Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/700

638 ductions, it is certain that the Ciceronian phrase of the liberal arts, the ingenuoiis arts, both in Latin and its deri vatives or translations in modern speech, has been used currently to denote the sciences themselves, and not merely the disciplines instrumental to them. The trivium and the quadrivi^(,m (grammar, logic, and rhetoric geometry, astro nomy, music, and arithmetic) have been habitually called arts, when some of them have been named in that sense in which they mean not arts but sciences, &quot; only contem plating things in the mind.&quot; In the German language particularly the words Art and Science have in general been loosely interchanged. The etymology of the word for Art secured a long continuance for this ambiguity. Kunst was employed indiscriminately in both the senses of the primitive Ich kann, to signify what I know, or Science, and what I can do, or Art. It was not till the end of the 17th century that a separate word for Science, the modern Wissenschaft, came into use. On the other hand, the Greek word TexvT;, with its distinct suggestion of the root sig nification to make or get, acted probably as a safeguard against this tendency. The distinction between rexy?], Art or practice, and eTricrr^yu,?;, knowledge or Science, is ob served, though not systematically, in Greek philosophy. But for our present purpose, that of making clear the true rela tion between the one conception and the other, further quotation is rendered superfluous by the discussion the subject has received at the hands of the modern writer already quoted. Between Art, of which we. practise the rules, and Science, of which we entertain the doctrines, Mr Mill establishes the difference in the simplest shape, by pointing out that one grammatical mood is proper for the conclusions of Science, and another for those of Art. Science enunciates her conclusions in the indicative mood, whereas &quot; the imperative is the characteristic of Art, as distinguished from Science.&quot; And as Art utters her con clusions in her own form, so she supplies the substance of her own major premise.

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And the logical relation of Art and Science, in other words, the manner of framing the intermediate member between the general major premise of Art and its imperative conclu sion, is thus defined:—

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The whole discussion may be summed up thus. Science consists in knowing, Art consists in doing. What I must do in order to know, is Art subordinate to or concerned in Science. What I must know in order to do, is Science subordinate to or concerned in Art. Art, then, is defined by two broad distinctions : first, its popular distinction from Nature; and next, its practical and scientific distinction from Science. Both of these distinc tions are observed in the terms of our definition given above. Within the proper limits of this definition, the conception of Art, and the use of the word for it, have undergone sundry variations. These variations correspond to certain vicissitudes or developments in the order of historical facts and in society. It remains very briefly to consider the chief of these. The requirements of society, stimulating the in genuity of its individual members, have led to the invention of arts and groups of arts, constantly progressing, with the progress of civilisation, in number, in complexity, and in resource. The religious imagination of early societies, who find themselves in possession of such an art or group of arts, forgets the history of the invention, and assigns it to the inspiration or special grace of some god or hero. So the Greeks assigned the arts of agriculture to Triptolemus, those of spinning and navigation to Athene, and of music to Apollo. At one stage of civilisation one art or group of arts is held in higher esteem, another at another. In societies, like most of those of the ancient world, where slaves were employed in domestic service, and upon the handicrafts supplying the immediate utilities of life food, shelter, and clothing these constituted a group of servile arts. The arts of husbandry or agriculture, on the other hand, have alternately been regarded as servile and as honourable according as their exercise has been in the hands of a subject class, as under feudal institutions, or, as under the Roman republic, of free cultivators. Under feudal institutions, or in a society in a state of permanent war, the allied arts of war and of government have been held the only honourable class. In commercial states, like the republics of Italy, the arts of gain, or of pro duction (other than agricultural) and distribution, have made good their title to equal estimation and greater power beside the art of captains. But among peaceful arts, in dustries, or trades, some have always been held to be of higher and others of lower rank ; the higher rank being assigned to those that required larger operations, higher training, or more thoughtful conduct, and yielded ampler returns the lower rank to those which called for simple manual exercise, especially if such exercise was of a dis agreeable or degrading kind. In the cities of Italy, where both commerce and manufactures were for the first time organised on a considerable scale, the name arte, Art, was retained to designate the guilds or corporations by which the several industries were exercised ; and, according to the nature of the industry, the art was classed as higher or lower (maggiore and minore). The arts of which we have hitherto spoken have arisen from positive requirements, and supply what are strictly utilities, in societies, not excluding the art of war, at least 