Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/385

Rh TACTICS,] WAR 361 while with very rapid firing from the flank an interval of from 6 to 8 seconds allows a shell to traverse a range of from 2500 to 3000 yards, so that the effect of each shell can be seen. 1 The effect of this is to enable the officer commanding the battery to have his fire under control, and to induce much more careful firing by each gun. Indeed, if a German battery is seen to be firing, not from the flank but irregularly, it may be taken for granted that it is being mastered by the hostile fire, and is out of hand. apply of The duty of each commanding officer of a battery is to nimuni- be continually watching over the replenishment of his ammunition, and therefore as long as possible to draw upon his waggons for ammunition, keeping the ammunition in his limbers as a last reserve. If this cannot be done, the limbers must be filled up as rapidly as possible. If, however, by misfortune all ammunition is exhausted, the artillery must not retire, but must, for the sake of the moral effect, remain without firing rather than produce the encouragement to the enemy and discouragement to their own troops of withdrawing without express orders. ummary. We shall complete this sketch of the duties of artillery in action by quoting the following summary from Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen : On the Offensive. (a) Artillery, after it has silenced the enemy s artillery, must not as a rule approach nearer than from 1600 to 1700 yards to infantry of the enemy which is as yet intact and is not engaged with other troops, (b) If the enemy s infantry is held in check by another force of artillery, or by infantry, it is not only advisable, but it is the duty of artillery to advance to a range of from 1100 to 1200 yards, (c) At the most decisive moment of the action artillery must not shun the very closest range, (d) As soon as the main attack has proved successful, the artillery must hasten np to secure the captured position by its fire ; at such a moment, its proper place, in most cases, is in the line of skirmishers. On the Defensive. (a ) The normal post for artillery in a defen sive position (though this may be modified by the character of the ground) is 500 yards in rear of the foremost infantry position, pro vided always that&quot; the latter leaves the field of fire of the artillery open, (b) Artillery must never abandon its position, even if the enemy come up to the muzzles of the guns, unless the officer com manding the troops has given orders for a general retreat. But this does not imply that artillery, acting on the defensive, are for bidden, if the assailant begins to get the advantage in the artillery duel, to cease firing for a time, and to withdraw their guns under cover, with the object of suddenly coming into action again at the most critical moment, (c) If the order to retreat is given, the only possible moment at which it can be commenced is either when the enemy has not yet advanced to the attack, or when he is preparing a second attack after having been repulsed in the first. Horse Artillery in a Cavalry Action. (a) As a rule horse artillery should go in at once to a decisive range for the artillery duel, since the considerations which compel artillery when engaged with infantry to fight at longer ranges lose their force in this case, owing to the speed at which cavalry can move. From this posi tion it will silence the enemy s artillery, and immediately after wards, or as soon as it can see them, it will turn its fire on tbc enemy s cavalry, (b) During the charge of its own cavalry it will fire on that of the enemy, or, if that be not possible, on his artillery. If it has nothing to fire at, it will remain in position with loaded guns (common shell and not shrapnel should be used), in order, in case of the failure of the charge, to give support to its retiring cavalry, and to show them where they are to rally, (c) The horse artillery requires a special escort on that flank of its position only on which the cavalry fight is not taking place, and even there it requires it merely for the purpose of scouting ; a section will therefore be sufficient, (d) If the charge succeeds, the horse artillery must gallop up to the spot where it took place, in order to secure its possession with their fire, and to assist in the pursuit. The Combined Action of the Three Arms. So far we have spoken of what may properly be called the minor tactics of the three arms, though that name is often applied in quite a different sense. There can be little doubt that it is in that portion of tactics that the complexity and difficulty of the present stage of the question lie. As regards the larger handling of armies, the tendency of recent wars has been rather to simplification than to increased diffi- 1 See the prince s 15th letter, Royal Artillery Institution Proceed ings, p. 171. culty. The employment of artillery in great masses, never in isolated batteries, is, so far as that arm is concerned, its most important law. So much so is this the case that, even when as many as eighty-four guns were collected together at Worth, the Germans found it answer best to turn all of them at once upon a single French battery, and then upon another, and so on. Wherever possible, some at least of the guns will take up an enfilading position ; that is, they will fire from flank to flank of the troops they assail, in preference to firing directly at them. It is always advantageous to the fire of artillery to have great depth rather than great extent to fire at, because range is much more difficult to fix correctly than direction. Prince Kraft regards it as doubtful whether artillery can be employed in crossing its fire, the right of a long line of guns firing at an enemy s right and the left at the left, which would give to each a certain advantage in the direc tion of their fire. But it is clear that, if the whole of a long line of guns be employed, as at Worth, first against one object and then against another, many of the batteries will not be firing directly to their front, but at an angle, sometimes a very sharp one, to their own front. In any case the earlier stages of a modern battle are Normal sure to begin with a heavy fire of artillery, following either course on some slight affairs of outposts or on the cavalry having u ascertained the position of the enemy at least approxi mately. Then may perhaps follow, what we have already suggested as one of the alternatives, a carefully regulated long-range fire of infantry; then probably a gradual development of the infantry of the assailing army in front of the position to be attacked and certain tentative move ments designed to feel the strength of an enemy s position. Then, as soon as the point to be carried at any cost has been determined on, every effort will be made to distract the enemy s attention from this, to occupy him at other points, and by engaging him all along the line to prevent him from reinforcing the point which it is essential to carry. At present the attempt will be, when possible, almost certainly to attack a flank. But, as the necessity of this becomes thoroughly realized as it now is on both sides, and a tendency arises towards continual extension of the space occupied in order to meet outflanking movements, it is almost certain that on one side or other the extension will exceed the limits of defensive power, and that then blows will be struck with the object of breaking the too extended line. All the cavalry not employed in mere reconnoitring duties, or for keeping up the connexion between different parts of the army, will ordinarily be kept under the con trol of the commander-in-chief until he is able to define the part of the battle in which it can be most effectually used. Then, when he has so far decided its direction, he will be obliged to leave all details to the cavalry leader, who will choose his own time and opportunity for delivering his blow. The local defensive power conferred by the present arms will be used on both sides. The assailant will endeavour by employing it at unimportant parts of his line to gain the advantage of the superiority of force neces sary for striking at the decisive point. The defendant will naturally employ it to the full. Both on one side and the other, however, the effort will be to keep strong forces of all arms for the decisive period of the action. So far as Continental warfare is concerned, the enormous development of modern armies makes it very uncertain how far elaborate strokes of tactical skill can ever again be delivered in the way they were by Napoleon, for instance, at Austerlitz and Dresden. The experience of recent wars supplies us at all events with nothing of the kind. The enormous masses and the enormous extent of ground to be covered almost force a general into the simplest possible arrangements on the larger scale, leaving XXIV. 46