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] rate of wages, voluntary enlistment is the cheaper of the two; but when the numbers arc large, and excessive wages are necessary to stimulate enlistment, compulsory service becomes economical. Such an army as England maintains is actually raised with less cost to the nation by the former system ; but armies such as those of the Continental powers are only possible under the latter. So heavily, however, does the conscription press on the life of a nation, that it may safely be asserted that no nation ever did or will accept it, except of necessity.

The next great question is that of the terms of service. No nation can afford to keep constantly under arms the whole force which it may require to put forth in war. In olden times fresh armies were raised on the outbreak of each war. The great step in modern orga nisation was the maintenance of permanent cadres and the formation of trained reserves. Military forces are now divided into &quot;standing armies,&quot; comprising those who are actually doing duty as soldiers, and forming in peace time the cadres and the school of instruction of the army; and &quot;reserves,&quot; under which name are included all who pursue their industrial callings in peace, but are called to arms in war. Such reserves, however, may be of very different value, from the Prussian &quot; reservist,&quot; a trained soldier in the prime of life, to the. garde mobile or volunteer who has only attended a few drills; and their value is always closely connected with the system and terms of service. There are practically three systems. The first, or long service system is now almost obsolete, it partly lives in England alone. Under this the soldier was engaged for life, or for a long term of years, remained with the colours so long as fit for service, and was then dis charged, usually with a pension. It produced a highly- trained army, in which discipline, mutual reliance, esprit de corps, constancy under discouragement, and all soldierly qualities, were carried to their highest pitch. The soldier made the regiment. his home, and knew no law but the word of his commander. But such an army was neces sarily small, being maintained in peace as well as in war, and could form no reserve, as all remained with the colours till they were no longer fit for service. In war, therefore, it had to be increased, and its casualties replaced by untrained recruits; and its quality deteriorated when excellence was most required. Long service also tended to produce a class army, isolated from the life of the nation, and always a dangerous weapon in the hands of an un scrupulous ruler. Further, to condemn a man drawn by lot to lifelong service was felt to be incompatible with the maintenance of compulsory service; and when it was found by experience that soldiers could in three years be sufficiently trained for all purposes of war, and that by the application of short service armies could be trebled in numbers in war without increasing the cost in peace, the old long service armies disappeared from Europe. The converse of this is the second, or militia system, actually in force in Switzerland and Canada, and to a certain extent in America. Under this no permanent army is maintained, but all, or a large proportion, of the inhabitants are liable to service, and undergo a partial training. The cost of such a force is very small, the in dustrial disturbance reduced to a minimum ; yet the forces that are put in the field are formidable, in numbers at least. But its real economy is more than doubtful. History abounds with lessons that such forces can never carry on sustained operations against trained armies. They may show brilliant courage; but they want the mutual knowledge and reliance, the constancy in defeat, and the instinctive discipline which can be acquired by habit alone. The cost of putting them in the field is always disproportionately great. Opposed to trained armies, they invite defeat; opposed to similar forces, as in the great American war, decisive action on either side is impossible, and the war drags on till its cost far exceeds that of years of standing armies and peace preparations. The third and intermediate system is that of short service and reserves, now adopted by all nations. The European details o f its application vaiy, but the general principles are the same in all, to maintain the cadres of a large army in peace, capable of expansion in war, and to keep the recruit in the ranks only so long as is necessary to make him a trained soldier, and then pass him into a reserve. It combines the numerical strength of the militia system with the organisation, training, and discipline of a long service army. Its practical application will be seen in describing the various armies of Europe.

The principles of organisation are comparatively simple. Organisation is of two kinds, tactical and administrative; the first having reference to action on the battle-field, the second to general maintenance in peace as well as in war. Originally the two were often distinct; thus companies and regiments were originally administrative units, bat talions tactical ones; and the two had not necessarily any connection. But the most perfect organisation is that which answers both purposes, and in this direction all modern improvements have tended; and as the battle-field is the ultimate object of all preparation, administrative considerations must give way to tactical ones when they clash, and all organisation must conform to the tactical requirements of the day. Great progress was made in this branch during the Revolutionary war. The origin of regiments and battalions has already been described. The first &quot;mixed divisions,&quot; i.e., divisions comprising troops of all arms, were formed in the Revolutionary armies of 1792, and in 1804 Napoleon organised &quot; corps d armee,&quot; each forming a complete army in itself, under the com mand of a marshal, the necessity for such organisation arising from the size of his armies, which had grown beyond the immediate control of one man. This organisa tion was copied by other armies, and attained its highest perfection when combined by the Prussians with their territorial system each corps d armee being permanently located in and recruited from a particular province. A modern army usually comprises several such corps d armde. A Prussian army corps, which may be taken as the type of modern organisation, consists of a staff, two infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, a regiment (seven batteries) of corps artillery, a regiment of engineers, and a number of administrative services. An infantry division consists of a staff, two infantry brigades, a rifle battalion, four batteries of artillery, and a regiment of cavalry. An infantry brigade consists of a staff and two regiments (six battalions); a cavalry brigade of a staff, three regi ments (twelve squadrons), and a battery of horse artillery. The engineers comprise a pontoon train, a light field bridge train, a column of entrenching tools, siege materials, and a field telegraph; while nine reserve ammunition columns accompany the corps artillery. The administrative depart ments include the commissariat, charged with the supply of the troops, and having at its disposal five provision columns and a large amount of hired or requisitioned transport, and provided with a field bakery; the medical department, consisting of a staff; three ambulance detach ments, each having a staff of medical officers, 120 trained stretcher-bearers to attend to and carry off the wounded on the battle-field, a supply of medical stores, covers for wounded, and a number of ambulance waggons, fitted for the conveyance of wounded; and the medical staff attendants, tents, and all appliances for 12 field hospitals, each calculated to receive 200 wounded; the pay depart ment, charged with the military chest; a field 2iost, a depot 