Latin? Does he write in verse or in prose?” but whether he has become better or more thoughtful — that is the principal thing, and that is left in the background. The enquiry should be, who is the best learned, not who is the most