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Rh 106 CODE important points of definition and arrangement. Much in terest has attached to the Penal Code drawn up by Edward Livingston for tho State of Louisiana, about 50 years ago. The system consists of a Code of Crime and Punishments, a Code of Procedure, a Code of Evidence, a Code of Re form and Prison Discipline, and a Book of Definitions. &quot; Though the State for which the codes were prepared,&quot; says Chief- Justice Chase, &quot;neglected to avail itself of the labours assigned and solicited by itself, they have proved, together with their introductions, a treasure of suggestions to which many States are indebted for useful legislation.&quot; A complete edition of Livingston s works has recently been published by the National Prison Association of the United States. Since the time of Bentham, the codification of the law of England has been the dream of our most enlightened jurists and statesmen. In the interval between Bentham and our own time there has been an immense advance in the scientific study of law, but it may be doubted whether the problem of codification is at all nearer solution. Interest has mainly been directed of late to the historical side of legal science, to the phenomena of the evolution of laws as part of the development of society, and from this point of view the question of remodelling the law is one of minor interest. To Beutham the problem presented itself in the simplest and most direct form possible. What he proposed to do was to set forth a body of laws, clearly expressed, arranged in the order of their logical connection, exhibiting their own rationale, and excluding all other law. On the other hand the problem has in some respects become easier since the time of Bentham. With the Benthamite codifica tion the conception of reform in the substantive law is more or less mixed up. If codification had been possible in his day, it would, unless it had been accompanied by the searching reforms which have been effected since, and mainly through his influence, perhaps have been more of an evil than a good. The mere dread that, under the guise of codification or improvement in form, some change in substance may secretly be effected has long been a practical obstacle in the way of legal reform. But the law has now been brought into a state of which it may be said that, if it is not the best in all respects that might be desired, it is at least in most respects as good as the conditions of legisla tion will permit it to be. Codification, in fact, may now be treated purely as a question of form. What is proposed is that the law, boing, as we assume, in substance what the nation wishes it to be, should be made as accessible as possible, and as intelligible as possible. These two essential conditions of a sound system of law are, we need hardly say, far from being fulfilled in England. The law of the land is embodied in thousands of statutes and tens of thousands of reports. It is expressed in language which has never been fixed by a controlling authority, and which has swayed about with every change of time, place, and circumstance. It has no definitions, no rational distinctions, no connection of parts. Until the passing of the Judica ture Act it was pervaded throughout its entire sphere by the flagrant antinomy of law and equity, and that Act has only ordered, not executed, its consolidation. No lawyer pretends to know more than a fragment of it. Few practical questions can be answered by a lawyer without a search into numberless Acts of Parliament and reported cases. To laymen, of course, the whole law is a sealed book. As there are no authoritative general principles, it happens that the few legal maxims known to the public, being apprehended out of relation to their authorities, are as often likely to be wrong as to be right, It is hopeless to think of making it possible for every man to be his own lawyer, but we can at least try to make it possible for a lawyer to know the whole law. The earlier advocates of codification founded their case mainly on the evils of judiciary law, i.e., the law contained in the reported decisions of the judges, Bentham s bitter antipathy to judicial legislation is well known, Austin s thirty-ninth lecture (Lectures, ed, 1869) contains an exhaustive criticism of the tenable objections to judiciary law. All such law is embedded in decisions on particular cases, from which it must be extracted by a tedious and difficult process of induction. Being created for particular cases it is necessarily uncomprehensive, imperfect, uncertain, and bulky, These are evils which are incident to the nature of judiciary laws. Of late years the defective form of our exist ing statute law has also given rise to loud complaints. Year by year the mass of legislation grows larger, and as long as the basis of a system is judiciary law, it is impossible that the new statutes can be completely integrated therewith. The prevailing mode of framing Acts of Parliament, and especially the practice of legislating by reference to previous Acts, likewise produce much uncertainty and disorder. Whether any attempt will ever be made to supersede this vast and unarranged mass by a complete code seems very doubtful. Writers on codification have for the most part insisted that the work should be undertaken as a whole, and that the parts should have relation to some general scheme of the law which should be settled first. The practical difficulties in the way of an undertaking so stupendous as the codification uno ccetu of the whole mass of the law hardly require to be stated. The probability is that attempts will be made from time to time to cast the leading portions of the law into the form of a code. Some years ago it was believed that the proper preliminary to a code would be a digest of the law, and a commission was appointed in 1866, under which draughtsmen were set to work to prepare specimen digests of three selected portions of law, The attempt was abandoned in 1872, the commissioners being of opinion that it could not be properly proceeded with in detail, and they recommended that a general digest should be undertaken. In discussions on codification two difficulties are insisted on by its opponents, which have some practical interest (1) What is to be done in those cases for which the code has not provided 1 and (2) How is new law to be incorpo rated with the code 1 The objection that a code will hamper the opinions of the court, destroy the flexibility and elasticity of the common law, &c., disappears when it is stated in the form of a proposition, that law codified will cover a smaller number of cases, or will be less easily adapted to new cases, than law uncodified. The Code Napoleon orders the judges, under a penalty, to give a decision on all cases, whether contemplated or not by the code, and refer them generally to the following sources : (1 ) Equite&quot; naturelle, loi naturelle; (2) Roman law; (3) ancient customs; (4) usages, examples, decisions, jurisprudence; (5) droit commun ; (6) principes g^neraux, maximes, doctrine, science, The Prussian code, on the other hand, requires the judges to report new cases to the head of the judicial department, and they are decided by the legislative commission. No provision was made in either case for incorporating the new law with the code, an omission which Austin justly considers fatal to the usefulness of codifica tion, It is absurd to suppose that any code can remain long without requiring substantial arbitration. Cases will arise when its meaning must be extended and modified by judges, and every year will produce its quota of new legislation by the state. The courts should be left to interpret a code as they now interpret statutes, and provision should be made for the continual revision of the code, so that the new law created by judges or directly by the state may from time to time be worked into the code. The process of gradual codification adopted in India has