Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 8.djvu/600

Rh 578 ETHICS definitions of all the notions that enter into practical reason ings, whether for the regulation of public or private con duct, and is unwearied in studying the rationale of even the most subordinate acts of life. In fact, he required of all men, whatever their special business might be, that they should know what they were doing and why, should act on some clear and consistent theory ; the requirement was startling to many, but to all philosophic souls it was not the less irresistible, because it was usually indirect The necessity, indeed, for firmness of purpose * as well as clear ness of insight he did not expressly recognize, but this quality was all the more conspicuously manifested in his life. Indeed, it was the very perfection in which he possessed this virtue that led him to the paradox of ignor ing it. Of himself at least it was true, that whatever he believed to be &quot; fair and good &quot; he must necessarily do ; when another acted apparently against knowledge, the easiest explanation seemed to him to be that true knowledge was not really there. These, then, seem the historically important character istics of the great founder of moral philosophy, if we take (as we must) his teaching and character together : (1) an ardent inquiry for knowledge nowhere to be found, but which, if found, would perfect human conduct; (2) a demand meanwhile that men should act as far as possible on some consistent theory ; (3) a provisional adhesion to the com monly received view of good, in all its incoherent com plexity, and a perpetual readiness to maintain the unity of its different elements, and demonstrate the superiority of virtue by applying the commonest standard of self interest ; (4) personal firmness, as apparently easy as it was actually invincible, in carrying out such practical convictions as he had attained. It is only when we keep all these points in view that we can understand how from the spring of Socratic conversation flowed the branching rivers of Greek ethical thought The Four distinct philosophical schools trace their immediate Socratio origin to the circle that gathered round Socrates the ols&amp;gt; Megarian, the Platonic, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic. The impress of the master is manifest on all, in spite of Hie wide differences that divided them; and they all agree in holding the most important possession of man to be wisdom or knowledge, and the most important knowledge to be knowledge of Good. Here, however, the agreement ends. The more philosophic part of the circle, forming a group in which End ides of Megara seems at first to have taken the lead, regarded this Good as the object of a still unfulfilled quest ; and setting out afresh in search of it, with a pro found sense of its mystery, were led to identify it with the hidden secret of the universe, and thus to pass from ethics to metaphysics. Others again, whose demand for know ledge was more easily satisfied, and who were more impressed with the positive and practical side of the master s teaching, made the quest a much simpler affair ; in fact, they took the Good as already known, and held philosophy to consist in the steady application of this knowledge to conduct. Among these were Antisthanes the Cynic and Aristippus of Gyrene. It is by their unre served recognition of the duty of living consistently by theory, their sense of the new value given to life through this rationalization, and their effort to maintain the easy, calm, unwavering firmness of the Socratic temper, that we recognize both Antisthenes and Aristippus as &quot; Socratic 1 Xenophon, it is true, describes him as exalting &quot;self-control,&quot; tyHpdreLa ; and Mr Grote (Hist, of Greece, vol. viii. c. 63) finds this in consistent with his fundamental principle. But there appears no reason for supposing that Socrates (or Xenophon) formanydistinguishedeyipa- re to. from atafypwvvt] as Aristotle does ; and it is quite easy to interpret the ordinary notion of &quot;self-control&quot; Socratically, as essentially con sisting in knowledge of the comparatively small value of gratitication of vicious appetite. men,&quot; in spite of the completeness with which they divided their master s positive doctrine into systems diametrically opposed. Of their contrasted principles we may perhaps say that, while Aristippus took the most obvious logical step for reducing the teaching of Socrates to clear dogmatic unity, Antisthenes certainly drew the most natural infer ence from the Socratic life. Aristippus argued that, if all that is beautiful or admir- Ar able in conduct has this quality as being useful, i.e., pro- F u ductive of some further good ; if virtuous action is essentially action done with insight, or rational apprehension of the act as a means to this good ; then surely this good can be but pleasure, which all living things with unperverted impulses seek, while they shun its opposite, pain. He further found a metaphysical basis for this conclusion in the doctrine to which the relativism of Protagoras led him, that we can know nothing of things without us except their impressions on ourselves. An immediate inference from this is the &quot;smooth motion&quot; of sense which we call pleasure, from whatever source it came, as the only cognizable good ; no kind of pleasure being in itself better than any other, though some kinds were to be rejected for their painful con sequences. Bodily pleasures and pains Aristippus held to be the keenest ; though he does not seem to have maintained this on any materialistic theory, as he admitted the existence of purely mental pleasures, such as joy in the prosperity of our fatherland. He fully recognized that his good was transient, and only capable of being realized in successive parts; giving even exaggerated emphasis to the rule of seeking the pleasure of the moment, and not troubling one self about a dubious future. It was in the calm, resolute, skilful culling of such pleasures as circumstances afforded from moment to moment, undisturbed by passion, pre judices, or superstition, that he conceived the quality of wisdom to be exhibited; and tradition represents him as realizing this ideal to an impressive degree. Among the prejudices from which the wise man was free he included all regard to customary morality beyond what was due to the actual penalties attached to its violation ; though he held, with Socrates, that these penalties actually render conformity reasonable. Far otherwise was the Socratic spirit understood by T^ Antisthenes and the Cynics. They equally held that no f yi speculative research was needed for the discovery and definition of Good and Virtue; but they maintained that the Socratic wisdom, on the exercise of which man s wellbeing depended, was exhibited, not in the skilful pursuit, but in the rational disregard of pleasure, in the clear apprehen sion of the intrinsic worthlessness of this and most other objects of men s common aims. Antisthenes, indeed, did not overlook the need of supplementing merely intellectual insight by &quot;Socratic force of soul;&quot; but it seemed to him that, by insight and invincible self-mastery combined, an absolute spiritual independence might be attained which left nothing wanting for perfect wellbeing. What, indeed, could be wanting to the free rational soul, when imaginary needs, illusory desires, and idle prejudices were all discarded. For as for poverty, painful toil, disrepute, and such evils as men dread most, these, he argued, were positively useful as means of progress in spiritual freedom and virtue. The eccentricities with which his disciple Diogenes flaunted and revelled in this freedom have made him one of the mo-t familiar figures of ancient social history, and one which in its very extravagance gives a vivid impression of that el 3- ment in the Socratic pattern which it involuntarily carica tures. Vainly, however, do we seek a definite positive import for the Cynic notion of wisdom or moral insignt, besides the mere negation of irrational desires and prejudices. We saw that Socrates, while not claiming to have found the abstract theory of Good or Wise conduct, practically