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 1921 REVIEWS OF BOOKS 283 been worse, a result of parsimony in time of peace and neglect to study the problems of naval warfare. Could anything have been more fatuous than the conflicting instructions issued to Admiral Haddock in February 1740 for the observation of Cadiz, the defence of Minorca, and oversight of the Spanish expeditions preparing in the Mediterranean ? Fortunately France delayed to strike, and Spain soon rushed into Italian adventures that diverted her strength from the maritime struggle. Thus, the blunders of the Bourbon powers cancelled ours. The Carteret administration also handled naval affairs badly, imposing on Admiral Mathews in the Mediterranean impossible tasks and blaming him when they were not fulfilled. Mathews's battle off Toulon of 11 February 1744 is fully described in vol. ii, pp. 1-52. It might have been well to prelude the narrative with a discussion of what was a possible aim of the Franco- Spanish fleets, viz. to escape from the Mediterranean, make for Brest, and assist that fleet in convoying from Dunkirk the French force held in readiness for an invasion of England. As appears from his letter of 11 January 1744, Mathews thought the allies had but one game to play, namely ' to go down the Straits '. Later on Rear- Admiral Richmond glances at that alternative ; but in view of the many occasions when the Toulon fleet started schemes of invasion, a full discussion would have been interest- ing. The knowledge of the vast issues that were at stake ought to have stilled the petty jealousies between Mathews and Lestock which marred their efforts on 11 February. The author considers that Mathews's actions before and during the battle were ineffective (as was established by the evidence given in the court martial), and that he should have pursued the enemy afterwards, but he endorses the severe censures which have been bestowed on Lestock for lagging behind with the British rear. The evidence of the Lestock court martial, summarized in vol. ii, App. iv, shows that, for a time at least, he hauled his wind and deliberately refrained from supporting the centre. Yet the court martial on Mathews censured that admiral for hoisting the signal to engage the enemy before the line was formed. The author states (vol. ii, p. 54) that Mathews was not cashiered for breaking the line, and it is well to correct the widespread error that it was this alleged offence alone which ruined Mathews's career. But article iv of the charges against him was to the effect noticed above, and it was carried by seventeen votes to two. It must therefore rank prominently among the decisions of the court as to ' divers breaches in his duty ' which led to the adverse verdict. The contrast between this harsh finding and the infamous devices adopted in the Lestock court martial to screen that officer gains in emphasis from the evidence presented in the appendices to vol. ii. In reviewing a work that is packed with information, it may seBm hypercritical to ask for more ; but the reader will probably regret the severe restraint which cuts short the account of Anson's ' predatory ' voyage and of his subsequent reforms at the admiralty. Also more impor- tance might have been assigned to the action of Captain Piercy Brett in the Lion (58) with the Elizabeth (64) escorting the Pretender to Scotland on the sloop Doutelle. The sloop escaped, but the Elizabeth was so crippled in a five hours' fight that by night she crept back to port, and so left