Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 3.djvu/460

444 human nature, which ages have not changed since history was first written. That undisciplined forces, for example, are easily shaken by panic arising out of any such sudden disaster as the fall of their general, was as true in the day when Ahab, for this reason, disguised himself at Ramoth- Gilead as it is now. That infantry, thoroughly broken up and exposed on open ground, may be taken or destroyed by a very inferior number of cavalry, was illustrated no less by Hannibal at Cannae than by Murat s charge round the allied right at Dresden. The feeling that there was no safe retreat open in case of disaster was as fatal to the Persians at Marathon as to the French at Leipsic. The crushing effect of heavy columns pressing against a line (which, as only the outer part of the column can act, is purely moral) was quite as conspicuous in the victory of Epaminoudas at Mantinea as when Napoleon cut his enemy s centre through at Austerlitz. Above all, military history, from the earliest times, proves two facts of prime import ance to commanders in every action : the one, that the best troops become unsteady when their flank is gained, just as a single, man in a struggle desires to face fairly the adversary about to rush on him ; the other, that a comparatively small body coming fresh into action with troops exhausted by the exertions and nervous tension of a battle, has an advantage over much larger numbers. And being thus fixed, these principles obviously yield certain general rules, to which every prudent commander of any age strives to conform. Circumstances may lead him to violate them, but the examples of Leipsic and Waterloo are there to prove that, even with the greatest of generals, the result may be ruinous. In the first case, the French were forced to fight with their backs to a river; in the second, by a combination they were not prepared for their flank was struck by the Prussians when they were fully engaged with Wellington in front ; and total defeat ensued in both. A battle is not only the most imposing, but also the most important event in war. It is the consummation to which all previous combinations necessarily tend ; it is that grand act which may decide the fate of empires as well as armies. The highest and dearest interests of nations, nay, ven of humanity itself, may be involved in its issue. It cannot, therefore, be uninstructive to look briefly at the theory of those received principles by the skilful application of which the fate of battles has in all ages been determined. All the methods in which a battle can be fought may be reduced to three for abstract purposes, each governed by a distinct principle The first, the purely defensive, consists in waiting for the enemy, in a position chosen for the purpose, the object being simply that of maintaining it successfully against him. Theorists almost universally condemn this, and that with good apparent reason; for there is something peculiarly trying to the moral endurance of even the best troops in feeling that they are pinned to one spot to aw r ait the assaults of the enemy without any prospect of retaliation. But the rule is not without exceptions, as is plainly proved by comparing the two great examples of purely defensive actions fought during the campaigns of 1862-63 in America, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. The defender in each case was perfectly successful, beating off his assailant with tremendous loss ; but the results were very opposite. Lee s victory at Fredericksburg stopped, indeed, the advance upon Richmond for the time, but did not seriously affect the course of the war. Meade, on the other hand, by beating the Confede rates off at Gettysburg, completely turned the tide of the campaign, and compelled Lee to abandon all idea of invading the North and commence a difficult retreat to Virginia ; while thenceforth Washington was saved from all danger of being separated from the states that supported the union. This was because the position maintained at Fredericksburg was no more than one point on a single line of advance direct upon Richmond, whereas that of Gettysburg was so completely the key to the whole of the campaign of Mary land, that, whilst it was held by Meade, it was impossible for I/ee to advance beyond it or any part of the north eastern states. The failure to carry it therefore paralyzed the whole scheme of the Confederates for transferring the burden of the struggle to hostile soil. And from a com parison of the varying consequences of these actions, so similar in their course, it will be seen that the defensive battle is justified only when the position to be maintained is one of vital consequence for the enemy to seize in order to carry on further operations with success. Lee has been fairly condemned by even friendly critics for not turning his defensive attitude at Fredericksburg into an offensive on the repulse of the enemy s attack. No one blames Meade for the like conduct at Gettysburg, because his holding his ground fully accomplished all that it w r as necessary for him to do. But such an instance as this last, it should be added, can but rarely occur. The second system is the entirely offensive, in plain words, the attacking the enemy wherever found, with all force available. As it carries with it the moral power which in all ages is found to accompany, until some decided check occur, bodies of disciplined men moving freely forward to the assault, and as it gives the leader the power of choosing the weaker points of his adversary s line on which to concentrate his blows, so it has ever been the favourite with bold and skilful generals leading good troops. Frederick and Napoleon alike preferred it, and won some of their chiefest victories by using it freely. Wellington employed it with marked success in the latest phases of the Peninsular War in 1813-14. Grant adopted it avowedly in his great struggle with Lee in Virginia in 1864. And the Prussians fought on this principle through out the two great wars of 1866 and 1870-71. History, however, shows that it is only fully justified when the attacking general has a force decidedly superior either in numbers or in moral power ; or when, as in the famous case of Frederick at Leuthen.he possesses such extraordinary skill in manoeuvring as to give him all the advantages of long odds, although engaged against superior numbers. It has the serious defect that if the defence prove more successful than was expected, the assailant may have to bring up successively and exhaust all his forces, and thus leave himself without any reserve to meet a sudden onset from the opposite side. In such case defeat probably entails the complete wreck of the hitherto offensive army, and with it possibly the loss of the campaign. It is for this reason that prudent commanders are wont, where the choice lies with them, to select the third mode, the defensive-offensive, or a combination of the two pre ceding. This consists in taking up a position with the design of awaiting the adversary s attack on it, but also of watching the opportunity afforded by the exhaustion of his army in its assaults, or by his extending it too widely in choosing the best points from which to make them, in order to pass suddenly to the offensive. Wellington is justly famous for the success with which he employed this form of action. But it is one of the highest tests of generalship to know exactly when most fitly to use either. And as Napoleon won three at least of his most striking victories, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Dresden, by passing at the right moment suddenly from an apparently passive attitude of defence to a vigorous offensive, so Wellington, after all the world had come to regard him as great only on the defensive, used the strictly offensive form, with the like success, at Vitoria, Orthez, and Toulouse, the last of these three actions being one of such apparent temerity as can hardly be paralleled in modern history, and yet perfectly. 