Page:English Historical Review Volume 35.djvu/469

 1920 REVIEWS OF BOOKS 461 battle or combat. If that is not possible, each side aims at neutralizing their action by the threat of battle or by evasion, and with that object the stronger seeks to take up such a position that he can watch or forestall the movements of, and thus force a battle on, the weaker, who on his part tries to evade or postpone one. Further, as a secondary aim, during the interval which necessarily elapses before the decision by battle, each side tries to weaken the armed force of its opponent, and with that object seeks to stop his seaborne trade and his military transports, to intercept his intelligence, and to seize his maritime bases of supply and intelligence. Thus, the armed ships and attendant aircraft are the dominating factor, and every operation should be directed to destroy, or to neutralize, or to weaken those of the enemy, and not to protect anything directly. Protection and safety are reached through battle or the threat of battle. It should further be remembered that the military aim at sea is constantly liable to be deflected by political and economic influences and by the influence of the war on land. To prevent these conflicting claims leading to unsound military action at sea is the ever-present difficulty. The armed ships round which the action centred during the war were first the massed fleets in the North Sea, and secondly the detachments in that and other seas. With the exception of Tirpitz, the German leaders were not willing to risk an immediate fleet-action with the possi- bility of victory and winning the war, because defeat at sea would have jeopardized their position in the Baltic and hastened their defeat on land. They hoped that the use of the mine and torpedo would reduce the superiority against them and give them later a more favourable oppor- tunity. Since the Germans refused an immediate battle, the British aim in the North Sea was reduced to watching the German fleet with a view to destroying it, if opportunity offered, or, failing that, to limiting its move- ments by the threat of battle and thus preventing interference with the detachments of light craft engaged in stopping the German trade through the northern exits, in covering the transit across the narrow seas of troops and supplies to France, and generally in the struggle with the German light craft of all descriptions within the North Sea and its approaches. This required the British fleet to be so placed as to be able to interpose between the German fleet and its base if it moved either to the northern exits or south into the narrow seas, that is past the Texel- Yarmouth line. The Firth of Forth was a position offering these possibilities. No German fleet could advance into either of the areas mentioned and return, as was absolutely necessary, without risk of battle on disadvantageous terms, if the flanking fleet based on the Forth meant to fight. Furthermore, the German light surface craft could not advance into the narrow seas and return without risk of battle with a flanking force based on Harwich. The theory of the flanking fleet is not new, but seems to have been forgotten, although attention was drawn to it before the outbreak of war. The plan actually adopted was to stop the German trade by holding the northern exits in force, and to contain the German main fleet, not with a flanking fleet in the Forth, but with the grand fleet based on Scapa Flow and a Channel fleet in the English Channel. War experience gradually showed the advantages of the Forth as a flanking base, and the futility of the