Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 20.djvu/768

Rh 744 ROME [HISTORY. knew little or nothing ; the task of ridding the Greek sea- ports of their barbarian foes he no doubt regarded as an easy one ; and the splendid force he brought with him was intended rather for the conquest of the West than for the preliminary work of chastising a few Italian tribes, or securing the submission of the unwarlike Italian Greeks. Pyrrhus's first measure was to place Tarentum under a strict military discipline; this done he advanced into Lucania to meet the Roman consul La^vinus. The battle which followed, on the banks of the Liris, ended in the complete defeat of the Roman troops, largely owing to the panic caused by the elephants which Pyrrhus had brought with him (280). 1 The Greek cities expelled their Roman garrisons and joined him, while numerous bands of Samnites, Lucauians, and Bruttians flocked to his standard. But, to the disappointment of his Greek and Italian allies, Pyrrhus showed no anxiety to follow up the advantage he had gained. His heart was set on Sicily and Africa, and his immediate object was to effect such an arrangement with Rome as would at once fulfil the pledges he had given to the Greeks by securing them against Roman interference and set himself free to seek his fortunes westward. But, though his favourite minister Cineas employed all his skill to win the ear of the senate, and, though Pyrrhus himself lent weight to his envoy's words by advancing as near Rome as Anagnia (279), nothing could shake the resolution of the senate, and Cineas brought back the reply that the Romans could not treat with Pyrrhus so long as he remained in arms upon Italian soil. Disappointed in his hopes of peace, Pyrrhus in the next year (278) turned his forces against the Roman strongholds in Apulia. 2 Once more, at Ascu- lum, he routed the legions, but only to find that the indomitable resolution of the enemy was strengthened by defeat. Weary of a struggle which- threatened inde- finitely to postpone the fulfilment of his dreams of empire, Pyrrhus resolved to quit Italy, and, leaving garri- sons in the Greek towns, crossed into Sicily. Here his success at first was such as promised the speedy realiza- tion of his hopes. The Sicilian Greeks hailed him as a deliverer; the Carthaginians were driven back to the extreme west of the island, and Eryx and Pauormus fell into his hands. But at this point fortune deserted him. His efforts to take Lilybaeum were fruitless ; the Carthaginians recovered their courage, while the unstable Greeks, easily daunted by the first threatenings of failure, and impatient of the burdens of war, broke out into open murmurs against him. Soured and disappointed, Pyrrhus returned to Italy (276) to find the Roman legions steadily moving southwards, and his Italian allies disgusted by his deser- tion of their cause. One of the consuls for the year (275), M. Curius Dentatus, the conqueror of Samnium, was encamped at Beneventum awaiting the arrival of his colleague. Here Pyrrhus attacked him, and the closing battle of the war was fought. It ended in the complete victory of the Romans. Pyrrhus, unable any longer to face his opponents in the field, and disappointed of all assistance from his allies, retreated in disgust to Tarentum and thence crossed into Greece. 3 A few years later (272) Tarentum was surrendered to Rome by its Epirot garrison ; it was granted a treaty of alliance, but its walls were razed and its fleet handed over to Rome. In 270 Rhegium also entered the ranks of Roman allies, and finally in 269 a single campaign crushed the last efforts at resistance in Samnium. Rome was now at leisure to consolidate the position she had won. . Between 273 and 263 three new colonies were founded in Samnium and Lucania Paestum in 273, Beneventum in 1 Pliu., JT. H., viii. 6. 2 Plut., Pi/rrh.,-21. 268, ^Esernia in 263. In central Italy the area of Roman 486, 4? territory was increased by the full enfranchisement (268) 486 of the Sabines, 4 and of their neighbours to the east, the Picentes. To guard the Adriatic coast colonies were established at Ariminum (268), at Firmum, and at Castrum 486 Novum (264), while to the already numerous maritime 49 colonies was added that of Cosa in Etruria. 5 Rome was now the undisputed mistress of Italy. The Rome limits of her supremacy to the north were represented astlie roughly by a line drawn across the peninsula from the "'.' j tr mouth of the Arno on the west to that of the ^sis on the east. 6 Beyond this line lay the Ligurians and the Celts ; all south of it was now united as " Italy " under the rule of Rome. But the rule of Rome over Italy, like her wider rule over the Mediterranean coasts, was not an absolute dominion over conquered subjects. It was in form at least a confederacy under Roman protection and guid- ance; and the Italians, like the provincials, were not the subjects, but the "allies and friends" of the Roman people. 7 Marvellous as are the perseverance and skill with which Rome built up, consolidated, and directed this confederacy, it is yet clear that both her success in forming it and its stability when formed were due in part to other causes than Roman valour and policy. The disunion which, in former times, had so often weakened the Italians in their struggles with Rome still told in her favour, and rendered the danger of a combined revolt against her authority remote in the extreme. In some cases, and especially in the city states of Etruria, Campania, and Magna Graecia, where the antagonism of the two political parties, aristocrats and democrats, was keen, Rome found natural and valuable allies in the former. Among the more backward peoples of central Italy, the looseness of their political organization not only lessened their power of resistance, but enabled Rome either to detach tribe after tribe from the confederacy or to attack and crush them singly. Elsewhere she was aided by ancient feuds, such as those between Samnites and Apulians, or Tarentines and lapygians, or by the imminent dread of a foe Celt, or Samnite, or Lucanian whom Roman aid alone could repel. And, while combination against her was thus rendered difficult, if not impossible, by internal dissensions, feuds, differences of interest, of race, of language, and habits, Rome herself, from her position in the centre of Italy, was so placed as to be able to strike promptly, on the first signs of concerted opposition. All these advantages Rome utilized to the utmost. We have no^means of deciding how far she applied elsewhere the principle upon which she acted in northern Etruria and Campania, of attaching the aristocratic party in a com- munity to Roman interests, by the grant of special privileges; but it is certain that she endeavoured by every means in her power to perpetuate, and even to increase, the disunion which she had found so useful among her allies. In every possible way she strove to isolate them from each other, while binding them closely to herself. The old federal groups were in most cases broken up, and each of the members united with Rome by a special treaty of alliance. In Etruria, Latium, Campania, and Magna Graecia the city state was taken as the unit; in central Italy, where urban life was non-existent, the unit was the tribe. The northern Sabellian peoples, for instance, the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani, were now 4 Veil. Pat., i. 14, "suffragii fcremli jus Sabinis datum." 8 Veil. Pat., i. 14 ; Livy, Epit., xv. The present writer has followed Beloch (Itul. Bund, 142) in identifying the " Cosa" of Veil., loc. cit., and Livy, Epit., xiv. , with Cosa in Etruria ; cf. Plin., .A 7 ". //., iii. 8, 51. Mommsen and Madvig both place it in Lucania. 6 Mommsen, R. O., i. 428, note; Nissen, Ital. Landeskunde, p. 71. 7 Beloch, Hal. Bund, 203 ; Monimsen, R. O., i. 428, note.
 * Livy, Epit., xiv. ; Plut, Pyrrh., 26.