Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/499

 FORTIFICATION 467 example, England, perhaps the most highly centralized of countries. Can it be doubted that an enemy in possession of London could exact what terms he pleased 1 Upon this point the commissioners appointed to consider the defences of the United Kingdom say, &quot; There can be no doubt that the main object of an enemy invading the country would be to push for the capital, in the hope that, if he succeeded in obtaining command of it, such a disaster would result in our buying him off upon any terms he might think it ex pedient to exact.&quot; This was written in I860, but within eleven years its general truthfulness was thoroughly esta blished by the fall of Paris, when the exactions of the Germans were only limited by the ability of the French to comply with them. It is then scarcely too much to say that the fall of London would result in the downfall of England. Speaking of the general confusion and ruin which the presence of a hostile army on British soil must produce, Lord Overstone said : &quot; The occupation of London by an invading army !....! cannot contemplate or trace to its consequences such a supposition.&quot; And he might well say so ; not England only, but the cause of civilization throughout the world would be shattered by such an occu pation. At a time when capitals were by no means the national centres which they have since become, owing to the develop ment of the means of locomotion, and to the discoveries of electrical science, Napoleon said that a great capital is the native place of the flower of the nation, the central point of public opinion, and the general depot ; and he added that it is the greatest of absurdities to leave so important a place destitute of immediate defence. How then should a capital be fortified ? The answer is, that it should be so fortified that it may be safe from bom bardment and from blockade, and that its defences may be beyond the control of its inhabitants. These objects may be attained by two methods, first by constructing a circle of detached forts round the capital, and at such a distance in advance of it as shall render investment impossible, or, secondly, by forming a cordon of intrenched camps far in advance of the capital, making at the same time such arrangements as shall facilitate the rapid concentration of troops in any of them. With respect to these two methods there is much differ ence of opinion, and eminent military authorities may be cited in support of one or the other according to the bias of the writer. Nevertheless it may be safely asserted that the value of either is dependent upon the number and quality of the troops available for its service. If the troops be few, or insufficiently trained and poor iri quality, then it would be proper to have recourse to a system of detached forts round and not far in advance of the capital, and so disposed that they may, in a measure at least, be manned by local auxiliary levies. If, on the other hand, the troops be fully equipped, thoroughly trained and disciplined, with high power of manoeuvring, then, even though inferior in num ber, it may be advisable to have recourse to a cordon of intrenched camps. Generally, if circumstances admit of its adoption, the second method is the better, especially if the camps are dis posed at such intervals that an enemy in force cannot pass between them, and at such distance from the capital that, if driven out of them, there is still time left to fall back and take up some inner position upon which to deliver a decisive battle. The capital, though well covered by the camps, would take no part in the active defence, and would not be attacked after the fall of one of them, while the occupants of the camps could fight with no apprehension of the populace rising in their rear, a danger to be apprehended from the most patient of people, as they become pinched by the privations and miseries of a siege. In practice it will almost always happen that a combina tion of the two methods will be adopted ; but whatever method be adopted it will generally be inadvisable to surround the capital, more especially if large, with a close enceinte. If, however, it have such an enceinte, the works of which the enceinte is composed should be provided with strong interior defence. In all large cities there is a con siderable cosmopolitan and vagrant element, possessed of no property, and having no interest in the maintenance of order, whose contact with the soldiery may be attended with deplorable results, inasmuch as it must tend to lessen the bands of discipline, to destroy the habits of obedience, and to weaken those feelings of devotion and self-restraint which are more than ever necessary under the privations of a close siege. Against this view it may be urged tbat the enceinte con structed round Paris in 1840 prevented its falling into th3 hands of the Prussians after the battle of Chatillon. This may be true ; but in estimating the value of this enceinta it should be borne in mind that 236,000 Prussians were sufficient to shut up in it, and eventually reduce by famine, a garrison of 300,000 men, audit is certain that the absence of interior defences in that enceinte permitted a mere hand ful of communists to make themselves masters of Paris and its fortifications, and to force back the regular troops upou Versailles. Generally, however, the rapid growth of the population in very large cities precludes a close enceinte. Indeed, the enormous extent of very large capitals, and tho very long range of present artillery, render the fortifica tion of them so costly that, in elaborating any scheme for their defence, cost must enter largely into calculation, and must materially modify theoretical and scientific conclusions. But however elaborately the capital may be fortified, the full effect of the expenditure upon its fortifications is not obtained unless other strong places are formed in appro priate positions in relation to it ; for if the capital only be fortified, defence will cease with its fall. It is asserted upon the authority of official documents that the French would not have yielded to the conditions exacted by the conquerors of Paris in 1871, if there had remained to them strong defensive positions such as Orleans, Tours, and Bourges, upon which the armies, poor in quality as they were, of Chanzy, Faidherbe, and Bcurbaki could have operated. In fact, if the capital only be fortified, the object of invasion will be limited to it, and the task of the invader will be much simplified, for he will have little fear of his communications, and will be able to make his circle of in vestment of such strength as seerns best to him. And when once the investment is completed, it is matter of great diffi culty for the inclosed army, even if superior in numbers, to break out. Its best chance of breaking out is during tho first days of the investment, particularly at the period when the enemy commences to extend himself round the circle of investment, and in so doing presents his flank to it. After the investment is complete, the inclosed army is in a bad position for delivering an attack, as it must advance and deploy under concentric fire playing upon it in front and in flank. The difficulties of such an attack are exemplified in the French attack during the siege of Paris upon the 5th German corps between St Cloud and Buzenval, when 84,000 French attacking from an interior position were defeated with a loss of 6000 men by 20,000 Germans with a loss of only 646. The advantage of other strong places was shown when 180,000 Germans were detained for a time before Metz. But Metz and Strasburg were so far from Paris that they had scarcely any relation to it. Moreover, they lay close to the frontier ; and as here there were no intermediate strong places they were rapidly isolated, and when they fell into the invader s hands proved of great service to him.