Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/617

 SUCCESSION WAR.] FRANCE 581 even preferred the acceptance of the will by Louis XIV. to the cause for which William, with his larger views of European politics, desired to fight ; and Philip of Anjou became king of Spain. Louis XIV. protested at once against the view that the two crowns of France and Spain should never be united, though he had used their certain separation as an argument to influence Spanish opinion, and reserved the rights of Philip V. to the French crown ; in 1714 there was only one person, and he a sickly child, be tween him and the hereditary right to the crown of France. Though war did not follow at once, it could not long be delayed, and meanwhile Louis XIV. did all he could to strengthen himself. Early in 1701 he made an agreement with the elector of Bavaria, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, and ejected the Dutch troops from the barrier fortresses. It was a haughty denial of the validity of the peace of Ryswick ; and, in open violation of the spirit of the same treaty, he soon after, on the death of James II., recognized James Stewart, his eldest son, the &quot;Old Pretender,&quot; the &quot; Chevalier de Saint George,&quot; as king of England, under title of James III. About the same time the Germans and Dutch, thoroughly alarmed, signed at the Hague a great treaty, &quot; the Grand Alliance,&quot; with William III., and bound themselves to restore the Netherlands barrier, to regain the Milanese territory for the empire, to win for the emperor all the Italian and Mediterranean pos sessions of Spain, to attack and take the Spanish Indies. The emperor, without delay, sent Prince Eugene, his greatest general, to begin the war in Italy; the double-dealing Victor Amadeus, the skilful strategy of the prince, the excellence of the fresh troops under his command, were toe much for Catinat, who was obliged to fall back. Louis, who never had liked his best general, was not at all sorry, and sent Villeroy, one of his worst, to supersede him. Villeroy speedily justified his choice by losing the battle of Chiari (1701); almost the whole of the Mau- tuan territory fell into Prince Eugene s hands. After the surprise of Cremona, early in 1702, Veridome, who, in dolent as he was, was a good general, replaced Villeroy, and by the indecisive battle of Luzzara (August 1702) re covered some of the lost foothold of France in Italy. Ere this war had broken out on all sides. The death of William III. and the accession of Queen Anne, early in 1702, made no change in the arrangements of the allies for their four campaigns, the Italian campaign, which was least in importance ; the Belgian, in which they aimed at the fortresses ; the German, chiefly on the Danube ; the Spanish, in which the archduke Charles struggled for the crown. Catinat, transferred to the Rhine, and ill-supported by an unfriendly court at home, the ill-will of which was reflected in the conduct of his officers, could not make head against the prince of Baden, who crossed the Pvhine and took Landau. Catinat, who soon after this sent in his re signation, was coldly allowed to withdraw, and France thus lost the most prudent and capable of her remaining generals. The elector of Bavaria was the only strong and true friend the courts of France and Spain had in this war : he bore the brunt of the early periods of it. Louis of Baden had occupied in force the strong elbow of hills and forests between the valley of the Rhine and that of the Danube, thereby threatening the elector, and hindering him from joining the French. His position was ver} r strong ; yet Villars, who was ambitious and lively, and longed for the marshal s staff, determined to attempt the task of driv ing him out. He accordingly crossed the Rhine, and attacked the Germans at Friedlingen (14th October 1702), and by good fortune rather than by skill defeated them. His success, however, was not such as to enable him to shake Louis of Baden; he could not even penetrate into the Black Forest. In the Netherlands Marlborough strength ened his position by taking a group of towns, and keeping 1702-4. Marshal BounMers and the duke of Burgundy actively em ployed, as they retreated before him from point to point. The defeat of the French fleet in Vigo Boy, and the out burst of the Protestants of the Cevennes mountains, both added largely to the difficulties of France. In the winter Marlborough enlarged his base of operations by occupying the electorate of Cologne, and early in 1703 he had cleared out all the Spaniards in his rear or on his flank. Before the end of 1703 everything was ready for that great ad vance which was destined to raise his fame to its highest point. And it was time that he went, as he said, &quot; to teach the Germans how to beat the French ;&quot; for in 1703 Villars had been very successful in Germany ; he had forced his way through the Black Forest, and had joined the elector of Bavaria in the upper valley of the Danube ; and the elector had already driven the Austrians down the valley to below Passau. A threatened attack on Vienna came to nothing. Towards the end of the campaign the elector and Villars drove Louis of Baden from his positions, and defeated Styrum at Hochstatt ; Tallard, with the army which had watched Louis of Baden in the lines of Stolhofen, returned to the Rhine and took Old Breisach and Landau, as well as won the battle of Spires. On this side the war had been very favourable to France, an advantage against which the transfer of Savoy and Portugal to the side of the allies had to be set. These changes, and the continued resistance of the Marll*&amp;gt;r Huguenots in the south of France, enabled Marlborough to ough s arrange with Prince Eugene his great campaign of 1704, in ca ~ a conference near Heilbronn. Here the so-called triumvi- rate, Marlborough, Eugene, and Heinsius England, the empire, and the Dutch, laid their plans to neutralize the French advantages in Bavaria, and by cutting the line of their communications, to relieve Vienna from all anxiety. The peril to Austria was great, for the French and Bavarians formed a long unbroken line from the Vosges to Passau. Quite early, therefore, in 1704, Marlborough began to move ; he misled Villeroy and Boufflers, who were watching him, and crossed the Rhine at Cologne, with a view to joining Prince Eugene, who held the famous Stolhofen lines. The French and Bavarians drew together to meet this formidable attack ; the elector entrenched himself near Donauworth ; Villeroy and Tallard observed the Stolhofen lines. Marlborough, with Prussian and other help, passed through Mainz, crossed the Black Forest, and came out in the Danube valley, join ing Louis of Baden near Ulm. Their united forces defeated the elector and took Donauworth. Thus doing, they had placed themselves between him and his French allies, Marsin and Tallard; and Marlborough, feeling his commu nications to be critical, and rather alarmed as to his position, drew back up the Danube, till he had effected a junction with Prince Eugene. The elector had also joined his French friends, and they lay in wait for their antagonists in a strong position on the left bank of the Danube, between Hochstatt and Blenheim. There, on the 13th August 1704, was The fought the great battle of Blenheim. The French and battle of Bavarians had the superiority in numbers and position ; Blen &quot; this, however, they neutralized by faulty arrangements, and by shutting up a large force in the village of Blenheim. The battle was hot and heavy, and the loss to the allies, who were the assailants, great. Eugene made little impression on the lines, but towards evening Marlborough succeeded in breaking through Tallard s position. Thereby he cut the enemy in two, and the French cavalry fled in panic towards Hochstatt. Many were drowned in the Danube; Marsin and the elector drew off in good condition towards the Black Forest ; Tallard was a prisoner, his whole force either dis persed or taken. It was the worst mishap that had ever befallen Louis XIV. Bavaria was entirely subdued ; Aus-