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104 104 ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA. lery, only two batteries — sixteen guns — being attached to it. Now it must not be supposed that the Orenburg army is an idle army — far from it, it is a very active one. Its duties are numerous and of various kinds. It lias to garrison a vast tract of country ; and it has to maintain order among the numerous and naturally very turbulent Kirghiz clans which hold the southern portion of this district. The Governor- General of Orenburg would raise strong objections to the weak- ening of his force. Even during the insignificant campaign against Khiva he insisted upon troops being despatched into the Ust Urt plateau to prevent the Kirghiz tribes making any inroad from that direction. In any more extended operation that necessity would still exist, and with double force. Events on the Hindoo Koosh would so far be reflected in the northern wastes of Ust Urt, that the Kirghiz of that quarter would seize the opportunity of any relaxing in Russia's vigilance to plunder and to ravage. It is improbable that the effective strength of the Orenburg army is more than fifty thousand men, and of that number not more than one-fifth could be spared to reinforce the Turkestan army. In artillery, in which arm both the Turkestan -army — sixty-four guns — and the Orenburg — sixteen guns — are extremely weak, no addition could be made from Orenburg. The Orenburg army, therefore, in so far as it is a reserve to the Turkestan, is a very insuJ0B.cient one. It can scarcely do more than fulfil its own duties, and holding as it does the gateway to Northern and Cen- tral Asia, its garrison cannot be unduly weakened.