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 1921 REVIEWS OF BOOKS 289 them. Lastly, one wonders if Wellington could have had exact knowledge of the Pyrenees if Sir John Fortescue had trouble in obtaining reliable maps to illustrate the battles. Every new account of Waterloo has its interest, and one is on the look out to find whether Sir John has anything that others have omitted. His main point is that the allies were compelled to await Napoleon's attack because of the uncertainty whether there was any war at all, until the emperor had actually crossed the Belgian frontier. His judgements on Blucher and Gneisenau are sound, and he adds that Wellington had definitely promised to fall back eastwards so as to maintain touch. He acknowledges that the allied line was much too long, and that Napoleon really did effect a surprise, so that Wellington bringing up his men piece- meal to Quatre Bras, and having no cavalry there till the evening, could hold no one responsible but himself. On the other hand, he shows that Napoleon on the Friday morning was quite ignorant of the disposition of the allies (' il se faisait des tableaux '), and in consequence gave vague orders to Ney ; in fact ' at any rate for that day Wellington's name inspired greater awe into the French than Napoleon's into the Allies '. The German charge that Wellington deliberately deceived Blucher by falsely stating the position of his own troops, and thereby inducing him to make a stand at Ligny, he dismisses with contempt ; this charge has been emphasized so strongly in order that the three bad Prussian blunders may be concealed, namely, Ziethen's failure to pass on to Wellington at once and quickly the news of the French advance on the Thursday, the bad choice of a position at Ligny, and the failure to inform Wellington of Friday's defeat and the line of Prussian retreat. He insists on the indis- cipline of the French, who were accustomed to ' live on the country ', and shows that they were bad horse-masters ; also the Prussians were unpopular in Belgium because they too wished to live at free quarters. He does not argue much about Erlon's wanderings between Quatre Bras and Ligny, nor of what Grouchy ought to have done when he heard the sound of the guns. Napoleon's delay in opening the battle on Sunday he attributes mainly to. the miserable way in which the French passed the night in the drenching rain, and had in many cases scattered to plunder. His final summing up of the great battle is as illuminating as anything that he has himself written, or as others have written, about Waterloo. Aware of Wellington's weaknesses, especially of his ' sweeping indictments ' — for instance, his constant finding fault with his artillery officers — he concludes with these words, ' The Waterloo medal is worthily unique, for it bears on the reverse, besides the name and date of the battle, the name of him without whom there would have been no victory — Wellington '. In fact, where all made mistakes Wellington made the fewest. In the preface Sir John Fortescue confesses that he may have made slips, for between the writing of the volumes and the correction of the proofs came the war. A few are to be found. In ix. 39 the 6th King's German Legion is recalled to Sicily ; on p. 45 it is still in Spain. The Brunswick contingent is not quite, as in the history of the 92nd German Regiment, its lineal descendant. There was an advanced guard battalion including four companies of Jagers, a guard or { life ' battalion, three light VOL. XXXVI. — NO. CXLII. V