Page:Essays, Moral and Political - David Hume (1741).djvu/182

 concluded, that Friendship and Virtue could not be disinterested. But the Fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous Sentiment or Passion produces the Pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a Pleasure in doing good to my Friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that Pleasure.

the second Place, it has always been found, that virtuous Men are far from being indifferent to Praise; and therefore they have been represented as a Set of vain-glorious Men, that had nothing in View but the Applauses of others. But this also is a Fallacy. 'Tis very unjust in the World, when they find any Tincture of Vanity in a laudable Action, to depreciate it upon that Account, or ascribe it entirely to that Motive. The Case is not the same with Vanity, as with other Passions. Where Avarice or Revenge enters into any seemingly virtuous Action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natural to suppose it the sole actuating Principle. But Vanity is so nearly ally'd to Virtue, and to love the Fame of virtuous Actions approaches so near the Love of virtuous Actions for their own sake, that these Passions are more capa-