Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/679

] clergy, surgeons, &c. ; all other citizens become liable on attaining the age of 20. No substitutes are allowed, and any one rejected for bodily infirmity, or exempted from any cause, is required to pay a small tax. The strength of the armed forces of Switzerland was given as follows in 1872:—

Auszag. Reserve. Lnndwehr. Total. Staff. 841 Infantry 66 649 39,078 54 334 160,061 Rifles (Scharfschiitzen) Cavalry 6,001 1 913 3,364 1 086 4,616 1 571 13,981 4,570 Artillery 8,262 5,350 4,643 18,255 Engineers 1 245 1,059 743 3,047 Administration 299 129 74 502 84,369 50,066 65,981 201,257 Of these, however, the landwehr exist on paper only, and may be left out of consideration ; and the available force is estimated at about 105,000, of whom 70,000 belong to the &quot;auszug,&quot; and 35,000 to the reserve. The infantry are armed and equipped by their cantons, the recruit himself having to bear a portion of the expense. Before being placed on the rolls of the &quot;auszug&quot; he has to undergo a training of four weeks for the line, or five weeks for the rifles ; and subsequently an annual training of eight days while in the elite, and six days in the reserve. Practically, however, the elite are commonly called out every second year only, and the training of the reserve is often omitted altogether The cavalry, artillery, and engineers have a recruit s course of six weeks, and an annual training of (nominally) a fortnight ; but in practice the latter has been reduced to eight days every second year. The cavalry resemble our yeomanry, consisting of a wealthier class of men, who find their own horses ; the engineers are selected from men following suitable trades. The whole army is formed in six divisions, and annually one or two of these are assembled for divisional manoeuvres. A handsome federal barrack for infantry and cavalry and a permanent instructional establishment exist at Thun. Officers are required to go through a six weeks course at this federal school, and to attend one course of recruit training on appointment. The nomination of officers, and promotions up to the rank of captain, are made by the cantonal governments ; promotion to the higher grades and appointments to the staff by the federal authorities, though usually on the recommendation of the cantons. Candidates for the staff are required to go through a two months course at a staff school which is annually opened for the purpose. A study of the military system of Switzerland will at once explain its apparent cheapness. The expenditure shown in the federal budget is only a portion of the real cost of the army ; to it must be added the expenses borne by the cantons and by the men themselves. The actual cost is estimated by the best authorities at 533,000 per annum, or about 5 per head fur an effective strength of 105,000 men. In England the annual cost of the militia is about 8 per head, of the volunteers 3. The Swiss 80-called army may take its place between our militia and volunteers. The men are less trained than our militiamen, but are generally better educated and of a more intelligent class. They show at least as much independence as our volunteers, and many things of acknowledged necessity are left undone, simply because the men will not do them. The officers are in all respects inferior, and that class who have previously seen service in the army is wanting. In equipment the army is far behind our auxiliary forces, and an attempt made in 1872 to improve its organisation generally, and give the federal authorities more power, was successfully resisted by the cantons. During the war of 1870-71 five divisions of the Swiss army, amounting in a 1 ! to about 37,000 men, were mobilised and assembled on tho frontier ; and superficial observers were enthusiastic in their praises of the organisation and efficiency of this citizen army. But their own commander reported that there was &quot; incredible friction in the mechanism of the whole force ; that many of the battalions were in the lowest condition of discipline and efficiency; and that &quot;to march against an enemy with such troops as these would indeed be a bold enterprise ;&quot; and urged that &quot;it would be far preferable to have an army weaker in point of numbers, but of better quality.&quot; What becomes of such forces when opposed to a real army has been abundantly illustrated by the history of the French gardes mobiles in the war of 1870. Switzer land exists by the sufferance of her powerful neighbours, and her military institutions are suited to such conditions, but not to a power that relies on itself for its independence.

  The Ottoman empire, whose power at one time seemed to threaten the very existence of the Christian states, has long lost her terrors, and her military institutions are now studied rather to see what elements of resistance to foreign aggression she still possesses, than for the part she may play in European politics. Her armies have lost their peculiar character and constitution, and with it much of the spirit which once made them formidable. In the early days of her rising power every Osmanli was a soldier; and the whole nation was animated with that martial fanaticism that was the secret of her strength. As her conquests extended, her warriors were rewarded with grants of land, and a system of military tenure arose resembling the feudal system of Western Europe. And though the Osmanli retained his simple habits and warlike spirit, the unfitness of such a militia for prolonged opera tions soon led, as in the Christian states, to the establishment of a more permanent force. Sultan Amurath I. in 13GO first formed a bodyguard of Christian captives ; and this force, highly privileged and rewarded, soon swelled to large dimensions. Such was the origin of the janissaries, the earliest standing army in Europe, and for long the scourge and terror of the neighbouring Christian states. Like most proselytes, they were more fanatical even than the genuine Osmanli; and this, added to a permanent organisation, made them for a time almost invincible. But success and indulgence produced their usual results ; they became over bearing, corrupt, and formidable only to their own country. From being the sultan s slaves they became his masters, and the history of Turkey shows a long list of rulers appointed, deposed, or murdered by tho janissaries. Two attempts to break their power failed disastrously. But Sultan Mahmoud II. was not daunted by a first failure, and when in 182G he commenced his reorganisation of the army, and the janissaries again rose against him, they found him prepared. The new troops remained faithful, and in a terrible three days struggle, in which 20,000 of their number were killed, the janissaries as a body were annihi lated. Mahmoud now hastened to reconstitute his army on European models ; but while his measures were still in embryo he found himself involved in a war with Russia, and though the newly-raised troops behaved with gallantry, the war soon took an unfavourable turn, and ended dis astrously for Turkey with the humiliating peace of Adrian- ople. The reforms instituted by Mahmoud were, however, carried on vigorously by his successor, Abdul Medjid, and form the basis of the present military institutions of Turkey. As now constituted, the Turkish forces consist of the &quot;nizam,&quot; or standing army; &quot; ichtjat,&quot; or first reserve: 