Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/675

] The total strength of the Italian active army on peace and war footing is approximately as follows:—

Peace, War. Infantry, 80 Regiments, 128,000 245,000 Bersaglleri, 10 ,, 18,000 36,000 Cavalry, 20 ,, 18,000 21,000 Artillery, 10 Field Regiments, 11.000 21,000 ,, 4 Garrison ,, 6,000 13,000 Engineer?, 2 Regiments, 4,000 7,000 Train, 3 ,, 2,500 10,000 Stall Administration, &c., 3,500 &amp;gt; 191,000 361,000

In war time this force is organised in 20 divisions, forming 10 army corps, each corps comprised of 24 in fantry battalions, 4 bersaglieri battalions, 2 cavalry regi ments, and 10 field batteries, giving a fighting strength of 28,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 80 guns. The corps and divisional organisation is not permanent in peace time ; but the divisional staffs are kept up in those of 1 6 territorial and 4 active divisions maintained in peace. The depots and active militia, or second line of troops, are maintained in cadre only in peace time ; the depots on mobilisation are raised to a strength of 125,000, or a third of the active army. For the militia the cadres of 960 companies of infantry, 60 companies of bersaglieri, 10 of engineers, and 60 of artillery, are formed in peace time. On mobilisation these will give a force of about 250,000 men, of whom 200,000, with 40 batteries or 320 guns, could take the field if necessary. The local or &quot; sedentary &quot; militia is not organised in peace time, and is only called out in the last extremity, corresponding generally to the landsturm of Germany. The kingdom of Italy is divided into 16 &quot;territorial divisions,&quot; and these again are subdivided into &quot; districts,&quot; of which there are 62, each comprising one or more of the 80 provinces of the kingdom. These districts are under the supervision of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, whose duties correspond generally to those of the commander of the landwehr battalion districts in Prussia. He has under him a staff, and the cadres of from 1 to 6 companies, forming the depots of the active army in peace time, and in war furnishing each the cadres for one militia battalion. He superintends the first instruction and forwarding of the annual contingent of recruits for the army, and the periodical training of the men belonging to the second class, who are on permanent furlough. The Italian army is composed of very various materials, rind in its reorganisation it has been the object of the Govern ment to blend these together as much as possible. Going exactly contrary to the Pmssian principle of localisation, the kingdom is divided into five &quot; zones,&quot; and special arrange ments are made to provide that each regiment shall receive recruits in due proportion from all five of these. The Picd- montese are a hardy, athletic race, superior, perhaps, to any in Europe in power of work and endurance of fatigue, pri vations, and hardships. They are temperate, intelligent, and combine a certain natural independence with a tradi tional respect for their princes and aristocracy, which makes them docile and amenable to discipline. The aristocracy of North Italy, like that of England, has always associated itself with the welfare and progress of the country, and deservedly kept the respect of all classes, and furnishes an excellent class of officers to the army. The southern Italian, on the other hand, is generally indolent, and incapable of much exertion, physical or mental ; occa sionally roused to enthusiasm, but wanting in steadiness of character; usually either bigoted and a slave to his priest, or a free-thinker, with little respect for any authority human or divine. Since enervated and luxurious Rome fell before the more vigorous northerner, the southern Italian has shown but little military spirit. Whether the amalgamation of the various races will raise the whole army to the level of the Piedmontese, or lower the old Pied- montcse army to the level of the others, is a problem which can only be solved practically; but one may fairly hope that the new national life which is dawning on Italy will restore to its inhabitants something of the qualities which once made Rome mistress of the world.

  . Spain, once the proudest of nations, has been brought so low by years of misrule and anarchy that she can scarcely now be classed among the powers of Europe; and the army which under Charles V., the Duke of Alba, and the Con stable of Bourbon had proved itself so formidable, has been reduced to a state of disorganisation that makes any detailed notice of it impossible. The martial spirit of old Spain, roused by the protracted struggle with the Moors, and fanned by the exploits of the Cid and the successes of Ferdinand of Castile, culminated in the reigns of Ferdi nand and Isabella, and of their successor, Charles V. At the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century the Spanish army was renowned throughout Europe ; while the discoveries of Columbus and the conquests of Cortes and Pizarro had extended her power and the fame of her arms to the New World. Gonsalvo de Cordova, Ferdinand s &quot; great captain,&quot; was the creator of the Spanish infantry, which, modelled originally on that of the Swiss, soon eclipsed the latter, and became in its turn the model for other nations. More heavily armed than the Swiss, it trusted, like them, to massive formations and the irresistible weight of its attack. During the 16th century the Spanish infantry maintained its reputation, and it was not till the close of the century that its renown began to fade before the new school of Maurice of Nassau, and that the deep masses of the &quot;Spanish brigade&quot; gave way to the smaller and more mobile formations of the Netherlaud ordon- nance. Under the disastrous reigns of the last princes of the house of Austria the army rapidly degenerated, and when Philip V. ascended the throne in 1700 it scarcely amounted to 15,000 men. During the 18th century it was largely augmented, and at the outbreak of the French revolution numbered about 120,000 of all arms. But though formidable in numbers, it was no longer so in quality ; and throughout the long war with Napoleon it distinguished itself principally by its uniform ill success, and the haste with which it abandoned even the strongest positions. After the peace the army was reorganised, and efforts were made to improve its general condition. But the series of civil Avars, or of risings in which the army was a principal actor, thwarted all such attempts. When Isabella was driven from the throne in 1868 the army espoused different sides, the bulk of the infantry joining Prim and the revolu tionists, while the artillery and some of the corps d elite remained faithful to the queen. In 1867 the total armed forces of the kingdom (including navy and colonial troops) were fixed at 200,000. The land forces in Spain itself amounted to 150,000, of whom 80,000 belonged to the regular army, and the remaining 70,000 were made up of caralineros or gendarmerie, guardia civil, and provincial militia. The law of recruiting passed in 1870 made all Spaniards liable to service on reaching the age of 20, and fixed the terms of service at four years in the ranks and two in the reserve. Substitution by exchange of numbers or by rempla^ants, and exoneration by payment, were sanctioned the price of the latter being fixed at 60. In 1872 the draft of a new military law was laid before the Cortes, by which substitution and exoneration were abolished, and the annual contingent required to complete the army was to be taken by position (according to age) on the lists, instead of by ballot. The term of service was 