Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/491

 FORTIFICATION 450 was crowned to within 65 yards. From the 13th to the 14th, after nearly sixteen nights of open trenches, the arrangements for the assault of St Laurent were completed, and orders were issued to prepare for the storm. Too much value was set on this outwork, defended by little more than a hundred men, one five-and-a-half inch howitzer, two Coehorn mortars, and a six-pounder. The mines being charged, the blinded descent into the ditch was pierced as soon as it became dark, and everything prepared for the assault. Three storming parties of the flank companies of the 65th regiment of the line were posted in readiness, with a column of reserve ; and at 5 A.M. on the 14th the match was applied to the saucissons of the mines. Three successive explosions took place, and the escarp im mediately presented a wide and practicable breach. The fascines for crossing the ditch had been injured by the explosions, but after a little delay the storming party entered almost without opposition, and made prisoners one lieutenant and forty-eight rank and file, the others having escaped into the citadel. Thus fell the lunette St Laurent. After this operations were carried on against the citadel, and at 11 A.M. of the 21st December the battering in breach commenced, and continued until the 23d. When a practicable breach had been formed, and Marshal Gerard was about to deliver the assault, the garrison surrendered, after a gallant defence, remarkable, however, 1 or its passive rather than for its active character. When Marshal Gerard entered the fortress, General Chasse was found in a case mate in the Alba bastion, which he had occupied during the siege. On their progress from the gate to the governor s quarters, they passed through a scene of desolation and ruin which baffles de scription ; with the exception of the principal powder magazine, two or three service magazines, and the hospital, not a building remained standing. The terrepleines of the bastions were ploughed into deep ruts by the shells ; the gorges were encumbered with heaps of fallen rubbish ; and though the casemates and subter ranean communications were not perforated, all of them had sus tained damage from the incessant explosion of shells, and they omitted an almost insupportable odour, caused by the number of men who had been crowded into them. When Count Gerard took his leave of General Chasse, he observed &quot;that it was high time to surrender, that he had gallantly and honourably done his duty, and that he ought not to have held out a day longer.&quot; With a fortress reduced to a heap of ruins, a garrison exhausted and at tenuated, and a breach sufficiently wide to admit a column formed upon a front of a hundred, it would indeed have been madness to attempt to stand an assault The following is a list of the different batteries, with the direction of their fire respectively : Xo. of

gLe .gg Distance Bat ^f &quot;^ Cs &quot;O w .J C 3 &quot; in Direction of Fire. teries. 1 i wo 2 Yards. CH 0, M 1 e 2 (535 & &amp;lt; Battering the left face of Toledo, 1550 1 and gorge of St Laurent. j. 2 2 2 too { Ricochetting the left face of To ledo. Q 4 2 f, n j 1 Battering the left face of the Ra { velin a 4 3 C C50 Ricochetting left face of the Ra velin. r /: o &amp;lt;6sr& ( Battering right face ofTo edo, and o 1430 1 ricochettihg left of Toledo. a G 2 2 &quot;OJ Ricochetting left face of Toledo. 3 .a 7 G 2 1 (380 ft. ( 1700 1 Ricochetting left face of St Lau rent, and battering right face of Paciotto.

JS 8 3 2 465 Ricochetting left face of Ravelin. 9 g R^O J Battering salient angle of 1 a- o 1 ciotto. o 10 g (G50& ( Battering left face of Ravelin, 09 1-520 1 and Lunette of Kiel. g A ... 10 850 Not armed. O B 9 1000 Body of the Citadel C 11 1050 Do. D 10 MO Do. 30 It 20 40 11 4 500 j Batte:ing the right face of To ledo. 73 12 3 435 Buttering the Bataideau. g 13 4 f 220 &) 12-5 ; Battering the left face of Ravelin. 33 E 6 500 The bodv of the Citadel. 6 490 Do. J= G 6 650 Do. e H G 380 Do. S IK 8 600 Do. 5 14 6 50 Breaching battery. a 15 6 350 -f Counter-battery against the left flank of Fernando. 1G 125 4 fix pierriers on the Ravelin and Toledo. I 10 2-Q J ! TeiTCpleine and rampart of To- 1 1 ledo. Out of their force of 66,450 men, the French lost during the siege 108 killed and 695 wounded total, 803. The Dutch had 4937 men in the garrison, of whom they lost 122 killed, 369 wounded, and 70 missing total 561. A careful comparison of the details of this siege with the general principles which have been enunciated will enable the reader to recognize the importance of the following maxims : 1. Independently of the great amount of labour to be provided for in the construction of parallels, approaches, and batteries, there will be a daily drain upon the besieger s forces by casualties, so that he can scarcely expect success unless his original preponderance in numbers has been such as to leave him at the final moment of assault in a condition to attack the diminished garrison with an overwhelming force. In addition, therefore, to a covering army when external relief is threatened or anticipated, the besieging army should be from four to five times the strength of the garrison, or even more, should the nature of the ground add to the ordinary difficulties of approach. This superiority of force is necessary to give celerity and steadiness to the operations, which would otherwise be tedious and interrupted. 2. A perfect investment is not merely expedient but indispens able. So long as any portion of the enceinte of a fortress is left open the garrison is able to recruit its strength from without, and it is relieved from that moral depression which must oppress men when closed up within a narrow space, and exposed, day after day, to fatigue and danger. Under such circumstances there seems to be no limit to the power of defence, as fresh supplies of men enable the besieged to add iiitrenchment to intrenchment, and it is only possible to overcome him by determined, reiterated, and over whelming assaults. Such were the circumstances of Sebastopol ; the system of attack forced upon the allies never enabled them to isolate even the southern section of the fortress, and the means of communication between the south and north remaining available fresh troops were continually brought to the south side, and a supe riority in numbers given to the defenders over the attacking force. It ought not therefore to be a matter of surprise that the progress of the siege was slow. 3. Good and secure lines of communication are most essential, as there ought to be no interruption after the ground is broken and the siege has commenced. Neither in the attack nor in the defence should guns be fired idly, or from distances and positions from which their fire would be useless or even uncertain ; but when the proper distance has been ascertained, battery should succeed battery as the works of approach advance, and no interval for rest or for the repair of injuries should be allowed to the besiegers. 4. The importance of advanced works was well exemplified at the siege of Antwerp, where the whole force of the attack was directed against the advanced lunette St Laurent, whilst the defence, though good, had not the advantage of the collateral defence of the lunette Montebello (see Plate XI.). Where the garrison is an army, such works afford the best means for an f obstinate defence, and, by forcing the besieger to act on the circumference of a larger circle, diminish very much his ordinary advantage of concentration. Siege of Dantzic. Having thus given an example of an interior and passive defence, we shall now, in further illustration of the prin ciples already laid down, advert to an example of a different kind. The siege of Dantzic, whether considered with re ference to the magnitude of the operation, the difficulties to be surmounted by the besiegers, or the active and varied character of the defence, was certainly one of the most me morable events in the campaign of 1 807. Before the war of 1806 and 1807 the fortifications had been much neglected, because from the position of the place it was not antici pated that it would have to sustain a siege. But when the battles of Jena and Auerstadt had entailed destruc tion on the Prussian army, and had laid open the king dom, General Manstein, who commanded at Dantzic in the absence of Field-marshal Kalkreuth, the titular governor, laboured with much activity in repairing the walls and the palisades, and in completing the enceinte. It is neces sary, therefore, to describe the principal defences at the time the place was invested by Marshal Lefebvre, at the head of the tenth corps of the grand army, and before the commencement of the trenches on the 1st of April. The city of Dantzic, traversed by the Mottlau, was sur rounded with large ditches filled from that river, the waters of which, retained by several sluices, formed, to the east ward, a vast inundation, which, reaching on one side to the suburbs of Oliva and St Halbrecht, and on the other to the dykes of the Vistula, extended about four leagues, and