Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/606

 570 F K A N C E HISTORY. 1638-42. were to die, as seemod only too likely, he would continue to guide the fortunes of the state under a regency; the hopes and future of Gaston of Orleans were reduced to nothing. The fall of Breisach at the end of the year, which placed the upper Rhine completely in the hands of Bernard of Saxe- Weimar, though it might not be altogether grate ful to Richelieu, who feared the skill and abilities of the ambitious and patriotic German, proved to the world that the Austrian power was worn out. The death of Father Joseph at the same moment caused the cardinal no small embarrassment ; his place was taken by the supple Mazarin. The death of Bernard, just as his plans seemed on the point of being realized juat as he thought he had made for himself a principality on the Rhine to check the progress as much of France as of Austria, came very oppor tunely for Richelieu. There was now no one engaged in the war who could interfere with his objects ; he got pos session of the army which had served Bernard so well, the best body of fighting men the war had produced after the Swedes had been exhausted ; he also seized on the districts in their hands. In 1641 the count of Soissons went over to the Spaniards and invaded northern France. He fell in battle, and the attempt failed. In Germany and Italy the strength of France was more and more distinctly shown. The last battles of the Thirty Years War were chiefly won by Frenchmen; the cession of Sedan by the duke of Bouillon, and the capture of Perpignan close to the Spanish border,. were &quot;the last present made by Richelieu to France&quot; (Michelet). The one helped to secure her northern, the other her southern frontier. The cardinal s last struggle for supremacy took place now. In 1641 the parliament of Paris was humbled, and its ambition to rival the English parliament rudely destroyed; in 1642 the conspiracy of Cinq Mars gave expression to the old and undying hatred of the court for Richelieu. The plot was detected and un ravelled as soon as it was spun, and Cinq Mars with his friend De Thou perished on the scaffold at Lyons. After this, all were prostrate and obedient ; the court party was utterly foiled, its chief members dead or exiled ; the car dinal s foreign policy was triumphant, and neither Spain nor Austria could do more. But he had no time to enjoy the successes his cold heart and strong hand had won ; he fell into the hands of the one enemy whom no subtlety Charac- could baffle, and died in December 1642. Richelieu had ter of an inflexible will, vigorous abilities, and a clear idea of what he desired that France should be ; and it is hardly too much to say that he made France what she has continued to be almost to our days. Not till the centre of power in Germany had passed from Austria to Prussia did the old foreign policy of France fail; not till constitutional life had got firm hold on the French people did the republic succeed in reversing the evil principles and consequences of Richelieu s home government. His leading idea was that unity brings strength ; and into unity his stern resolves and pitiless severities forced his reluctant country. In the career of Louis XIV. we read the true commentary on his acts and principles ; in the corrupt and deadly despotism of the 18th century we read its punishment; even the Revolution, though it scourged the older system with scorpions, could not at once destroy it, or build on surer foundations. When we remember how Richelieu crushed, one after another, those elements of society which had in them germs of a modern constitutional life, we are tempted to speculate on the splendid career which was possible for France had a wiser statesman ruled her in these critical years. The base subserviency of the church, the humilia tion of the lawyers in the parliaments, the loss of noble independence, the overthrow of all healthy civic life, the steady depression of Huguenot opinions, the silence of the States-General, the diminution of local liberties even in Riche lieu. the &quot; pays d etats,&quot; the assertion of the king s independent 1G-J right to levy taxes and issue edicts, all these evils might have been avoided, and the strong life, strong often to tur bulence, which lived in these different institutions might have been harmonized, brought into friendly and fruitful action, until an original and characteristic constitutional history had given France that strength and prosperity, that home development of magnificent resources, which would have secured her the undisputed lead and lordship among the nations of Europe. Instead, Richelieu gave her unity and glory. The burdens of France increased enormously ; her aggressive power, now that she was concentrated in the hand of a despot, who had unchecked command of the persons and purses of his subjects, was immensely increased. If we look into Richelieu s character, we shall discern, side by side with that pride which could rejoice in debasing the noblest and strongest, a vanity which, like a vein of im- purer metal, spoilt the ring and clearness of his life. He was always conscious of effects : as an author, a dramatist, or a statesman, he was on the look-out for &quot;situations&quot;; his most striking political successes seemed due as much to the necessity of impressing men by startling novelties as to an honest belief in the justice of his cause or the wholesome- ness of his course of action. His extraordinary powers, his life-long devotion to the policy he had drawn out for him self and France, secure him his safe position as a great man, a great man on the lower level, one whom one fears, perhaps admires, but never loves; because there were in him no really high aims, nor any true love of the people under him, nor any desire to rule them well. Richelieu has been often compared with Wolsey and contrasted with Mazarin. The red robe of the cardinal is common to all three ; beyond this the comparison with W T olsey is of little value, for the men were essentially unlike in character and aim. The contrast with Mazarin, who lived with him, studied his policy, and succeeded him, is of more value and interest. It is brilliantly treated by Voltaire in his Henriade (vii. 327 sq.) : Henri, clans ce moment, voit sur ties fleurs-de-lis Deux mortels orgueilleux aupres du troue assis. Us tienuent sous lours pieds tout un peuple a la cliaine; Tous deux sont revetus de la pourpro romaine; Tous deux sont entoures de gardes, de soldats; 11 les prend pour des rois .... Vous ne vous trompez pas; Us le sont, dit Louis, sans en avoir le titre; Du prince et de 1 etat 1 un et 1 autre est 1 arbitre. Kichelieu, Mazarin, ministres immortels, Jusqu au trone eleves de 1 ombre des autels, Enfants de la fortune et de la politique, Marcheront a grands pas au pouvoir despotique. Richelieu, grand, sublime, implacable ennemi: Mazarin, souple, adroit, et dangereux ami; L un fuyant avec art, et cedant h 1 orage, L autre aux flots mites opposant son courage; Des princes de mon sang ennemis declares; Tous deux hais du peuple, et tons deux admires; Enfin, par leurs efforts, ou par leur Industrie, U tiles a leurs rois, cruels a la patrie.&quot; One thing they had in common, the love and encourage ment of letters ; yet even this in Richelieu s hands must be organized, despotic. Still, he and Mazarin have an honourable claim to remembrance when we speak of the writers of the &quot; great age,&quot; for it was under them in the first half or so of the century, rather than under Louis XIV. in the latter half, that the chief masterpieces were produced. The tendency of the reign of Louis XIV. was rather to depress than to ennoble literature. Richelieu founded the French Academy in 1635, and set on foot the Gazette of France ; he established the royal printing press ; he desired to patronize learned men, though his own literary efforts failed, and men of real independence of character, like Corneille and Descartes, shunned the fatal honours of his patronage. He was in all his tastes a great and showy