Page:English Historical Review Volume 37.djvu/451

1922 true to the Pitt tradition, also urges the aggrandizement of Prussia west of the Rhine, of Austria and Sardinia in Italy, and of Holland in Flanders. Wellington's triumph at Vittoria strengthens his hand at the crisis of the armistice of June-August 1813, and, inter alia, he now waives the projected mediation of Alexander between Great Britain and the United States. But he accepts Austria's offer of mediation between the allies and Napoleon, in the belief that the latter will overreach himself. He also encourages the Habsburg power by the offer of a loan of £500,000 on condition of her drawing the sword—'we cannot advance money for armistices'; and with his customary loyalty to the Spaniards and Portuguese, he insists then, as also later, on the satisfaction of their claims. His outline of a general league against Napoleon (dated 18 September 1813) is a clear forecast of the famous compact of Chaumont (1 March 1814), whereby, with infinite tact and patience, he cemented the Grand Alliance. In view of the importance of that treaty, its articles should have been presented fully and not in the meagre summary given in a note on p. 165. A short account should also have been given of the previous almost fatal disputes, the healing of which is among Castlereagh's chief titles to fame. Great interest attaches to the parliamentary disputes with Whitbread and Mackintosh, as set forth in Appendix II. Castlereagh disposed of the 'foul calumnies' of the former; but the latter found weak places in the ministerial case, e. g. Norway and Genoa. 'This was not the war for the success of which I offered my most ardent prayers,' said Sir James; and the ministerial replies of expediency or necessity were not convincing.

In the introduction (otherwise admirable) one or two points are open to question. It is hard measure on Cathcart to call him 'a rather stupid man who lacked both insight and energy'. He was not equal to the tremendous demands of the time (who was?); but on one occasion at least, he successfully opposed Russian tactics; and Castlereagh's references to him were often complimentary. It is also rather sweeping to call Sir Robert Wilson 'a wonderfully brave and foolish soldier'. In 1812 he fathomed and exposed the delinquencies of Kutusoff; at Leipzig on 16 October, his dispositions were very able; and, in general, his vagaries were political and of later date. Finally, it is incorrect to state (p. xl) that we had not shrunk from war with the United States, in order to preserve our maritime claims 'in their most vigorous and brutal form'. Mr. Webster must know that the British government had given way on the chief points at issue, on 17 June, one day before the United States declared war. Had a submarine cable existed, there need have been no war. In any case, it was the act of the bellicose sections at Washington that precipitated the rupture. There is an awkward misprint, 'Illinau' for 'Illyrian', on p. 6, note. It is also to be wished that some of the earlier documents should have been omitted in favour of a fuller treatment of the crises of February 1814 and the earlier part of 1815. Most deplorable of all is the absence of an index. But these are slight defects in an admirable work.