Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/228

214 that s feel the necessity for some more powerful and orderly than the mere operation of the blind principle of. For these and similar reasons, it is believed that few practical men will in the deny the advantages of apprenticeship. No one would probably advocate the restoration of the old s with their ; but many would perhaps incline to advise the institution of some order or degree by which, in certain, the workman who has passed through a regular apprenticeship may be distinguished from the man who is not so qualified.  APRICOT, the fruit of Prunus armeniaca or Armeniaca vulgaris, according to others. Under the one it is a  of the  to which the s belong, the other establishes it as a distinct  of the  Rosaceæ. The apricot is, like the, a stone, cultivated generally throughout , and used chiefly in the form of and in s. The  is said to be a native of  (hence the name Armeniaca), and it is found commonly in ous  throughout. It s very early in, and is a hardy , but the will scarcely ripen in  unless the  is trained against a. A great number of varieties of the apricot, as of most s, are distinguished by cultivators. The s of several varieties are edible, and in those of the Musch-Musch variety form a considerable article of. The  Eau de Noyaux is prepared from bitter apricot s.  APRIES (Ἀπρίης), the name by which and designate Pharaoh-Hophra, the eighth  of the twenty-sixth ian. See.  APRIL was, in the, the second of the, but is counted in the as the fourth. The of the name is unknown, though as far back as Varro we find the traditional, omnia aperit, “it opens everything,” which is supported by comparison with the modern  use of ἄνοιξις (opening) for ; while some would make out a connection with  , and Grimm suggests the name of a hypothetical  or , Aper or Aprus. Among the this  was  to, the Festum Veneris et Fortunæ Virilis being held on the first. On the fourth and the five following s, (Ludi Megalenses) were celebrated in  of ; on the fifth there was the Festum Fortunæ Publicæ; on the tenth (?)  in the, and on the nineteenth,  , in  of ; on the twenty-first—which was regarded as —the Vinalia urbana, when the  of the previous  was first tasted; on the twenty-fifth, the Robigalia, for the averting of ; and on the twenty-eighth and four following s, the ous Floralia. In many of, as , , and , the first of April has for long been appropriated to a facetious custom, for which no very satisfactory origin has been assigned. To send an unsuspecting or ignorant person on some bootless errand is the great endeavour of the day. In the unfortunate subject of the trick is called a gowk—which has now, though the words were probably at one time different, the meaning both of “fool” and “,”—and the mischievous errand-sending is “ing a gowk.” In  the dupe is called poisson d'Avril, or April-. One remarkable theory traces the custom to, as sending out his on such a quest; it is also referred either to the  representing the sending of  from  to  and from  to , or to the change, in , in , of   to the first of , which left the first of April destitute of anything but a  of its former ; and more recently an identification has been attempted with the   of , which is celebrated in a similar manner on the 31st of. No references to all-fools'-day have been found in our earlier ; and it seems that both and  have derived the  from. 's is the twenty-third of the ; and 's Eve, with its  about those who were doomed to die, falls on the twenty-fourth. In the symbolical  of the  by the  and s of the  takes place in their third, which frequently corresponds to our April; and in  a pleasant domestic , called the  of s, is celebrated in the same. The s of April (journées d'Avril) is a appropriated in  to a series of s at, , and elsewhere, against the  of  in , which led to violent repressive measures, and to a famous  known as the Procès d'Avril. (See Chambers's Book of Days; Grimm's Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache, cap. “Monate.”)  A PRIORI and A POSTERIORI. The philosophical distinction expressed by these terms is to be explained by referring to the phraseology of Aristotle. According to him there may be a double starting-point in knowledge. When our individual progress in learning is chiefly considered, the things Avith which we are first and best acquainted may be termed earlier and prior; whereas the truths of a more general, primary, and fundamental character, to which wo are subsequently led, have a later and posterior position. But if we lose sight of our personal interest in knowledge, then the priority may be more justly claimed by whatever is the cause or principle from which something else springs. In this sense the causal, original, and primary in the objec tive world is by nature prior (irporepov vo-et) ; whilst the secondary and derivative existence is posterior. Priority in the first acceptation is only relative to us, and for general purposes may be called accidental ; in the second acceptation, the priority is absolute, and without qualifica tion. It is the second acceptation which Aristotle laid down as the properly philosophical one, and which regulates the usage of the phrases a priori and a posteriori by the schoolmen. In that sense of the term there can evidently be no a priori demonstration of first and fundamental principles. According to Aquinas, for example, there can be no a priori knowledge of God ; because He, as uncaused and uncreated, cannot be deduced from anything prior in causation to Himself, and can only be apprehended ration ally by means of that which is consequent upon His action, viz., the creatures of the natural world. In other words, our knowledge of Him must be a posteriori. It is obvious that science in the highest sense must be a priori, if vere scire est per causas scire ; i.e., the knowledge must spring from an insight into causes, which are the true primaries. By an extension of this usage an argument is said to follow an a priori path, when from the basis of some conception it proceeds to evolve by analysis all or some of the logical consequences ; whereas, the mode of reasoning, which endeavours to gather into a single formula the various facts of observation, is described as a posteriori. The argument of Anselm, which, from the mere conception of God, pro poses to deduce his existence, is an example of a priori reasoning. An a priori reasoner has to predict what is or will be, by considering what ought to be in accordance with certain presuppositions. He tries by argument to assign beforehand the place of a fact which may not yet have been discovered by observation. From the analysis of certain given conditions, or by constructing the total product from some given elements, he seeks to anticipate experience. Of course, if the original conception be bad or defective, the conclusions will be false or inadequate. Often too, what 