Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/387

Rh TACTICS.] the infantry, and corresponding formations were as far as possible taken by the other arms, the length of the longest column, accord ing to Von der Goltz, was, when actually on the road, from front to rear 67^ miles in length. In this case about three corps were march ing together. Hence it is always desirable when possible to allow one road at least to each division. Another striking illustration both of the size of modern armies and of the length occupied by troops on a road is given by Von der Goltz. He calculates that, if the present German army were placed on one road, it would reach from Mainz to the Russian frontier, the whole distance being densely packed with men, guns, and waggons. Again, lie shows that either the present French or German army extended in battle array would occupy the entire length of the common frontier of the countries, .dvanced Advanced and Hear Guards. The questions involved in the ad rear proper use and employment of advanced and rear guards would nards. occupy more space than we can possibly afford for them. In general terms it may be said that, with both advanced and rear guards, artillery (perhaps with machine and quick-firing guns), cavalry, and mounted infantry will play the principal parts. It is tolerably certain, though opinion is much divided on the subject, that the enormous advanced guards employed by the Germans during the 1870 campaign, in which the advanced guard of an army corps sometimes consisted of about half the whole force, would be for most campaigns a mistake. The tendency of very large advanced guards is, as that campaign showed, to bring on actions prematurely. Artillery or mounted corps can be easily drawn out of a premature action. Infantry cannot be so withdrawn. If the advanced guard is large enough to give time to the marching body to form upon suitable ground before it is attacked, it possesses all the strength that is necessary. The task of a rear guard retiring before a victorious enemy, and covering the retreat of a beaten army, is one of the most delicate of operations. It depends for its proper execution on the full employment of those means for gaining time by forcing an enemy to deploy on unfavourable ground which have been described under the general heading. utposts. Outposts. The subject of outposts is also one which, for its full explanation, would require a volume to itself. The general prin ciple on which their use is based is that a slender cordon of men shall so surround an army when at rest that no enemy can approach its quarters unobserved, and that this cordon shall be supported by piquets from which the actual sentries for the cordon are taken, and these again by stronger but less numerous bodies, serving to connect together the different parts, so that, if the enemy attempts to drive in the outposts at any point, he meets with a continually increasing resistance. In this broad indication of the method, the principle is equally applicable to cavalry and to infantry outposts. In general, however, the security of a modern army, when not in actual contact with an enemy preparatory to battle, depends chiefly on the early information gained by cavalry pushed far out beyond the rest of the army. The cavalry will be at a distance of at least one or two days march in advance and on the flanks scouring the country in all directions. It is practically certain that during the earlier stages of a campaign the collisions that will occur will be between bodies of cavalry pushed forward from both sides, supported by horse artillery and by such infantry as can be rapidly transported to the front. The circumstances of the collision of the main armies must depend in the first instance upon what happens in these encounters, in which cavalry will be the most important arm. Both sides will endeavour to use their cavalry to obtain all the information they can and to prevent the enemy from obtaining information of their own movements. At the same time, in the case of two great neighbouring powers like France and Germany, it is probable that attempts will be made by the cavalry on both sides to interfere with the mobilization of the armies across the frontier. These efforts promise to result in contests on a scale and of a kind such as we have never yet seen, and of the nature of which it is difficult to judge from any past experience of war. It seems certain, how ever, that the body which will gain victory in these encounters will be the most highly trained and numerous cavalry, supported by its sister arm the horse artillery. But the value of a body of mounted infantry, and perhaps a strong force of cyclists, pushed forward to support the cavalry, can hardly be doubted when it is remembered how often defiles will have to be seized, bridges held, and important stations permanently secured. No doubt, when such infantry is not available, cavalry will at times have to be employed on foot for these purposes. So long as such employment is looked on as exceptional and a necessity to be regretted, it need do no harm. In any case no rules must prevent the securing of the actual object for the time being. ieconnais- Reconnaissance and Intelligence. The vital necessity of obtain- ince and ing all possible information of what an enemy is doing makes the itelli- reconnaissances continually carried out by cavalry all round an ence. army, and the occasional special reconnaissances conducted by single officers and small parties or strong bodies employed for the purpose, some of the most important operations of war. It is, however, 363 difficult in brief space to lay down rules for their guidance, because the essence of the value of such work depends on officers being trained in all parts of the art of war so as to know what to look for and what to report. The principles of such reconnaissance are determined by the general principles of both strategy and tactics, and are not in themselves independent. Nevertheless, it is very important that it should be realized, by men who are sending in reports from some one point of a large circle, that information in itself apparently unimportant may be of the greatest value when it is collated with other facts either already known or simultane ously gathered from other quarters. Thus, for instance, a news paper advertisement, or a reference to a particular man or officer as not being with his regiment, may give negative evidence of the position of that regiment which may become of great importance. The sifting, therefore, of information should be chiefly left to the department at headquarters which has charge of that work. Spies and deserters will supply evidence the value of which usually depends on the power of the department to check their assertions by a number of minute facts already known. Any information about the enemy or the country which may assist to that end should be carefully gathered and reported. Numerous forms and rules have been drawn up to supply hints as to the kind of informa tion about roads, rivers, railways, villages, &c., which should be gathered. Lord Wolseley s Pocket-Hook and Colonel Harrison s Handbook are the best for these purposes. Literature. The following books may Ibe recommended as the most recent and most valuable on matters of military art. (1) On tactics, to which modern military literature has been chiefly devoted, see Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen s Letters on cavalry, infantry, and artillery, especially those on the last-named. These arc being now translated in the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institu tion. (2) On cavalry tactics two anonymous works by the same writer appeared in Germany in 1884 : Die Kava/lerie-Division als Schlachten/corper,and Ueber die Beitaffnung, Ausbi/dung, und Vencendunrj der Reile.rei. The former has been translated into French in the Re.i-ue de Cavalerieof successive months of 1885-8fl, and we have no hesitation in saying that it is a book that ought to be known to every officer of every arm of the service, but more especially to every cavalry officer. See also Das Volk in Waffen (&quot;The Nation in Arms&quot;), by Baron von der Goltz, which hiis been completely translated into French under the title of La Nation arme e organisation militaire et grande tactique moderncs (1884) ; parts of it have been translated by Sir Lumley Graham in the Journal of the United Service Institution, .No. 138. vol. xxxi. (1887). (3) On infantry tactics the books are legion. They should be read in conjunction with the actual history of the battles on which their conclusions are based, and if possible with a study of them on the ground on which they were fought. Perhaps the most important are Von Scherff s Studien zu neuen Infanterie-Taktik (1873), translated by Sir Lumley Graham, New Tactics of Infantry, 1875; Verdy du Vernois s Studien uber Fe/d- dienat (1SSG), and his Studien uber Tnippen- Fuhrung (1873-75), and the numerous strategical and tactical studies recently published in Germany, many by Von Gizycki, and in some cases translated as we have noted above by Captain Spenser Wilkinson, and publUhed by the Manchester Tactical Society. We should also recommend a perusal of Col. the Right Hon. J. II. A. Macdonald s Common Setife on Parade (1880), from which we have given seveial extracts. (4) On strategy Prince Kraft s &quot;strategical letters&quot; have already been alluded to. Sir Edward Hamley s Operations of War (4t h cd., 1878) remains without a rival in the English language on questions of strategy. We cannot think that Clauscwitz s great book. On War. translated by Col. J. J. Graham, 1873, has ceased to be of value. Mekler s Taktik, which represents the course for the German war school, has not as yet been translated ; it is a most important work. No soldier can read Major Adams s Great Campaigns without advantage. But on these matters we must conclude by expressing our conviction that an exhau&amp;gt;tive study of at least a single campaign carried out pretty nearly on the principles laid down, for the pur poses of the study of general history, by Dr Arnold, in his Lectures on History, but with just such modifications as apply to war study, is almost indispensable to a soldier who would derive much value from those books which examine the whole field of war, and that that cultivation of the judgment of which we have spoken must follow, if any real use is to be made of either one or the other. (J. F. M*.) XAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS. The introduction of steam, armour, the torpedo, and other modern changes must necessarily have produced modifications in naval strategy and tactics since the days of the last great naval war. In the course of the last eighty years wars on land, both in Europe and elsewhere, have been frequent, and soldiers have thus been enabled to keep pace with modern inventions, and to accommodate their strategy and tactics to the ever-changing conditions of the problem. But since 1805, when Great Britain, by her crowning victory of Trafalgar, placed herself in un disputed command of the seas, and, having rendered her self superior to all possible combinations against her, was thus enabled to found unmolested her unrivalled colonial empire, the world has seen no naval war of sufficient magnitude to enable seamen to lay down maxims of strategy and tactics founded on actual experience. It does not follow, however, that we must necessarily give up the problems as insoluble ; we are entitled to reason by analogy. The lessons of history, if not followed too slavishly, will act as a useful guide ; and when we have made due allowance for the superseding of sail by steam power, and the consequent limits to the mobility of all