Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/681

Rh W OMEN 641 seventy-four hours in a week. Women have recently been em ployed to a greater extent than formerly in Government depart ments, especially in the post-office. A married woman may, since the Married Women s Property Act, 1882, carry on a trade separ ately from her husband, and in such a case is liable to be made a bankrupt. She may apparently be a partner of her husband, and may lend him money, but in this case her claim to a dividend on his bankruptcy is postponed to that of other creditors. Family Rights. The age at which a girl can contract a valid marriage is, following Roman law, twelve ; she is thus two years in advance of a boy, who must be fourteen. Under the Infants Settlement Act (see SETTLEMENT) a valid settlement can be made by a woman at seventeen with the approval of the court, the age for a man being twenty. An unmarried woman is liable for the support of illegitimate children till they attain the age of sixteen. She is generally assisted, in the absence of agreement, by an aflilia- tion order granted by magistrates. A married woman having separate property is, under the Married Women s Property Act, liable for the support of her husband, children, and grandchildren becoming chargeable to any union or parish. At common law the father was entitled as against the mother to the custody of a legitimate child up to the age of sixteen, and could only forfeit such right by misconduct. But the Court of Chancery, wherever there was trust property and the infant could be made a ward of court, took a less rigid view of the paternal rights and looked more to the interest of the child, and consequently in some cases to the extension of the mother s rights at common law. Legislation has tended in the same direction. By 36 Viet. c. 12 the Court of Chancery was empowered to enforce a provision in a separation deed, giving up the custody or control of a child to the mother. The Judicature Act, 1873, 25 (10), enacted that in questions relating to the custody and education of infants the rules of equity should prevail. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, largely extended the mother s powers of appointing and acting as a guardian, and gave the court a discretion to regard the mother s wishes as to the custody of the children. The children of women convicted of crime or frequenting the company of prostitutes may be sent to an industrial school. The principal disabilities under which women are now placed may perhaps be classed under the head of family rights, viz., exclusion of female heirs from intestate succession to real estate, unless in absence of a male heir (see INHERITANCE, PRIMO GENITURE), and the obtaining of DIVORCE (q.v.) by a husband for the adultery of his wife, while the wife can only obtain it for adul tery coupled with some further cause, such as cruelty or desertion. Rights of Property. Unmarried women and widows have practi cally equal rights with men. Since the date of the article HUSBAND AND WIFE the Married Women s Property Act, 1882, has extended the change in the law attempted to a limited degree by the previous Acts of 1870 and 1874. The most important provisions of the Act (45 and 46 Viet. c. 75) falling under this head are the following. A married woman is capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing by will or otherwise of any real and personal property as her separate property, in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, without the intervention of any trustee. Every contract entered into by a married woman is to be deemed to bind her separate property, unless the contrary be shown. Property of a woman married after the commencement of the Act, whether belonging to her at the time of marriage or acquired after marriage, is to be held by her as a, feme sole. The same is the case with property acquired after the commencement of the Act by a woman married before the Act. After marriage a woman remains liable for antenuptial debts and liabilities, and as between her and her husband, in the absence of contract to the contrary, her separate property is to be deemed primarily liable. The husband is only liable to the extent of property acquired from or through his wife. The Act also contains provisions as to stock, investment, insurance, evidence (see WIT NESS), and other matters. The effect of the Act is to render obsolete the old law as to what creates a separate use or a reduction into possession of choses in action (see PERSONAL ESTATE), as to equity to a settlement, as to fraud on the husband s marital rights,- 1 and as to the inability of one of two married persons to give a gift to the other. Also, in the case of a gift to a husband and wife in terms which would make them joint-tenants if unmarried, they no longer take as one person but as two. The construction of the Act by the courts has been in one or two cases perhaps somewhat narrow ; still there is no doubt that it has aifected the proprietary rights of married women to an immense extent. Its effect has been principally to improve the position of wives of the humbler class unprotected by marriage settlement. There is a special saving in 1 This was a rule of law, confirmed, though not for the first time established, by the well-known decision of Lord Thurlow in Countess of Stratlnnore v. Bowes, in 1789, to the effect that a secret conveyance by a woman during her engage ment to her future hu.sband might be set aside by him after marriage A legal relation wits in this case created by engagement or betrothal. The only other instance in English law in which betrothal gives any rights appears to be the action for breach of promise of marriage. In the Mosaic law betrothal was, for the purposes of punishment of adultery, equivalent to marriage (see Dent, xxii 23). In some modern systems betrothal is a matter of more importance than it is in England. In Germany, for instance, it is publicly advertised. the Act of existing and future settlement. A settlement is still necessary where it is desired to secure only the enjoyment of the income to the wife and to provide for children. The Act by itself would enable the wife, without regard to family claims, instantly to part with the whole of any property which might come to her. Restraint on anticipation, a means of protecting a married woman s property from her husband s influence, is also preserved by the Act, subject to the liability of such property for antenuptial debts, and to the power given to the court by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, to bind a married woman s interest notwithstanding a clause of restraint. This possibility of being restrained from anticipation is now one of the principal points of difference between the proprietary rights of men and women. Formerly remaining unmarried could be attached as a condition of the enjoyment of property by a widow only, but it has been recently decided that such a condition may be imposed upon a widower as well. In one case, however, the widow has still an advantage over the widower. Limitations contained in her marriage settlement in favour of her children by a former marriage are not treated as voluntary, while similar limitations in the settle ment of a widower are regarded as voluntary, and therefore void as against a subsequent mortgagee of the settled property. 2 By Magna Charta, c. 7, a widow is to have her QUARANTINE (q.v. ), and is not to be forced to re-marry. Procedure. An action for breach of promise of marriage 3 and an Proce- affiliation summons under the Bastardy Acts are, the former prac- dare. tically, the latter entirely, confined to women. An action of SEDUCTION (q.v.), though not brought in England by the woman herself, is for injury suffered by her. The Rules of the Supremo Court and the Married Women s Property Act contain various pro visions for the bringing and defending of actions by married women. The main provision is 1 (2) of the Act, enabling a married woman to sue and be sued, either in contract or in tort or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a, feme sole. Her position, however, is not, owing to the judicial interpretation of the Act, as completely independent as the words of the Act would at first sight appear to imply. It has been held, for instance, that she cannot since the Act, any more than before it, be next friend or guardian ad litein of an infant. The husband and wife too may still be sued jointly for a tort committed by the wife after marriage. Apart from proceedings for divorce or judicial separation, a husband cannot sue his wife for a tort committed during the coverture, nor a wife her husband, unless for the protection and security of her separate property. She can, however, cause him to be bound over in recognizances to keep the peace towards her in case of violence on his part. The Married Women s Property Act contains a useful section enabling questions between husband and wife as to property to be decided in a summary way. A judgment against a married woman under the Act is limited to execution against her separate property ; she cannot like an ordinary debtor be committed to prison under the Debtors Act for default in payment. Criminal Law. There are some offences which can be committed Criminal only by women, others which can be committed only against them. law. Among the former are concealment of birth (in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred), the now obsolete offence of being a common scold, and prostitution and kindred offences. Many offences of the latter kind were up to a recent date dealt with under the Contagious Diseases Acts, which were repealed in 1886. Where a married woman commits a crime in company with her husband, she is generally presumed to have acted by his coercion, and so to be entitled to acquittal. This presumption, however, was never made in witchcraft cases, and is not now made in cases of treason, murder, and other grave crimes, or in crimes in which the principal part must necessarily be taken by the wife, such as keeping a brothel. In fact, the exceptions to the old presumption are now perhaps more numerous than those falling within it. The doctrine of coercion and the practice of separate acknowledgment of deeds by married women (necessary before the Married Women s Property A ct) seem to be vestiges of the period when women, besides being chattels, were treated as chattels. 4 Formerly a wife could not steal her husband s property, but since the Married Women s Property Act this has become possible. The evidence of a wife is not usually receivable for or against her husband (see WITNESS). She does not become an accessory after the fact by receiving and harbouring her husband after he has committed a felony; the husband, however, is not equally privileged if the offence be committed by the wife. Adultery is now no crime, England being almost the only country where such is the case. It was punished by fine in the ecclesiastical courts up to the 17th century, and was made criminal for a short 2 See Re Cameron and Wells, Law Rep., 37 Chancery Div., 32. 3 A brief sketch of the law relating to this branch of the subject has been added by way (if appendix to this article. 4 It was certainly laid down by the Court of Chancery, in more than one case, that the reason for enforcing acknowledgment of deeds by a manied womati apart from her husband was the presumption that in matters of property she was sure to be coerced by him. If such were the truth, the separate acknowledgment a matter of a few minutes conversation was but a poor safeguard. The doctrine of coercion in felonies is attributed by Mr Justice Stephen to the wish to give women, while they had not benefit of clergy, the same chance of escape as men tsee his Diijat of the Criminal laic, App., note 1). XXIV. Si