Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 8.djvu/604

Rh 582 ETHICS tion to the fundamental notion of ultimate end or good for man. All men, in acting, aim at some result, either for its own sake or as a means to some further eud; but obviously everything cannot be sought merely as a means ; there must therefore be some ultimate end In fact men commonly recognize such an end, and agree to call it well being 1 (uSai/xon. a) ; but they take very different views of its nature. How, then, shall we find the true view ? Another genuinely Socratic induction leads us to this. We observe that men are classified and named according to their functions ; all kinds of man, and indeed all organs of man, have their special functions, and are judged as functionaries and organs to be in good or bad condition according as they perform their functions well or ill. May we not then infer that man, as man, has his proper function, and that the wellbeing or &quot; doing well &quot; that all seek really lies in fulfilling well the proper function of man, that is, in living well that life of the rational soul which we recog nize as man s distinctive attribute] Again, this Socratic deference to common opinion is not merely shown in the way by which Aristotle reaches his fundamental conception; it equally appears in his treatment of the conception itself, In the first place, though in Aristotle s view the most perfect wellbeing consists in the exercise of man s &quot; divinest part,&quot; pure speculative reason, he keeps far from the paradox of putting forward this and nothing else as human good; so far, indeed, that the greater part of his treatise is occupied with an exposition of the, inferior good which is realized in practical life when the appetitive or impulsive (semi-rational) element of the soul operates under the due regulation of reason. Even when the notion of &quot;good performance of function &quot; was thus widened, and when it had further taken in the pleasure that is inseparably connected with such function ing, it did not yet correspond to the whole of what a Greek commonly understood as &quot;human wellbeing;&quot; though, in order to make it fit better, Aristotle emphasizes more than we should have expected the necessity of worldly goods for the realization of such virtues as liberality, justice, &c There still remain other goods, such as beauty, good birth, welfare of posterity, &c., the presence 01 absence of which influenced the common view of a man s wellbeing, though they could not be shown to be even indirectly important to his &quot; weli-acting.&quot; These Aristotle neither attempts to exclude from the philosophic conception of wellbeing nor to include in his formal definition of it. The deliberate looseness which is thus given to his fundamental doctrine characterizes more or less his whole discussion of ethics. He plainly says that the subject does not admit of com pletely scientific treatment ; his aim is to give not a per fectly definite theory of human good, but a practically adequate account of its most important constituents. The most important characteristics, then, of wellbeing or good life for ordinary men are represented by the notions of the different moral excellences. In expounding these, Aristotle gives throughout the pure result of analytical observation of the common moral consciousness of his age. Ethical truth, in his view, is to be attained by induction from particular moral opinions, just as physical truth is to be obtained by induction from particular physical observa tions. On account of the conflict of opinion in ethics we cannot hops to obtain perfect clearness and certainty upon all questions; still reflection will lead us to discard some of the conflicting views and find a reconciliation for others, 1 This cardinal term is commonly translated &quot; happiness ;* and it must be allowed that it is the most natural term for what we (in Eng- listy agree to call &quot;our being s end and aim/ But happiness so defin itely signifies a state of feeling that it will not admit the interpretation that Aristotle (us well as Plato and the Stoics) expressly gives to tuSaiu-ovla ; hence the rendering ei-Sa.uoi/t a by happiness has caused serious confusion to the students of Greek philosophy. and will furnish, on the whole, a practically sufficient residuum of moral truth. In many respects this adhesion to common sense involves a sacrifice of both depth and completeness in Aristotle s system. His virtues are not arranged on any clear philosophic plan ; the list shows no serious attempt to consider human life exhaustively, and exhibit the standard of excellence appropriate to its different departments or aspects. He seems to have taken as a starting point Plato s four cardinal virtues. The two comprehensive notions of Wisdom and Justice (SiKatocrwr/) he treats separately. As regards both his analysis leads him to diverge considerably from Plato. As we saw, his distinction between practical and speculative Wisdom belongs to the deepest of his disagreements with his master ; and in the case of SiKaioo-^j? again he distinguishes the wider use of the term to express Law-observance, which (he says) coincides with the social side of virtue generally, and its narrower use for the virtue that &quot; aims at a kind of equality,&quot; whether (I) in the distribution of wealth, honour, &c,, or (2) in commercial exchange, or (3) in the reparation of wrong done. Then, in arranging the other special virtues, he begins with courage and temperance, which (after Plato) he considers as the excellences of the &quot; irrational element&quot; of the soul. Next follow two pairs of excellences, concerned respectively with wealth amd honour : (1) liberality and magnificence, of which the latter is exhibited in great.r matters of expenditure, and (2) laudable ambition and high mindedness similarly related to honour. Then comes gentleness the virtue regulative of anger; and the list is concluded by the excellences of social intercourse, friend liness (as a mean between obsequiousness and surliness), truthfulness, and decorous wit. The abundant store of just and close analytical obser vation contained in Aristotle s account of these notions give it a permanent interest, even beyond its historical value as a delineation of the Greek ideal of &quot;fair and good&quot; life. 2 But its looseness of arrangement and almost grotesque co-ordination of qualities widely differing in importance are obvious; and Aristotle s restriction of the sphere of courage to dangers in war, and of that of temperance to certain bodily pleasures, as well as his non distinction of selfish and benevolent expenditure in describing liberality, illustrate the fragmentariness and superficiality of treatment to which mere analysis of the common u^age of ethical terms is always liable to lead. Nor is his famous general formula for virtue, that it is a mean or middle state, always to be found somewhere between the vices which stand to it in the relation of excess and defect, of much avail in rendering his treatment more systematic. It was important, no doubt, to express the need of limitation and regulation, of observing due measure and proportion, in order to attain good results in human life no less than in artistic products ; but the observation of this need was no new thing in Greek literature; indeed, it had already led the Pythagoreans and Plato to find the ultimate essence of the ordered universe in number. But Aristotle s purely quantitative statement of the relation of virtue and vice is misleading, even where it is not obviously inappropriate ; and sometimes leads him to such eccentri cities as that of making simple veracity a mean between boastfulness and mock-modesty. 2 Aristotle follows Plato and Socrates in identifying the notions of Kai (&quot;fair,&quot; &quot;beautiful ) and kyaGos (&quot;good ) in their application to conduct. We may observe, however, that while the latter term is used to denote the virtuous man, and (in the neuter) equivalent to end generally, the former is rather chosen to express the quality of virtuous acts which in any particular case is the end of the virtuous agent. Aristotle no doubt faithfully represents the common sense of Greece in considering that, in so far as virtue is in itself good to the virtuous agent, it belongs to that species of good which we distinguish as beautiful. In later Greek philosophy the term Kav (&quot;honestum : ) became still more tech nical in the signification of &quot; morally good.&quot;