Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/524

Rh 498 WELLINGTON the Spanish, movement, whether called revolutionary or constitutional, by which the absolute monarchy of King Ferdinand had been overthrown. It was the settled policy of the British Government to oppose any joint intervention of the powers in Spain ; it was not, however, known at London before Wellington set out that the pro ject of intervention yet existed anywhere in a definite form. In passing through Paris the duke discovered the danger to be more imminent than had been supposed ; he also learnt that, whatever might be the intentions of the French Government with regard to intervention in Spain by its own army, it was determined under no circumstances to give Russian troops a passage through France. No sooner had Wellington arrived at Verona than he found that the czar was bent upon obtaining a joint declaration of all the powers condemning the Spanish constitution, and committing to the Russian army, as the mandatory of Europe, the task of overthrowing it. In pursuance of his instructions, Wellington now stated that Great Britain would rather sever itself from the European alliance cemented at Aix-la-Chapelle than consent to any such joint declaration ; and the information which he had privately acquired at Paris enabled him to inform the czar that his project of employing Russian troops in Spain would certainly be thwarted by France. Armed with these two powerful arguments the one public and official, the other personal and private Wellington had no great difficulty in preventing the summary framing of a decree against Spain like that which had been issued two years before by the congress of Troppau against the constitution of Naples. In this respect the British Government had gained its point ; but its success was apparent rather than real. Although the congress of Verona published no declaration of joint European action against the Spanish constitution, it was not in Wellington s power to prevent the negotiations which followed between the French representative and the three Eastern courts. Out of these negotiations arose the French attack upon Spain in 1823, accompanied by diplomatic action on the part of the Eastern powers which rendered the restoration of Spanish absolutism more complete and more unqualified, than it would have been if France had entered upon the work entirely alone. In the cabinet of Lord Liverpool the influence of Canning had, since Castlereagh s death, been predominant on all matters of foreign policy. Though Wellington disliked the tone of defiance frequently used by Canning towards the autocratic courts, he was sincerely at one with Canning s Spanish policy ; he did not oppose his recog nition of the independence of the South-American re publics ; and, when Canning, abandoning his position of passive neutrality between the Turkish Government and insurgent Greece, proposed to attempt joint diplomatic action with Russia in hope of terminating the struggle, the duke was willing to co-operate in this policy within certain limits. Canning, while really anxious to assist the Greeks, based his new policy officially on the need of preventing Russia from acting alone. With the duke, the design of putting a check upon Russia was the sole active motive. He cared nothing whatever for the Greeks, but he did feel anxious to prevent Russia from making their cause a pre- Negotia- text of war with the Porte. He therefore consented, on tions at the coronation of the czar Nicholas in 1826, to carry pro- St Peters- p 0sa ] s to St Petersburg for the diplomatic co-operation of Russia and England in bringing about a settlement of the Greek question. On the 4th of April 1827 the protocol of St Petersburg was signed, by which the two powers agreed that the mediation of England should be offered to the Porte, on terms that Greece should be granted local autonomy, but remain part of the Ottoman empire and tributary to the sultan. No provision was made for further action in case the Porte should not accept England s mediation on these terms, nor was employment of force even alluded to. Scarcely had this protocol been signed when the accession of Canning to the premiership caused Wellington to withdraw from the Government. He was willing to serve with Canning under a common leader, but would not serve under him. The effect of his withdrawal was momentous in its bearing upon Eastern affairs. Canning, freed from Wellington s restraint, carried his intervention on behalf of Greece a step further, and con cluded, on the 27th of July, the treaty of London, whereby France, England, and Russia bound themselves to put an end to the conflict in the East and to enforce the condi tions of the St Petersburg protocol upon the belligerents. Against this treaty Wellington protested, on the ground that it &quot;specified means of compulsion which were neither more nor less than measures of war.&quot; His apprehensions were fulfilled by the battle of Navarino. Canning died in August 1827, and on the fall of Lord Prime Goderich s cabinet five months later Wellington became i nis t prime minister. He had declared some time before that it would be an act of madness for him to take this post ; but the sense of public duty led him to accept it when it was pressed upon him by the king. His cabinet included at the first Huskisson, Palmerston, and other followers of Canning. The repeal of the Test and Corpor ation Acts having been carried in the House of Commons in the session of 1828, Wellington, to the great disap pointment of Tories like Lord Eldon, recommended the House of Lords not to offer further resistance, and the measure was accordingly carried through. Soon after wards a quarrel between the duke and Huskisson led to the retirement from the ministry of all its more liberal members. It was now hoped by the so-called Protestant party that Wellington, at the head of a more united cabinet, would offer a steady resistance to Catholic eman cipation. Never were men more bitterly disappointed. The Clare election and the progress of the Catholic Cathol Association convinced both &quot;Wellington and Peel that the emanc: time had come when Catholic emancipation must be P atloa granted ; and, submitting when further resistance would have led to civil war, the ministry itself brought in at the beginning of the session of 1829 a bill for the relief of the Catholics. Wellington, who had hitherto always op posed Catholic emancipation, explained and justified his change of front in simple and impressive language. His undoubted seriousness and his immense personal reputation did not, however, save him from the excesses of calumny and misinterpretation; and in order to impose some modera tion upon his aspersers the duke thought it necessary to send a challenge to one of the most violent of these, the earl of Winchelsea. No mischief resulted from the encounter. Catholic emancipation was the great act of Wellington s ministry ; in other respects his tenure of office was not marked by much success. The imagination and the breadth of view necessary to a statesman of the highest order were not part of his endowment, nor had he the power of working harmoniously with his subordinates. His Eastern policy was singularly short-sighted. There Easter might have been good reason, from Wellington s point policy of view, for condemning Canning s treaty of London ; but when, in consequence of this treaty, the battle of Navarino had been fought, the Turkish fleet sunk, and the independence of Greece practically established, it was the weakest of all possible courses to withdraw England from its active intervention, and to leave to Russia the gains of a private and isolated war. This, however, was Wellington s policy; and, having permitted Russia to go