Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/793

 FREE T 11 A D E 757 mutation of tithes took no account of any other kind of agricultural produce than the three principal cereals, although in that commutation interests, lay and clerical, of not less, in capital value, than 150 millions sterling were involved. Even here, however, the tithe-owner has suffered no loss by the change, for though the price of wheat has fallen, the decline has been more than compensated by the upward movement in the price of barley and oats. Since the repeal of the corn laws, the tithe rent charge has been 2| per cent, above par value. Far greater, however, has been the consequence of the change on the price of other agricultural products, especially meat and dairy produce, the value of which has nearly, if not quite, doubled during the last forty years. Now this result was anticipated in a rough manner by the shrewder heads among landowners and occupiers, and therefore reconciled many whose inte rests might seem to be imperilled to a change which, while it threatened a superficial and temporary loss, might easily determine in a permanent and increasing profit. And finally, the farmers learnt by demonstration and experience that, whoever might gain by restrictions on the trade in food, they did not ; and that in some unexplained manner the machinery of a law which seemed to be intended for their profit either turned out to be a loss, or was wholly in adequate to secure the results intended. And yet, though the people were starved, manufacture was unprofitable, foreign trade was declining, and the revenue had been con stantly insufficient for the expenses of government, it needed the catastrophe of the Irish famine in order to give effect to an agitation more prolonged, more costly, and more popular than any which has happened in the history of a civilized nation, to effect a peaceful repeal of laws which did no person whatever any good, which were no advantage what ever to the parties for whose special benefit they were enacted, and which inflicted prodigious losses on the two most important classes in the community, the producer and the consumer. The history of the movement which led to the repeal of the English corn laws in 1846 has been sketchedat some length, in order to show that if, in a case where the impolicy and the in jury of the Jaw was proved to demonstration, it was so arduous a task to effect a change, the difficulty is far greater in those countries where it is not possible to array such for midable forces against the continuance of a protective sys tem. It is easy to show that the law of prices above referred to applies with the same cogency to the collective industries of any country whatever as it does to such industries as necessarily supply varied products, and that any artificial attempts to direct the home and foreign trade of a country into special channels is sure to bring about a factitious ex altation of one set of values, and a factitious depreciation of another set of values. Various Governments in Europe, in the New World, and in the British colonies have striven to start special industries. They will succeed in the at tempt, however injudicious the attempt may be, if there be a demand for the product which they determine to artificially foster. But from two consequences they cannot escape. The consumer of the produce thus stimulated into an un natural or premature existence must pay for the policy of the Government in enhanced prices, and the producer of goods must offer more of his goods for sale in order to effect an exchange in that which the Government permits to be imported, but hinders either in kind or quality with a pro tective tax. But it by no means follows that, when the consequence of this policy is exhibited, when its mischief is demonstrated, when its futility is exposed, nay, even when it is proved that, on pretence of doing a special service to the Government and the people which it is in tended to aid, it deliberately gives the maximum of advan tage to the foreign exporter, and inflicts the maximum of loss on the domestic consumer, the country which makes the discovery will reverse its policy. For, apart from the considerations which have been dwelt on above, the fact, namely, that the revocation of a protective duty which is efficient in raising prices must be followed by a loss to the producer, the existing practice may always be defended by a number of plausible arguments, held, it should be admitted, with perfect good faith by those who promulgate them, however shallow and erroneous they may seem to others, whose passions and interests are not stimulated to defend such a practice. With the same sincerity of convic tion the defence may be further supplemented by appeals to an irrelevant patriotism, or by an imputation of sinister motives on the part of assailants, or by a bold assertion that the social condition of other countries differs radically from that of the district in which protection is maintained. And finally, in all political and economical movements, it must be repeated, the forces of defence are far more manageable than those of attack. For, as the defenders are in posses sion, and the sentiment of civilized societies is always favour able to existing interests, the defence can urge, if not with truth, at least with great effect, that it is dangerous to re linquish what is actual, and under which society has long existed, for that which is hypothetical, problematical, experi mental ; and it can always threaten its assailants with the indefinite danger of the discontent which may come from a great and far-reaching change. Those who remember the history of the free-trade movement in England are well aware that all these expedients were used against the promoters of the movement, though the position which the defence occupied was singularly untenable. But it is certain that in countries which have adopted protection the defence will be more stubborn, and the struggle more protracted than it was in England more than thirty years ago. And in illus tration of this fact, it may be observed that it took all the forces at the disposal of the personal Government of the second French empire, and all the threats of a power which was then at the highest of its reputation for military prowess and domestic control, to impose upon the French manufacturers, even iu view of great reciprocal advantages to the most important and natural among the domestic industries of France, the very moderate concessions of the commercial treaty with England. The Government of Napoleon actually went to the length of informing the iron manufacturers of France that they would be held personally responsible for the effects of any discontent that might arise by any act of theirs towards their workmen which might be taken in view of the contemplated changes ; and the menace was effectual, because it was not doubted that it would be followed by action, and that this action would be irresistible. As the origin of protective enactments was a desire that a nation should profit by the losses of another nation, and as the extension of this feeling is the primary motive of war, so a permanent or persistent division of international interests, with the object of sustaining or promoting muni cipal or rather particular interests, is a fruitful source of international difficulties. It is, in fact, what Thucydides calls, speaking of the caution with which commercial inter course was carried on in the days which preceded the great Peloponnesian war, an unproclaimed war. Many forms of patriotism, falsely so called, have inflicted grievous and ineffaceable injuries on mankind. The war for empire be tween the old and new notions of government, which was at the root of the Peloponnesian war, was the ruin of Greek civilization. But each of the combatants appealed to the patriotism of race, and the defence of repugnant institutions. The Thirty Years War threw back Europe for two centuries, and left behind it memories, jealousies, policies, the effects of which are even now dominant in the attitude of the nrerit