Page:England & Russia in Central Asia,Vol-I.djvu/129

109 BUSSIA'S military strength in central ASIA. 109 Therefore, the army of Turkestan, even when reinforced from Orenburg, is utterly incapable of undertaking those extended operations which are necessary to carry Eussian arms to the banks of the Indus. Its sphere is a more limited one, and must remain so as long as its communications with Europe are so imperfect as they are at present. If we stand aside, it could capture Merv, it could give a king to Afghan Turkestan. It could — had it chosen to strike in, as it was in honour bound, with Cabul — have made Afghan resistance more protracted. But for the invasion of India it as yet possesses neither the numbers nor the organization that are necessary. A bold policy in Afghanistan exposes at once the actual weakness of Russia's power in Central Asia, which is of too recent a growth to have become firm and consolidated. So far we have only dealt with the forces that Russia can dispose of from Turkestan — that is to say, of those which recognise in General Kaufmann their superior officer. But this is only one phase of Russian activity in Asia — certainly the most prominent, but in many respects the least important for India and our- selves. We have now to consider that quarter of Asiatic events of which the Caspian is the base, and which was the original point from which Russia aspired to realise her designs against India, and which for a time forgotten has returned to a foremost place in public interest, mainly through the energy of General Lomakine. In November 1873 the Grand Duke Michael, Lieutenant of the Caucasus, acting, as it is believed, under the instigation of this general.