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] line, and has from 2000 to 3000 names on its books. The general commanding an army corps has under his orders all military forces (territorial or reserve troops as well as active) and establishments within the district. He is assisted by a staff divided into two sections, of which the first or active part accompanies the active army on mobilisation, while the second or territorial part is per manently attached to the district, and is specially charged with recruiting, remounts, and all local affairs, and remains stationary on mobilisation. No general can hold the com mand of an army corps for more than four years. At the head of each subdivisional recruiting office is placed an officer of rank corresponding closely to the landwehr bat talion district commander in Prussia. All soldiers of the active army, reserves, or territorial forces who are living at their homes, under whatever conditions, and are domiciled within his subdivision, are under his orders. The territorial army exists in cadre only in peace time ; but its cadres are alwaj s formed and its organisation established. It is officered by retired or half-pay officers and one-year volun teers, or old non-commissioned officers who, on completing their army service, have qualified as officers of the territorial army. The reserve of the territorial army is not called out except in case of absolute necessity, and then by classes beginning with the youngest. The military forces of France under the new laws are estimated as follows, allowance being made for casual ties:—

Active army (5 classes), 705, 000 Reserve of active army (4 classes), 510, 000 Temporary exemptions, 141,000 Permanent part of army, 120,000 Total of active forces, 1,476,000 Territorial arm} 5 classes, organised, 532,000 6 classes (reserve), not organised, :... 626,000 Total, 1,208,000 In estimating the numbers available for the active army, however, deductions must be made for the last class of recruits (150,000) and the temporary exempts (141,000), who are untrained, and for a number of non-effectives, estimated at from 150,000 to 200,000, which would reduce the total to about 1,000,000. And further, in comparing these numbers with those of the German army, it must be borne in mind that, whereas almost every man on the German lists has received his three years training, nearly one-half of the French army is composed of men who have served a year or less with the colours. The peace establish ment of the French army is fixed at 450,000 ; the war establishment of the field army, exclusive of depots and garrison troops, at 780,000. The French field armynow (1874) numbers 496 battalions of infantry, 380 squadrons of cavalry, and 380 batteries ; being 126 battalions, 56 squadrons, and 158 batteries in excess of its strength at the outbreak of the war of 1870. The imperial guard has been broken up, and its soldiers dis tributed throughout the army. Of the creations of the war, the mobilised national guard has been disarmed and dis solved; the gardes mobiles sent home, but inscribed as reserve of the army; and the regiments de marche have been partly disbanded, partly amalgamated with the regiments from whose depots they had been formed. The infantry consists of 144 line regiments, each of 3 active and 1 dept.t battalion ; 4 regiments of Zouaves and 3 of Turcos, each of 4 field battalions and a weak depot ; 36 rifle battalions (chasseurs) of 6 field and 2 depot companies each ; a foreign regiment; and 3 battalions of Algerian light infantry (&quot; Zephyrs &quot;). The peace establishment of a regiment of the line is about 2000; the total strength of the infantry, 298,000.

The cavalry consists of 12 regiments of cuirassiers, 26 of dragoons, 12 of hussars, 20 of chasseurs-a-cheval, 4 of chasseurs (TAfrique, and 3 of Spahis. Notwithstanding the reputation which the Prussian uhlans had acquired in the war, one of the first acts of the French Government was to abolish the lance, and transform the old lancer regiments into dragoons. Each regiment consists of 5 squadrons, 4 of them field and 1 depot, and numbers about 900 men and 800 horses ; the total strength of the cavalry is 58,000 men and 50,000 horses.

The artillery consists of 38 regiments, of which 19 have each 10 field batteries, and 19 have 6 field and 4 horse- artillery batteries. The batteiy has six guns. The artillery further comprises 30 garrison batteries, a regiment of ponto- niers, 1 5 companies of artificers, and 2 regiments of artillery train. The total peace strength of the artillery is 45,000 men and 24,000 horses.

The engineers consist of a staff of 462 officers and 570 men, and 3 regiments, forming 48 companies of sappers, 6 of miners, and 3 of engineer train. These are ultimately to be formed into 19 independent batteries. The key to the French military character, its strength and its weakness, is well given by one of their own writers, Bloadel : &quot; We love the roll of the drum, the coquetry of uniform, the roar and tumult of battle ; but obedience is burdensome to us, it is strange to our character and to our time. The ruling spirit of criticism is injurious to discipline, and too often the study of duties is overlooked in the study of rights. The ivarlike spirit of the ancient Gauls has remained as an inheritance to their descendants : but notwithstanding the fame which our arms have achieved in all epochs of our history, the true military spirit is rare in France.&quot; This warlike spirit, which the French possess perhaps beyond any other nation, is a matter of race and temperament ; the military spirit is the result of a nation s training, and in that the French have been singularly unfortunate. From the time that the Franks, fourteen centuries ago, subdued the original Gallic or Celtic popula tion of France, the nation was divided into two sharply- defined classes, the conquerors and conquered. The former alone were warriors and free ; the latter were mere serfs condemned to till the ground and labour. The Frank chivalry was renowned through Europe ; but the peasant was perhaps the most abject of his class. This it is that explains the difference between the helpless crowds of foot men that followed the French nobility to battle, and seemed only brought there to be slaughtered, and the sturdy British archers who formed so important an element of strength in the English armies. Hence also the difficulty found in raising an efficient national infantry; as their own king, Francis I., says in his manifesto to the German princes &quot; We have in our land no foot soldiers, because our ancestors trained our peasantry to agriculture rather than war.&quot; Even in the days of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. the foreign troops amounted to one-third or one-fourth of the army, and formed distinct corps, usually receiving higher pay. The brilliant feats of arms that gave such prestige to the French name were mostly performed by her gay and gallant aristocracy. It was the &quot; Maison du Roi&quot; who seized Valenciennes in broad day by a coup de main, who decided the battle at Steinkirk, who broke the column of Foutenoy. The common soldiers were canaille, separated by an infinite gulf from their officers. All this was changed by the great Revolution. The former slaves became masters, but they had had no training to qualify them for freedom, and that &quot; law-abiding &quot; spirit that marks the German and Anglo-Saxon races was wanting in them. The old warlike spirit was revived and stimulated by the enthusiasm of newly-acquired liberty ; and Napoleon knew how to turn to account the admirable material he found to hand. But 