Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 8.djvu/790

Rh 754 EVOLUTION cal view of the process. The first and crude form in which this modification presents itself is that of an original, thin, quasi-material substance (as ether), which may serve as the raw material, so to speak, of individual minds. The formation of these minds, however, is regarded as a strictly, mechanical process, and related to that of physical evolution in tie narrow sense. This theory of the origin of mental existence clearly approaches one of the forms of the doctrine of emanation already referred to. We have only to conceive of the primordial mental substance as the infinite being, transcending our finite world, and the doctrine becomes one of emanation. The second modification of this view consists in the theory that all parts of matter are endowed with sensibility, but that the sensations are not themselves (as teleological fac tors) the productive force in the process, but are rather the appendages of the real factors. The world forms itself according to strictly mechanical laws of combination, and the evolution of the various grades of mind in the organic region takes place by a composition of elementary feelings exactly similar to the process of material combination. Before leaving the systems which are based on the mechanical view, a bare allusion must be made to a recent suggestion that all things consist ultimately of mental sub stance (&quot;mind-stuff&quot;), which combines itself both in the material world and in the region of conscious mind accord ing to strictly mechanical principles. (b) The second mode of viewing the process of evolution subordinates the idea of physical cause to that of final cause. The force which effects the continual production and transformation of things is conceived of more or less distinctly after the analogy of a rational impulse towards an end, and the process is regarded as determined or con ditioned by this element of purpose. This teleological view of evolution may be found in a number of systems of nature, which look on the material world as at once bodily and vital or spiritual, though it is often difficult to say whether any particular system should be called dualistic or monistic (in the narrow sense). Thus we have the evolution of the physical world referred to a vital principle which pervades all matter, and of which the essential nature is productivity, to a formative plastic principle which moulds the dead material into various shapes, to an organizing cosmic force, and so on. In all these conceptions, which appear to aim more especially at an explanation of organic forms and life, the element of purpose appears in a nascent shape. Nature is personified as a worker who aims unconsciously and instinctively at some dimly descried end, such as the most various produc tion, the progressive manifestation of life, and so on. In some of these systems, notably in the Aristotelian, the genesis of conscious mind is explained along with that of organic life by means of the supposition that mind is but the formative principle of the individual organism. The_idea of purpose becomes more definite, and, at the same time, a further step is taken towards the explanation of mental life as a development out of physical, in those systems which project a distinct spiritual principle into nature. The way in which this is frequently done is by means of the theory of a world-soul which animates the whole of the material world and directs all parts of its evolution. When this spiritual principle is regarded not only as the formative force, but also as the substantial source of conscious mental life, which has eternally coexisted with matter, we have, as already remarked, a pantheistic conception of evolution which, like another and cognate conception already referred to, approximates to one form of the emanation theory. The full development of this way of regarding the world and its evolution as the work of a spiritual principle aiming towards an end is to be found in certain doctrines of Objective Idealism, which resolve all material existence into a mode of mental existence will and thought. These theories clearly simplify the conception of evolution to the utmost, by the identification both of the substantial reality which enters into all parts of the world-process, and of the rationale of all parts of the process itself. In the systems now referred to, the mechanical idea is wholly taken up into the teleological. Purpose is the highest law of things, and it is one purpose which manifests itself through all stages of the world s evolution, in the region of inorganic nature, of organic life, and of human history. The first genesis of conscious life is explained as a particular moment in this process. In some spiritualistic systems an attempt is made to combine the mechanical (causal) and teleologicol ideas under the notion of logical development. Yet as a rule the teleological way of conceiving the process predo minates. (c) The systems which seek to combine the teleological a.nd the mechanical view of evolution are for the most part based on the monistic idea that the material and the mental are two equally real aspects of one thing. It is clear that this conception of reality provides a way of doing justice to both modes of looking at evolution. In this manner the systems now spoken of are able to regard all parts of evolu tion as identical in nature, being alike links in a chain of purposeful effects. This way of regarding the world in its process of evolu tion will vary according to the particular view of the one reality underlying material and mental phenomena. Thus we may have a universalistic conception of evolution as the two-sided activity of one undivided substance. This idea passes easily into a pantheistic view of the world- process as determined by a divine reason which is also the principle of necessity. In the second place, we may have an individualistic conception of this two-sided process, according to which the world arises out of the unceasing activity of an indefinite number of elements endowed with motion and sensation, and so comprehending a mechanical and a teleological factor. It has already been remarked, however, that this conception may be combined with a strictly mechanical view of evolution. History of the Idea of Evolution. The doctrine of evolution in its finished and definite form is a modern product. It required for its formation au amount of scientific knowledge which could only be very gradually acquired. It is vain, therefore, to look for clearly defined and systematic presentations of the idea among ancient writers. On the other hand, nearly all systems of philo sophy have discussed the problems underlying evolution. Such questions as the origin of the cosmos as a whole, the production of organic beings and of conscious minds, and the meaning of the observable grades of creation, have from the dawn of speculation occupied men s minds ; and the answers to these questions often imply a vague recog nition of the idea of a gradual evolution of things. Accordingly, in tracing the antecedents of the modern philosophic doctrine we shall have to glance at most of the principal systems of cosmology, ancient and modern. Yet since in these systems the two inquiries into the esse and fieri of the world are rarely distinguished with any precision, it will be necessary to indicate very briefly the general out lines of the system so far as they are necessary for under standing their bearing on the problems of evolution. Mythological Interpretation. The problem of the origin of the world was the first to engage man s speculative activity. Nor was this line of inquiry pursued simply as a step in the more practical problem of man s final destiny. The order of ideas observable in children sug gests the reflection that man began to discuss the