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 be vigorously developed. The attractiveness of using space satellites for military reconnaissance is also obvious, provided practical methods for achieving this difficult task can be developed. This, too, should be vigorously pursued. But improved communication and reconnaissance, of themselves, do not give overwhelming military advantage to either side. We are not going to surrender suddenly to the Russians because they can talk to each other better than we can—or even because they can see us better than we can see them. They can do that now!

The question is: What new weapon systems does space provide, or what new methods of using present weapons does it promise?

It is on these questions that our ignorance is so great that only speculations can be made. But speculations are being made very vigorously!

For example, does a space vehicle promise to be vastly superior to an ICBM when it comes to placing weapons accurately and surely on distant targets?

My own opinion is that at present no techniques are known by which this superiority can be attained. An ICBM can be made so accurate, so reliable, and (when suitable launching sites are available) so relatively impregnable that space vehicles have a very long way to go to equal them, much less surpass them. Space satellites in orbit are not especially invulnerable; there are a number of methods of observing and destroying them. While they are in orbit, they are extremely difficult to control—i.e., to change orbit. They tend to stay in the same orbit forever, and one must wait patiently for the earth to turn underneath them for a given target to come into position. Finally, the ejection of a weapon from a space satellite with the proper speed and direction and timing to hit a given target accurately is an enormously difficult task for which no present technology is anywhere near adequate or satisfactory. New and better technologies may someday come, and a development effort is certainly necessary. But we need not get hysterical about space-satellite weapons yet.

What about those who say it is of great importance for us to capture the moon as a military base? Here is the ultimate in the "high ground" the military man always seeks!

A long and very learned-looking article in The Air University Quarterly Review last summer set forth the arguments why the moon should be "sovereign U.S. territory"—our 51st state presumably. If it was our territory, we could tell the Russians to stay away, and it would then be a "tremendously hard" missile base. No one can quarrel with that. All we have to do is figure out a way to keep the Russians off, orV even more important,: keep them from getting there first!

But even if the moon is shared with other nations, the article says, our missile bases would still be hard to see (from the earth, that is) and hard to destroy with nuclear weapons, especially if the bases were underground. Again, no one can deny that. But bases in Iowa or Texas or Maine or Alaska would be hard to see and destroy, too—if they were underground. And these places are much closer to Moscow than the moon is. Viewed from the moon, Moscow is on a spinning ball, about 240,000 miles away and moving (relative to the moon, or the moon relative to it) at about 2,000 miles per hour. There is nothing scientifically impossible about developing guidance and computing equipment able to do the job. But I'll predict we can hit Moscow more often and more cheaply from Iowa—for the rest of this century, at least.

The clinching argument for a missile base on the moon appears to be that the acceleration of gravity is only 1/6 as great there as on the earth, and hence the velocity of escape is only 1.5 miles per second instead of 7 miles per second. Splendid! But just how does the missile get to the moon in the first place? And what about the crew, the equipment, the fuel, the food, water, oxygen, the bulldozers that will operate in a vacuum, etc., etc. They have to be lifted from the earth—and then landed very gently on the moon before the missile can be shot off. It will take many times as much fuel to get to Moscow via the moon as to go directly.

Finally, the article suggests that, in order to obtain good observation of the earth, so we can see what the Soviets are doing and can guide our missiles to the target, we should erect a 200-inch telescope on the moon! I hope I can return from the grave the day that the Palomar telescope of the moon is dedicated, it will be a great day for the science of astronomy. But the task of putting a 200-inch mirror on a rocket and delivering it safely to the moon strikes me as being one which presents certain difficulties. I breathed a sigh of relief the day our 200-inch mirror safely completed the 130-milc journey from Pasadena to Talomar Mountain.

I have great confidence in the skill of American engineers, you understand. I just think some of these things may take a little time. Say 100 or 200 years.

Please forgive me if I express certain doubts as to whether lethal military operations in—or from—space are an immediate probability. But again I emphasize that further research and development is justified. New ideas and new inventions may change the picture. I just don't like to bet billions of dollars on discoveries not yet made.

If military security is not obviously or immediately the most essential rehson for conducting space exploration and development, what then about the scientific values?

II. SCIENTIFIC VALUE

Here is where I would like to give a complete lecture on the scientific value of space research. To explore the earth, the moon, Venus, Mars, and the great mysteries of interplanetary space presents problems February 1960