Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 8.djvu/597

Rh E T II I C S 575 Tlie true Christian saint lived even on earth, no less than tho pagan philosopher, a life which he regarded as intrinsi cally preferable to all other modes of earthly existence ; and, like the Platonic philosopher, a life of which practical virtue was not so much the essence as the outward expression. Still even for the saint this earthly life afforded but an imperfect foretaste of the bliss for which he hoped; aud iti the view of more ordinary Christians, the ultimate good of man vanished from the scrutiny of mere ethical speculation into the indefinite brightness of a future life of happiness, supernaturally bestowed by God as a reward for obedience to his laws. Or rather, perhaps, by the mass of Christians, the moral code was more commonly regarded, in still closer analogy to human legislation, as supported by penal sanc tions; since in all ages of Christianity the fear of the pains of hell has probably been a more powerful motive to draw men from vice than the hope of the pleasures of heaven. Ou either view the ultimate weal or ill of human beings became something that might be imagined and rhetorically described, but not definitely known or scientifically inves tigated ; and thus the subject-matter of ethics defined itself afresh as Moral Law, a body of rules absolutely prescribed, and supplying a complete guidance for human conduct, though not claiming to contain an exhaustive statement of human good. Within the Christian church, through the early and middle ages of its history, it naturally fell to theologians to expound, and to priests to administer this code of divine legislation. But when a more philosophical treatment of ethics was introduced by the schoolmen, the combination in the code of two elements, one distinctively Christian, and the other cognizable by natural reason and binding on all men apart from revelation, began to be clearly seen; and an adequate theory of this second element seemed to be supplied by the development of theoretical jurisprudence that followed on the revival, in the 12th century, of the study of Roman law. In the later treatment of legal principles in Rome, the notion of a law of nature had bucome prominent; and this notion was naturally and easily adapted to represent the element in morality that was independent of revelation. It is true that the natural law of the philosophical jurists did not concern itself primarily with duties, but rather with rights, and so with the relative and negative duties that are involved in the notion of rights ; hence it could not properly be iden tified with more than a portion of the moral code. This portion, however, is of such fundamental importance that the difference we have noticed has been frequently over looked, and Morality not distinguished from Natural Law, except by the further control that the former claims over the inner springs of voluntary action. It is chiefly in connexion with this jural view of morality that the inquiry into the origin of the moral faculty has occupied a prominent place in the modern treatment of Ethics. So long as the &quot; moral faculty &quot; is regarded merely as the faculty of knowing our true good, together with its main causes or conditions, it hardly seems im portant to inquire how this faculty originated, any more than it is for a geometer to investigate the origin of the spatial faculty. But when conscience is conceived as a legislator and governor within the breast, claiming abso lute authority over all other impulses, it is natural that the legitimacy of its claim should be investigated; and it is not hard to understand how this legitimacy is thought to depend on the &quot; originality &quot; of the faculty that is, on its being a part of the plan or type according to which human nature was originally constructed. Hence investigations into the moral condition of children and savages and even animals, and more or less conjectural theories of the soul s growth and development, have been commonly regarded as necessary appendages or introductions to modern ethical discussion So again, it is through the jural conception of ethics that the controversy on free will chiefly becomes important. A man does not naturally inquire whether he is &quot; fn:e &quot; or not to seek his own good, provided only he knows what it is, and that it is attainable by voluntary action. But when his conduct is compared with a code to the violation of which punishments are attached, the question whether he really could obey the rule by which he is judged is obvious aud inevitable, since if he could not, it seems contrary to our sense of justice to punish him. To sum up, the subject of Ethics, most comprehensively understood, includes (1) an investigation of the consti tuents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature and particular species of Virtue or (b) Pleasure, and the chief means of realizing these ends ; (2) an investigation of the principles aud most important details of Duty or the Moral. Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue); (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. It is connected with Ontology or Theology, in so far as a Universal Good is recognized, inclu sive of Human Good, or analogous to it; with Theology again, so far as morality is regarded as a Code of Divine appointment. It is connected with Politics, so far as the wellbeing of any individual man is bound up with the wellbeing of his society; and again with Jurisprudence (or Politics), so far as morality is identified with Natural Law. Finally, almost every branch of Ethical discussion belongs at least in part to Psychology; and the inquiries into the origin of the moral faculty and the freedom of the Will are purely psychological. We will now proceed to trace briefly the course of ethical speculation from its origin in Europe to the present day; confining our attention, during the latter part of this period, to such modes of thought as have been developed in England, or have exercised an important influence there. II. GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN ETHICS. The ethical speculation of Greece, and therefore of Europe, has not, any more than other elements of European civilization, an abrupt and absolute commencement. The naive and frag mentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct, in which nascent moral reflection everywhere first manifests itself, supply a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the &quot;gnomic&quot; poetry of the 7th and Gth centuries before Christ; their importance in the development of Greek civilization is strikingly characterized by the traditional enumeration of the &quot; seven sages&quot; of the Gth century; aud their influence on ethical thought is sufficiently shown in the references that Plato aud even Aristotle make to the definitions and maxims of poets and sages. But from such utterances as these to moral philosophy there was still a long step ; for though Thales (circ. G40-5GO B.C.), one of the seven, was also the first physical philosopher of Greece, we have no ground for supposing that his practical wisdom had anything of a philosophical character. There seems to have been more connexion between moral teaching and metaphysical speculation in ths case of Pythagoras (circ. 580-500 B.C.), who is conspicuous among pre-Socratic philosophers as the _ founder not merely of a school, but rather of a sect or order, bound by a common rule of life. Certainly the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, that the essence of justice (conceived as equal retribution) was a square number, indicates a serious attempt to extend to the region of conduct that mathematical view of the universe which was the funda mental characteristic of Pythagoreanism; and the same may be said of their classification of good with unity, limit,