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 284 REVIEWS OF BOOKS April Prince Charles without the expected help in men and munitions. The naval dispositions for the defence of Great Britain against French or Jacobite landings were not effective. In October 1745 Vernon had six sail and ten smaller craft in the Downs or off Flanders ; Byng had three sail and nine small craft off the east coast of Scotland ; and many light ships were in the home waters, in addition to our fleets in the Mediterranean and elsewhere ; yet there was no systematic observation of Dunkirk, the chief danger point in the invasion schemes, and Byng's cruises between the Firth of Forth and Flanders were futile. This work throws no fresh light on the question how many men and how much treasure the French got through to the help of Prince Charles. In vol. ii, chap. 8 (a chapter which ends rather abruptly) the author states that 100 men landed in the early spring of 1746. But the French claim that they landed in all between 1,000 and 1,200 men, and some £15,000. Lord John Drummond in November 1745 brought some 800 men of the Royal Ecossais regiment to Montrose. Certainly the navy performed meritorious and little known services in preventing the arrival of large Jacobite reinforcements. A short account is given of the reduction of Louisburg, further details of which might have been culled from the Correspondence of William Shirley, published in 1912. Thus the letters of Shirley and Pepperell show that the final decision of the French governor to surrender was due to lack of food and munitions. The author also describes the diffuse and ineffective operations of 1745-6 in the Mediterranean, the interest of which lies chiefly in the proofs of the urgent need of small craft to control the enemy's coast road along the western Biviera, and of the singular pessimism of Byng while off the Lerins Isles. This peculiarity of his was forgotten apparently at the time of his appointment in March 1756. The heed of efficient small craft has had to be learnt over again in every coastal enter- prise down to the year 1915. It is impossible here to notice the account of the operations in the East and West Indies in 1747-8, also of the two actions of the year 1747 with the fleets escorting French convoys. The influence of Anson's victory off Cape Finisterre on affairs in the East Indies is duly emphasized. The comments in vol. iii, chaps. 3, 4, on the convoy system and its limitations are of high significance. In general, the narrative invests with interest a not very interesting conflict. The author proves, inter alia, the disgraceful unpreparedness for war, the ministerial habit of shifting blame on to the admirals (Lestock, a whig, being the only exception), and the gradual growth of efficiency in 1745-8. The conclusion as to the paramount importance of sea power in repairing our military disasters is illuminating. It remains to commend the reproductions of contemporary plans and engravings of ports and fortresses, which have never been surpassed in a work of this description. Each volume contains an index, but it is scarcely adequate, there being no reference to ' Great Britain ', ' France ', ' Spain ', or ' navy ' (British, French, Spanish). There are a few slips, e. g. in vol. i, p. xiii, ' Malta ' for * Minorca ' ; ' 1749 ' for ' 1743 ' (?), on p. xviii, note ; Fort St. Louis is undiscoverable on the plan of Cartagena, p. 112 ; on p. 125, ' March 6 ' should be ' May 5 '. In vol. ii, p. 7, occurs the statement that the news of the Brest squadron putting to sea on January 26 reached Turin on