Page:England & Russia in Central Asia,Vol-I.djvu/117

97 EUSSIA's military strength in central ASIA. 97 taken here approximate very closely to the actual strengtli of the Russian army. The peace duties of this foxce are by no means trivial. It has to garrison an enormous tract of country, and to keep in order the Khokandians — one of the most turbulent races in Central Asia. In war time those duties would become more arduous. Let Russia take never so many pre- cautions against sedition, the advance of a large army across the Oxus must be the signal for local disturb- ances that would require to be promptly repressed. They could not be repressed if the province were denuded of troops ; and with each day of success or impunity their importance would increase, and from being only an annoyance they would become a danger. It would, therefore, be impossible for the Russian authorities to withdraw the whole Turkestan army from the province, and, indeed, it must remain a matter of individual opinion how far it would be pru- dent to weaken that garrison so long as there existed such numerous causes of internal danger as there are at present, or so long as a semi-independent power like Bokhara retained an army which might, under possible contingencies, refuse to recognise the com- mands of a too-accommodating prince. It would certainly be extremely hazardous to take more than half that force away from its duties ; and last summer barely a third was sent forward to Djam. Under the most favourable circumstances, therefore, it would be impossible for Russia to weaken the Semiretchinsk garrison by a man, and from the gar- risons of Tashkent, Samarcand, and Ferghana it 7