Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/623

 CHANGES IN EUROPE.] FRANCE 587 airy Dg- 1 and uce. Europe was very far from being finally pacified by the peace of Aix-la Chapelle ; on the contrary, every one seemed to see rents and holes in it through which lie might win new advantages. Frederick the Great was no doubt con tent with it, and so was England ; others, however, were far from such feelings. Maria Theresa had reluctantly set her hand to the cession of Silesia, and scanned the horizon for help to enable her to recover that important duchy. France was almost as uneasy, for England had gained ad vantages which were in fact her losses ; and she, too, hoped ere long to reverse the decisions of the treaty. In India her prospects seemed bright, under the brilliant leadership of Dupleix ; in North America the peace had left very serious matters still unsettled, and it was hardly likely that any court save that of the sword could decide the diffi cult questions still open, questions as to the limits of the Acadia which had been ceded to England ; vital questions as to the connexion between Canada and Louisiana, both still French territories ; questions as to the islands off the coasts of America, the ownership and possession of which had been left undetermined. Acadia had been ceded with out any definite statement as to whether the cession carried any portion of the mainland as well as the peninsula of Nova Scotia; and England claimed the territory as far as the shore of the St Lawrence river. This was a smaller matter ; the question as to the relation between Canada and Louisiana involved no less than the ultimate possession of all North America. For while England held the coast, and hoped to combine the wealth of agriculture with that of commerce, she had always behind her the long line of French possessions and claims, which interfered with her colonizing development, and threatened to push her back to the sea. For France had the Canadian lakes, the valley of the Ohio, and that of the Mississippi ; she had communi cation with the sea on the north at the estuary of the St Lawrence, on the south in the Gulf of Mexico. Were she to secure the connexion through this long line, the English colonies would be terribly straitened and endangered ; the French forts along the Ohio seemed a perpetual menace to English interests. Consequently the doors were scarcely shut on the negotiators at Aix-la-Chapelle, when fresh discussions began to spring up, and conferences were held, in a more or less angry tone, at Paris. In 1754 England, thinking that France was only lengthening out the dispute because she hoped to strengthen her navy for a fresh struggle, suddenly made war, without a proper declaration, and fell on French ships and forts whenever she could capture them. It was a high-handed and offensive proceeding. In India also an undeclared war was going on between the officers and forces of the East India Company and the French under Dupleix, which brought out the latent power of that young civilian, Clive, and ended in 1754 in the recall of Dupleix, and in a peace, or at least a cessation of warfare, between the rivals on the Indian shores. It was quite plain that before long this state of half-warfare must develop into a more serious struggle. To that also the whole movement of European politics speedily began to tend. For it was not only at Paris and London that negotiators were busy in these years ; the Austrian court, eager for revenge on Prussia, and led by a strong and dangerous statesman, Kaunitz, was looking hither and thither for new alliances. The world had grown weary of the old lines of opinion, the old rules of policy, the old relations of courts. Kaunitz deemed himself the chosen instrument of a new departure, which would rearrange the map of Europe, and restore its proper authority to Austria and the empire. This statesman, father of modern diplo macy, and more especially of that side of it which has ever since ^been cultivated at Vienna, had administered the Austrian Netherlands in the last years of the late war, and had represented Austria at the congresses of 1748. In 1750 1750-55. he was sent as ambassador to Versailles, and, as he watched the manners and temper of French society, persuaded him self that he saw his way to new combinations which might be very profitable for his mistress. The experience of Aix- la-Chapelle had convinced him that England was not trust worthy when her interests clashed with those of Austria. He saw how his country had suffered by the peace ; it seemed to him that France would be a far better ally than England. Hitherto France had steadily played the part of friend and protector of the smaller North-German states, in their struggle against the dominance of the house of Austria, this was a natural and necessary result of the secular rivalry against the Austro-Spanish power. Now, however, Prussia had taken up the post of champion of North-German interests and opinions ; whereas France, by her new Bourbon relations in Spain, and her support of the Jacobites against the Hanoverians in England, had entirely changed her ground. She was far more likely to find a Changes cordial friend in south than in north Germany ; she had E- nothing to fear from Austria ; she had much to lose or gain 10 lf al ^ in the north] the Hanoverian interests of the reigning dynasty in England led the Guelfs to oppose the advance of France on the Rhine ; the jealousies on other sides between France and England all tended in the same direction, the direction of compelling France to look for new friends, and to abandon her ancient policy. Prussia became the inevit able ally of England; France began to look towards Austria. The disagreements between Austria and Holland as to the barrier-towns in the Belgian country naturally threw the sea-powers together ; for neither Holland nor England cared to see Austria on that side, or to find a new rival rising up at Antwerp. Now, all political alliances are based rather on interest than on sentiment ; and when it grew tolerably clear that the interests of England and France and those of England and Austria had become widely divergent, it became equally clear that new com binations must come. Austria was altogether implacable towards Prussia; England, or rather the English court, in its anxiety for Hanover, felt that Prussia could be no rival, and might be a good friend. Prussia was not a sea-power, and was a very near neighbour to Hanover. And so, when Kaunitz tried to persuade the [English cabinet that it ought to join Austria in a war for the recovery of Silesia, he found so cool a reception that he at once turned else where. His knowledge of France taught him how to suc ceed there; it must be by appeasing and interesting Madame de Pompadour; and the king of Prussia had lately offended not only her but her parasite the Abbe&quot; Bernis by his unpleasant trick of plain speaking ; and the political independence of late years asserted for Prussia was also highly distasteful at Versailles. He knew that if he could overcome the reluctance of Louis XV., who clung to the older ideas of French policy, and persuade him also that Austria could be a good friend against England, he might succeed in reversing the political conditions of Europe, and perhaps win Silesia back for his mistress. He easily per suaded Madame de Pompadour ; her influence was his from 1751; but the king was slow to move. Not till 1755, when the insults of England to the flag of France were too great to be borne, did he determine to accept the good offices of Kaunitz, and to threaten Hanover. England at onco drew towards Prussia, Hanover being the bond of union between them. While the two Catholic powers formed their alliance together, and Madame de Pompadour, as men noticed with a smile, showed quite a fervour of devotion, which seemed not in the least incompatible with her moral position, the two Protestant powers, England and Prussia, set themselves to resist the Catholic movement, and, if possible, to secure the triumph of toleration in northern