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Lausanne lies in the fact that the world now realises that Kemalist Turkey is not the cat's-paw of Bolshevist Russia, that the Turkish Nationalists did not defeat one invader in order to put themselves at the mercy of another, and that the ambitious plan of Moscow for using Turkey as a pawn in the great game of destroying British dominion in the East is in all probability doomed to failure. It is too early yet to say that the Bolshevicks have been outwitted, but both in their silences and their speeches there are evidences of chagrin. They have found out that Lausanne is not Genoa and that, if we may thus describe him, Curzon libre is a very different person from Curzon enchaine. Chicherin had his Rapallo. Perhaps it was his final triumph.

Kemal, in his interview, said: "I am certain we shall eventually return to the traditional friendship between Turkey and Britain. I can see no obstacle thereto." With the fall of the Coalition Government, the last obstacle has gone. Lord Curzon has been firm with the Turks, but not venomous, frank but not insulting. He can afford to leave rude harangues and offensive imprecations to the congress of fallen angels now assembling at Algeciras. Indeed, all the declarations of the Foreign Secretary go to show that he is sincerely anxious to reach a durable and friendly settlement with the emissaries of Angora, and that if he is determined to uphold the rights of the British, he is equally ready to acknowledge the independence of the Turkish Empire. We are glad to see that Kemal is anxious to reciprocate, and therein he shows himself to be not only a soldier but a statesman. For his task is not yet ended; indeed it is only beginning. He has saved his country from the Greek; he must now save it from the moth and rust of economic decay. In that great task he will find Great Britain his best friend. Fethi Bey has doubtless made it clear to him how much Europe can contribute to the economic reconstruction of Turkey, and a recent statement of Mr. Morgenthau should convince him that the United States will be a reluctant and difficult lender. In the long run he has to choose between free co-operation with Great Britain and an enslavement at the mercy of Bolshevist Russia. He seems already to have chosen the better course; for the sake of his country, and ours, we hope and believe that he will persist in it.