Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 3.djvu/550

538 difference between the believed and imagined idea the same as that between impression and idea, which is an ultimate distinction, and yet holds the difference to be merely one of degree. In Mill s account of memory it may be pointed out that the ideas of past experience, and of myself as having had the experience, contain in themselves the very element which is supposed to be got out of their conjunction. With regard to expectation it is clear that ideas irresistibly suggested by present experience are by no means necessarily believed, and further, that many of our beliefs do not arise from any such association. J. S. Mill, who subjects the association theory of belief to a searching examination, comes to the conclusion that the distinction between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture is ultimate and primordial. With his opinion later investigators, as Mr Sully, concur. Professor Bain, in opposition to other psychologists, holds that belief is not so much an intellectual state as a &quot; phase of our active nature, otherwise called the will.&quot; &quot; It is a growth or development of the will under the pursuit of intermediate ends.&quot; When, for instance, we perform certain acts as means towards a desired end with as much vigour as if we were realizing the end itself, &quot; we are in a very peculiar situation, not implied in desire.&quot; This situation is belief, which is essentially &quot; an anticipation of the pleasure &quot; of attaining the end. Belief being a form of activity, our primitive state is one of complete confidence. The mind is filled with its present experience, and con fidently believes that the future will resemble it. Ideas are so strongly taken up by the mind that they are accepted as real, and influence the will. The various disappoint ments of this primitive confidence give rise to definite avoidances of certain actions, and to pursuit of others, in order to escape pain or gain pleasure. Action directed towards these intermediate ends involves, or rather is, belief. This theory has to explain expectation and memory. With regard to the first, &quot; we make light of the difference between the conceived future and the real present ; &quot; or in other words, &quot; we are disposed to act in any direction where we have never been checked.&quot; Our primitive disposi tion to act is equivalent to full expectation. It may be pointed out that this explanation throws no light on ex pectation of events in which our activity could by no possibility be involved. But the theory seems to break down entirely when applied to memory. There is first to be explained the fact of memory, and then it has to be shown how reference to activity is contained in it. &quot; In surrendering our mind to the idea still remaining, and so imparting a momentary quasi-reality, we have an experience possessing the characteristic features of present reality.&quot; &quot;We really make no radical difference between a present and a proximate past.&quot; This, in the first place, would apply only to certain cases of memory. Secondly, impart ing a quasi-reality is not an explanation of the peculiar phenomenon of. an idea representing the past. It is an error, even on Professor Bain s own principles (see note to Mill s Analysis, i. 342; Emotions and Will, 2d ed. 525), to speak of belief in a present reality, while here memory is explained as a pseudo-realization of the ideas. Nor is he more successful in referring memory to activity. To identify my remembrance of having run up against a wall to avoid a carriage with the conviction that, should such a danger recur, I should again run up against the wall (see Emotions and Will, 2d. ed., 554), is absurd. The whole theory seems but an instance of a not uncommon error in psycho logy, the confusion of the test or measure of a thing with the thing itself. Belief is truly a motive to action, and all that has been said of it by Professor Bain would hold good of it in this relation ; to identify the two is to run together totally distinct processes. {{ti|1em|Modern German psychology has not approached the problem of belief from the same side as the English. Beneke alone, by his analysis of tact (see Lehrbuck der Psycft., 158, and System der Logik, i. 268, seq.), has opened up a somewhat fresh vein of thinking. His hints have been carried out by Germar (Die alte Streitfrage, Glauben odo- Wissen, 1856), who gives the following definition of belief : &quot; If the consciousness (of the truth of what we think) arises from tact, and therefore without consciousness of the factors or grounds through which it is produced, it is called belief ; it is elevated to knowledge when these factors are brought before consciousness&quot; (p. 58). In general the example of Kant has been followed, who looked upon the question as belonging not so much to psychology as to the theory of knowledge. His own discussion of the subject and his distinction between Meinen, Glauben, and Wissen have powerfully influenced later thought. Accord ing to him, Glaube (belief, in the sense of Fides as opposed to Gredulitas, Foi as opposed to Croyance} should be con fined to such propositions as rest on grounds subjectively not merely sufficient but necessary ; that is to say, the pro positions believed in are recognized as the demands of our moral or practical reason, and their truth can never bo disproved, for such disproof would be radically inconsistent with the moral nature which we are conscious of possessing. Our confidence in their truth is unwavering and practi cal, i.e., leading to action; for without them we could not act in conformity with our moral nature. Never theless, of the objects of such propositions we can never have scientific knowledge.}}

3. Kant s distinction of Meinung and Glaube leads us directly to the one species of belief which has not yet been considered. All objects of belief, so far as has yet appeared, might come within our temporal experience ; but we are said to believe in the supersensible, which from its very defini tion seems to surpass experience and, consequently, know ledge. To such belief the name faith is properly restricted, and in its nature it differs somewhat from the belief hitherto discussed. There is not, of course, included in it the specifically theological notion of faith as Fiducia (qii&amp;lt;z est apprehensio meriti QeavOpwirov appropriativa ad me et fe in individuo] ; it corresponds rather to the Notitia and Assen- sus, which are also elements in theological faith, and may be defined as the subjective expression of man s relation to God. When understood in this sense, religious belief is by no means a mere feeling, though it contains feeling as one of the stages in its development, for mere feeling is in itself blind and valueless, whereas faith is intelligent or rational. Nor is it a blank faith which would have the same value whatever were the objects believed in, for religious belief has a definite content ; it is the acceptation of certain facts and truths and the active realization of them. As its content is definite (for if it were not so, the religions of Christ and of Mahomet, of Buddha and of Zoroaster, would stand on the same level, all having sub jective faith or conviction), belief of necessity involves knowledge, rational construction of the facts believed. Faith is but the lower stage of completed insight, and in its own development follows the natural order of progress in knowledge, which begins with feeling and intuition, rises through concrete representation into logical connection, 