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 between the parties. There is no evidence, however, that Majestic participated in the making of The Birth or that it hired Griffith or anyone else to do so.

Epoch was not formed until February 6, 1915, which was after The Birth had been made. Its Certificate of Incorporation was filed in New York State on February 8, 1915, the date of the first public exhibition of The Birth in Los Angeles. Majestic had until this time apparently been unable to fulfill its obligations to Dixon. Epoch assumed those obligations in an agreement dated June 14, 1915. Dixon released Majestic from its obligations, which were increased from $75,000 to $110,000, and accepted Epoch in its place. The two corporations, Majestic and Epoch, appear to have been closely related, since Harry E. Aitken was president of both. Their familiarity to D. W. Griffith is confirmed by Albert H. T. Banzhaf’s status as treasurer of both Epoch and DWG Corp. However, there is no evidence of any employer-employee relationship between Majestic or Epoch, on the one hand, and D. W. Griffith, on the other. There is no contract of employment, record of salary payments, or proof that Majestic or Epoch supervised or controlled Griffith in the making of the picture.

The present suit by Epoch for infringement of its renewal copyright has its genesis in the acquisition, by means of a quitclaim deed, by Killiam Shows, Inc., in 1959 of any interest owned by the estate of D. W. Griffith in the right to a statutory renewal copyright in The Birth and in other films. Killiam has distributed The Birth to theatrical and television outlets from 1959 to the present. This distribution is claimed by Epoch to have infringed its renewal copyright.

Of the various claims of error asserted by Killiam on this appeal, we turn first to the failure of the district court to grant Killiam’s motion for a directed verdict since our disposition of that issue renders it unnecessary to consider some of the other grounds urged for reversal. First, a few words must be said about the standard by which we are governed in reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Our standard is the same as that which governs the trial court. The evidence must be “such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943). See Urti v. Transport Commercial Corp., 479 F.2d 766, 768–69 (5th Cir. 1973); O’Connor v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 308 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1962). “If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the