Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/381

Rh TACTICS.] W A E 357 far as we can train picked shots to fire at long ranges, so as to disturb the movements of columns, and to interfere with artillery, it is well worth our while to do so. But with the utmost training that we can give them the mass of men in the ranks of an army never will become good shots at long ranges. Almost all fire, therefore, at long ranges becomes unaimed fire, and an enemy can to a great extent avoid exposing himself on the ground where the fortuitous rain of bullets is falling. Meantime the mere fact of firing having begun puts the troops who are firing almost beyond the reach of orders. Their own excite ment and the noise together make it most difficult to give them any directions. Sights that have been fixed for the long range are not changed to the short. The fact that, despite all their efforts, the enemy continues to ad vance demoralizes them, and despite his losses encourages him. These are considerations which are not taken into account in the arguments of those who base their con clusions merely on the amount of loss which may be in flicted at very long ranges. Yet, at all events up to 1877, they had in actual fighting proved supreme. It may be the case that a very highly trained army, using long-range volley firing under effective control, might produce such loss upon an enemy approaching that it would make his actual attack upon a position impossible. What is certain is that, up to 1877, there had been no experience in war which proved that such long-ranged fire was as effective as fire carefully reserved for the ranges within which infantry can use their arm with the greatest effect. Such at all events was the experience of the 1870 cam paign, and it confirmed the experience of previous wars in certain respects which, as will have been seen from the above account, depend rather on the condition of men s minds than on the efficiency of weapons. Both, however, in the German army and in the French an immense im pression was produced by the incidents of the attack on Plevna. There is no doubt that there the certainly un aimed fire of the Turks produced an enormous effect. Skobeleff, when he had at last succeeded in reaching the &quot; Green Hill &quot; in one of his own most brilliant efforts, found that there were no troops behind the slender line of skirmishers whom he had actually with him. All his reserves had melted away under the storm of bullets. If this experience could be accepted as representing a normal phase of a modern battle, the conclusion would be inevit able that so long as there are ample supplies of ammuni tion the effect of long-range fire may be so great as to be decisive. It would be madness altogether to reject such an experience. Where analogous conditions occur no doubt a better regulated long-range fire is too important an element of power to be ignored. But it is necessary to realize what the conditions were. In the first place, the whole attack was one that never ought to have been made. It never would have been made had not the com manding archduke overriden the advice of all the best soldiers he had, and in mere obstinacy and ignorance dashed his men against a position that ought never to have been so assailed. It was an attempt of a field army against what had almost become a fortress. The Russians were unsupported by any adequate artillery for its reduc tion. The ground was unusually open and exposed to the full range of the Turkish fire. The Russians showed here just the same incapacity for taking advantage of ground, so far as the smaller groups were concerned, which they had shown in the Crimea. They huddled together in great masses, more unwieldy than any regular column, but just as much exposed to unaimed fire. There was therefore nothing to show that a properly conducted skirmishing attack might not have found means of reaching the posi tion which Skobeleff actually secured. Nevertheless, when all these allowances have been made, and while it seems as important as ever to realize what advantages the sudden effect of reserved fire may secure, the fact remains that under certain very possible condi tions of fighting an extensive employment of long-range fire may be advisable, and it is therefore right that every army should prepare for such an event. For instance, in an attack on the forts d arret with which the French have covered their frontier, it is ex tremely probable that the Germans, being close to their own magazines, and therefore able to employ a practically unlimited amount of ammunition, will overwhelm these places with long-range infantry as well as with artillery fire. There is no doubt that their infantry has been practised in firing volleys at very long range, and for such purposes it would be certainly comparatively easy to ensure the delivery of actual volleys. It may even be the case that in defensive positions, where the extent of ground open to view is considerable, long-range infantry fire regu lated by volleys may be attempted. We cannot, however, see how it would be possible to attempt this during an attack unless one special body of troops be assigned for the work of long-range fire, in order to occupy the atten tion of the enemy while other forces advance to the attack. On the one hand, the discipline of the French army was so loose during the campaign of 1870 that it is quite possible that long-range fire might be much better brought under control than it was by them ; on the other, it is emphatically necessary to assert that the difficulties involved in a free employment of long-range fire are not merely those of an adequate supply of ammunition, but that those considerations to which we have drawn atten tion must be taken into account. If an army is sufficiently well in hand for the choice between long-range fire and reserved fire to be in the option of the general who com mands, then undoubtedly cases will arise when each may be used with advantage. Certainly it would not be a wise or safe thing for an army to enter the field without having ever practised the regulated fire by volleys at long range against an army which had practised it. It is clear that the tendency in that case would be for the unpractised to indulge in much unregulated long-range firing. With an army trained to both methods of action, the general who realizes the risks and advantages of either will be able to exercise a sounder choice than the man who has become an inveterate pleader for either system, and cannot there fore adapt himself to the cases that arise. The general question of volley firing as against indivi- Volley dual shooting is independent of the special use of volleys for very long-range shooting to which we have above re ferred. It may obviously be possible to ensure the regular delivery of volleys at very long ranges, such as the French are now practising, 3000 yards or more, without its being possible to do so in anything that can properly be called an engaged fight. The effect produced by a well-delivered volley is out of all proportion great as compared with the effect of isolated shots. Moreover, it is a curious fact that apparently men aim better when they fire together than when they fire each by himself one after another. It is constantly found at the butts that the greatest number of shots has been delivered by the &quot;best volley,&quot; that is, the one in which all the arms go off most like one. But it is a matter of great doubt whether in war it is practically possible under most circumstances to deliver a volley at all. Captain May, the author of the &quot; tactical retro spect &quot; on the I860 campaign, denied that any volleys had been fired in that campaign. The cases of its employment in the 1870 campaign, which are sufficiently established not to fall under such criticism as he applied to the nomi nal volleys of 18G6, are not very numerous. We may