Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/628

566 less of that of other countries also. Every citizen .was declared liable to service for five years, and the whole male population, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, was divided into classes and enrolled by name, to be called out as occasion required. It was the terrible power of the conscription that enabled Napoleon to carry on the gigantic wars which characterised his reign, and after losing in the snows of Russia the largest army ever put in the field, to reappear in a few months with another almost as large. Other nations of necessity followed the example of France, and the conscription became general. Prussia still further developed its power by reducing the period of service in the ranks, and passing her soldiers as soon as sufficiently trained into a reserve, thus gradually training the whole of her population. The &amp;lt;l short service and reserve &quot; system, the greatest revolution ever effected in this branch of military art, and characterised by a recent foreign writer on political economy as &quot; the greatest, and in its ulterior consequences probably the most important, of the events of our century,&quot; owed its origin to the conditions imposed on Prussia by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. Restricted to an army of 43,000 men, the Prussian statesmen evaded the spirit of the clause by sending the trained soldiers to their homes, to be recalled when needed, and replacing them with recruits. This system, by which every citizen becomes also a trained soldier, and there is no limit to the size of the armies save that of population, was at first only partially adopted by other countries. The prejudice in favour of professional armies soldiers whose business it was to fight and do nothing else was too strong, and doubts were felt whether these semi-citizen armies would stand the rough trials of war. But after Sadowa, other nations had no choice but to copy it or resign their military position. It is true the lesson was not learnt at once by all, but 1870 and 1871 enforced what 18G6 had already taught; and within the last few years every great Continental power has reorganised its military institutions on the model of Prussia.

If we glance back at the history of military institutions in Europe since the fall of Rome, we find it divides its-self into four well-defined periods. In the first or barbarous stage we have vast armies or hordes, formidable from their numbers and the courage of the warlike freemen composing them, but almost without tactics or organisation. In the second or feudal period we have armies nearly as numerous, but whose strength lay entirely in a small body of highly-equipped knights and men-at-arms, the bulk of the army no longer freemen fighting for their country, but slaves fighting at their lord s command. Little progress has been made in tactics and organisation, and the fighting power of nations is exhausted in constant petty wars. In the third or &quot; stand ing army&quot; period we have small armies of highly-trained professional soldiers forming a class distinct from the rest of the population, tactics and organisation becoming a science and making vast progress. Lastly, under the conscription we have armies, once more national, embracing the whole male population, more numerous than ever, but now trained and organised with all the science and skill of professional soldiers. Some remarks on the general principles involved in this branch of military art will serve as introduction to a more detailed account of existing armies. {{ti|1em|The military institutions of a nation are governed by various considerations, the principal of which are geographical position, policy, national character, and wealth. A country like America, which is threatened by no powerful neighbours, can devote its whole energies to peaceful pursuits, and reduce its army to a mere police force. But a European state, surrounded by warlike and powerful nations, may depend for its very existence on its army, and must consequently keep pace with its neighbours, and develop its forces to the utmost that industrial and economical considerations admit of. Political economists class all military expenditure as non-productive. Perhaps it might more fairly be called indirectly productive, as necessary to the maintenance and extension of civilisation, and the protection and development of trade. Further, the value of property increases with increased security, and military expenditure within certain limits thus tends to repay itself. Broadly, however, it may be treated as a. tax for insurance, and as so much withdrawn from the productive power of the nation. The object of all military institutions is to develop the highest amount of fighting power, that is, attain the greatest security with least strain on the industry of the country, the latter being measured not by the cost of the army us shown by the budget, but by the amount of productive labour withdrawn and disturbance produced. All ques tions, therefore, have to be considered under two aspects, military and economical that of efficienc} r and that of cost.}} The first question that presents itself is the manner of raising armies. There are two methods, that of voluntary eidistment, and that of compulsory levies or conscription : the former once the universal system, but now retained by England alone; the latter adopted by all other European powers. By voluntary enlistment the burden of military duty is distributed evenly throughout the community, the soldier receiving fair wages for his service, while the citizen bears his share in the form of taxes. Personal liberty is net interfered with, the industry of the country generally is undisturbed, those members only are withdrawn who aro likely to contribute least to its wealth, and the army becomes a useful school and refuge for the restless classes of the community. But the supply of recruits is fluctuating and uncertain, they are drawn almost entirely from the lowest class, every desired improvement i.&amp;gt; hampered by considerations of its effect on recruiting, and the army tends to become a class rather than a national one. Compulsory service gives unlimited com mand of men, introduces a higher class in the ranks, and raises the tone of the army generally; while mili tary efficiency alone has to be considered in organisa tion. But it presses much more severely on the country. Military service becomes a tax inflicted by lot, falling with excessive weight on some, while others escape free. &quot; Admit substitutes (or exemption by payment), and tho hardship falls exclusively on the poor; insist on personal service, and the loss of time, which to the young man of fortune is nothing, and which to the lowest class of labourer is unimportant, because the pay Avhile serving is as good as he would get elsewhere, becomes a very heavy tax on the skilled industry of the artisan or the profes sional man, or &quot;those who have business habits to acquire.&quot; Hence in all countries where personal service is enforced, it is necessarily accompanied with provisions for softening its hardships and reducing its inequality. The time of service is reduced to a minimum, and a special short course is established for men of means and education above the average. Exemptions are permitted on personal or family grounds, and in Prussia these exemptions arc carried so far that the ballot is practically done away with ; and in some countries money payments are required from all who do not serve. The relative cost of the two systems depends upon the size of the army. So long as the num bers required are small and can be obtained at a fair 