Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/382

Rh 358 W A K [TACTICS. leave the question with the remark that the moral effect produced by a volley is too great for the attempt to use it ever to be willingly thrown away, but that it would be now rash to take for granted that on service the best troops can be depended on to deliver during close fighting accurate volleys, unless it be in small parties. The possi bility of even the fire of groups is disputed by Von der Goltz. It is obvious that, if he be correct in this respect, all attempt at regulating fire in action is &quot; An effort only and a noble aim, Still to be sought for, never to be won.&quot; We incline to think that all war experience tends to this conclusion, and it is a reservation which we must therefore append to our cordial agreement with the passages we have quoted from Colonel Macdonald. Cavalry. Of all tactical facts, the one which needs most study for practical purposes is the relation of the size of men, on foot, mounted, in mass, and in different formations, to the undulations and features of ground. There is nothing which the untrained eye so little realizes as the extent to which concealment and cover for men, even for mounted men, exists on the apparently most level plain. This fact, which is important for both the other arms, is for cavalry vital to its present use. Nothing is more certain than that under the present condition of arms cavalry cannot successfully assail in front either artillery or infantry in any formation in which the artillery or infantry are able to use their arms and can observe the approach of cavalry over long distances. On the other hand, cavalry striking by sudden surprise on the flank of unprepared infantry or artillery, engaged with other enemies, may produce an effect, great to an extent of which as yet we have no adequate example in modern war. That is the conclusion drawn from their own experiences of the 1870 campaign by the most experi enced leaders who were employed in it. Count Von Moltke in 18o2, and Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen in his letters on cavalry published in 1887, have alike pro nounced decisively on the subject, and it would be easy to show that the whole weight of the best military opinion in all countries except Eussia is on the same side. The practical possibility on most fields of battle of cavalry being thus employed depends on two facts, on the one hand the extent to which almost all ground presents opportunities to a skilful leader for moving his men unobserved from point to point of a great battle-field, and on the other that absorption in the intense excitement of a modern fight which prevents men from observing what is taking place anywhere beyond the immediate range of their own employment. It follows from this that the utmost possible skill in the handling of cavalry as a mounted arm will be required if cavalry is to take advantage of such chances as modern fight will present to it. Now, in all periods since the invention of firearms, there has been a tendency, as improvement in weapons has taken place, to attempt to put cavalry on a level in point of firearms with the infantry with which it has had to contend. Invariably, when that rare development of armies, a great cavalry leader, has arisen, he has swept away all attempts of the kind, and has employed his cavalry with their proper weapon, the &quot;arme blanche,&quot; sword or lance. The reason of this is easy to explain, and the explana tion is one that shows that the principle is as applicable to the present condition of warfare as to any preceding one. The effective action of cavalry as cavalry depends on ruse, on surprise, on skilful manoeuvring, and on the impetuous power and moral effect of the man and horse, glued to one another as though they together formed the old ideal of the arm, the centaur. Now, the dash and vigour with which an actual cavalry charge takes place depends on the moral condition of that part of the centaur in whose hands it is the great purpose and effect of high training to place the guiding of the composite animal. Never has it been possible to train a great body of fighting men in two opposite directions at once. Balanced judg ment, and an appreciation of the powers and uses of each part of the force he has to employ, are the duties of a general. But if a body of infantry, dispersed in scattered groups, or isolated men, are to repel successfully a body of charging cavalry, they must have acquired sufficient sang-froid to calmly fire at the great and overwhelming avalanche which they see moving down on them. To that end they must have acquired confidence in their weapon, the firearm, and must have learnt to believe that its power is so great that it gives them plenty of time to bring down the mighty-looking horseman before he closes with them. Similarly, if cavalry is successfully to be led by skilful manoeuvring into a fight where firearms are creating the most horrible appearance of danger, they must have ac quired a confidence in the skill of their leaders, in their own power of combined action, and in the effects of their sudden appearance, which will carry them on though leaders fall, and though death and destruction seem to await them. In other words, they must have learnt to despise the firearm when pitted against their own skill in evading its danger and in delivering home their blows. All attempts, therefore, to train cavalry not to employ their skill in manoauvring as the weapon to which they trust, but, on the contrary, to be always ready to jump off their horses and begin firing, tends directly to weaken and destroy the very spirit and quality on which the efficiency of true cavalry depends. Now, the great leaders to whom we have referred believe absolutely in the possibility of true cavalry properly trained being able to play its part on the field of battle. Prince Kraft s 7th letter on this subject is so admirable in its analysis of past experience that all who would under stand the subject should study it in its integrity. His conclusion is &quot; From all that I have stated in this long letter I draw the conclusion that cavalry will, in the future, also be able to play a decisive part in battle if they can be led in such a manner that they can break out round a flank, and can thus, up to the last moment, take advantage of the fire effect of their own line of battle. But to do so will sometimes require from the cavalry that they shall be able to advance as much as four miles, at a rapid pace, before they deliver their charge.&quot; 1 There is, however, another necessity of modern warfare Mounted which is altogether distinct from the question of supplying firearms to cavalry in order to make up to them for the increased power of infantry. Powerful as modern infantry is, it is very slow in its movements. It is very difficult for a general to have it at the very place where he wants it. Hence the idea of mounting infantry and of sending them forward either on horseback or in carts, or where there are numerous roads on bicycles and tricycles, is one that is of the greatest importance. The so-called cavalry of the American civil war were all of this character. Most of them had been accustomed to rifle-shooting from their child hood and could ride. They had had no opportunity what ever of acquiring the manoeuvring facilities of European cavalry. Probably European cavalry would have been altogether unsuited to the country in which they had to work. The essential condition of the efficiency of mounted 1 Translation in Royal Artillery Institution Proceedings, April 1888, p. 40. See also Die Kavallerie- Division als Schlachtenkorper, 1884.