Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/627

] to the habits of the country, and according to the -wealth or personal influence of the leaders. In the days when men fought in compact masses, and one man s voice could thus control a large number, 500 and even 600 men was not an uncommon strength for a company; and in some nations the numbers never fell very low. In France, however, the policy initiated by Richelieu, and afterwards adhered to by Mazarin and Louis XIV., of breaking the power of the French nobility, and making them followers and dependants of the king, reacted on the organisation of the army ; for it was found desirable to give employment to as many of the young noblemen as possible in the royal armies, and therefore to multiply the companies and commands, and the French companies sometimes fell as low as 30 men. As the undisciplined melde of feudal battles gave way to regular and scientific tactics, the necessity of bodies of constant and uniform strength was felt, and the battalion and squadron were introduced as a.Q fighting formations of infantry and cavalry respectively. Originally battalions were dense masses num bering several thousand men, and composed of many regi ments. As changes in arms led to the adoption of more extended formations, it became necessary to subdivide into smaller fractions, and battalions were gradually reduced in size till they became mere fractions of a regiment. Finally, when the advantages of uniform and permanent organisa tion were more fully understood, and large standing armies enabled such improvements to be introduced, regiments also were made of uniform strength, and the battalion be 1 came a fixed fraction, usually one-half or one-third of a regiment, but still retained its distinctive character as a tactical unit ; while for administrative purposes, recruiting, clothing, payment, &c., the regiment was the unit. Simi larly, the company remained the lesser administrative unit, that is, the captain was answerable for the pay; equipment, and discipline of his company in camp and quarters; but on the parade-ground or battle-field the battalion was divided into a number of equal divisions not necessarily corresponding to the companies. In Frederick the Great s time a Prussian battalion consisted of five (afterwards four) companies, but on parade was divided into eight &quot; zugs &quot; (divisions) ; and the Prussian company column, now so famous, is merely a return to the old formations adopted when the company acted independently,

The tactical changes effected in European armies between the beginning of the 16th and end of the 18th centuries, consequent on alterations in arms, need only be very briefly noticed here. In the earlier wars of the 16th century the musketeers formed but a small propor tion of the infantry, and the great bulk consisted of pikemen, whose power lay in weight and mass : deep formations were consequently the rule. The cavalry still fought principally with the lance. In the latter part of the century, during the great war of inde pendence of the Netherlands, improvements in fire-arms led to the proportion of musketeers being increased, and the front of battle proportionately extended to give effect to their fire. Thus Maurice of Nassau usually formed his armies in battalions of 500 men, of 250 pikemen, and 250 musketeers each, the pikemen ten deep in the centre, the musketeers on the flanks. The cavalry also adopted fire-arms, and were taught to trust more to fire than to the effect of the charge. During the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) the proportion of musketeers was still further increased. The imperial armies under Tilly and Wallen- stein still fought in heavy masses, but Gustavus Adolphus reduced his formations to six ranks. The bayonet, intro duced about the middle of the 17th century, gradually superseded the pike, and led to a further reduction of the ranks to four. During the prolonged wars of Louis XIV. s reign, and under the auspices of the great generals of that age, Turenne, Conde, Eugene, and Marlborongh, considerable improvements were effected in the tactics and organisation of armies, and the permanent grouping of battalions and regiments into brigades and divisions was first introduced. Still further improvements were made during the Silesian and Seven Years Wars (1740-63). Many changes ascribed to Frederick the Great are really due to Leopold of Dessau, who, under the first Frederick, formed the army which the second Frederick led to victory. He reduced the ranks of the infantry to three, trained them to manoeuvre rapidly and with extraordinary precision, and was the author of the drill-book which has remained the basis of all European systems of drill. But the improve ments in cavalry tactics were unquestionably due to Frederick himself, who taught them the true secret of their strength, shock and rapidity, and further- developed their power by the introduction of horse artillery, able to move rapidly and accompany the cavalry anywhere. At the close of Frederick s brilliant career every army in Europe had copied that of Prussia more or less closely. Infantry was organised in regiments of two or three battalions, each battalion 500 or 600 strong this number being determined by the length of line which it was considered one man could effectively control. Cavalry was organised in regiments of four squadrons, each squadron from 100 to 150 strong. Artillery organisation was still in its infancy, a large part of the guns being attached to regiments, and the heavy guns often horsed and driven by contractors. But Gribeauval was laying the foundation in France of the battery organisation afterwards adopted by all nations. The Prussian army, proud of its brilliant series of successes, equally proud of its manoeuvring power and drill, was looked up to by all Europe, and believed itself invincible, but in its pride forgot how much was due to the hand which had guided it. The French army had fallen very low in general esti mation, and even the American war, and minor successful expeditions towards the end of the century, did little to raise it. The Austrian army was slow to adopt improve ments, but had acquired a reputation for tenacity. Eng land, recently driven out of her American colonies, was hardly acknowledged as a power on land.

Such was the military condition of Europe when the French Revolution broke like a storm over the Continent, sweeping away old landmarks and old systems, covering the land for years with a flood, which, when it receded, left the whole face of the country changed. When, in 1792, the monarchs of Europe banded to crush the revolution, the military force of France was at a very low ebb. The old Royalist army was disorganised by revolutionary passions and frequent changes, and the constituent assembly had rejected the proposed &quot; compulsory service &quot; as at variance with the liberty of the citizen. But on the proclamation that &quot; the country was in danger,&quot; volunteers flocked from all parts to join the armies, and a levy en masse was ordered to repel the invaders. Officials vied in proving their zeal by the numbers of recruits they forwarded to the frontiers, and patriotism and terrorism, combined to fill the ranks. Within three years nearly 1,200,000 men were thus poured into the army, and sufficed to repel the invaders, and form the armies which, under Hoche, Moreau, and finally under Bonaparte, brought France forth victorious in 1797. But the long and bloody war had exhausted the supply, large as it was, and some new system of recruiting became necessary, for it was evident that voluntary enlistment would no longer suffice. In 1798, therefore, Jourdan brought forward and passed the law establishing conscription, the basis of all French military legislation since that date, and more or 