Page:English Historical Review Volume 35.djvu/470

 462 REVIEWS OF BOOKS July Channel fleet on the side of our detachments in the narrow seas remote from the enemy soon became apparent. The ships composing the Chaimel fleet had been outclassed by the Dreadnought policy, and were gradually diverted to the convoy and other secondary services. With the grand fleet based two hundred miles north of the best flanking position, and, owing to the want of protected anchorages, obliged to remain under way or even to leave the North Sea, and with the German fleet held back in port, the detachments on either side were much exposed. The different uses made of the opportunity are to be noted. The British with battle cruisers and small craft attacked the German detachments, which were unsupported by their fleet, for instance in the action of the Heligoland Bight. The Germans did not make sorties in force against the British detachments, although good opportunities offered thus to bring on a battle, but attacked the British coast towns, such as Lowestoft, with battle cruisers, using only submarines and mine-layers against armed ships. These coast raids were probably undertaken with a political object. At any rate, their military aim was unsoimd. The numerous examples given of the interaction of the land war and the sea war merit particular notice. The operations at sea were deflected from time to time to counter any possible attack on the military transports and supply-ships. This deflexion was legitimate in that the navy was still used against the enemy's armed ships. But, when naval resources were diverted froni the sea to the land and were used against the enemy's army, the deflexions seem to have been of questionable value. For example, the formation of the naval division and its diversion to Antwerp, the Ostend expedition, the use of the naval air service on a land front instead of over the sea, the attention given to armoured cars and tanks — in all these cases the thought and resources of the navy were diverted to the land war. Later, the diversion became still more serious when the ship-building programme was influenced by the war on land, as in the building of the monitors, and the navy was used in conjunction with an insuflficient army to overthrow the Turkish army at Gallipoli. The result was seen later in a lack of efficient antidotes to the submarine, which should have been the first care. In the Mediterranean the problem was comparatively simple. On 4 August 1914 Great Britain entered the war, the neutrality of Italy was announced, but Austria had not yet declared war with either France or Great Britain. The opposing forces were, on the one side, the French fleet and the British squadron of three battle cruisers with other ships ; on the other side, one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser, with the probable immediate addition of the Austrian navy, which was much inferior to the French fleet. The Anglo-French aim was to destroy the German ships and to watch the Austrian fleet. The German aim was to evade battle with a superior force. The intended destination of the German ships was unknown, but the French transports carrying troops from Algeria to France, if unprotected, would have been the most tempting one. This was realized by the French admiral, who seemingly on his own initiative placed his ships alongside the transports, although his original instructions are said (pp. 56-9) to have been to seek out the enemy with his whole fleet and