Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 19.djvu/218

Rh 208 PLATO tomies, lie is careful to look on both sides of each alterna tive, and he no longer insists on dividing between this and not-this when another mode of classification is more natural. A rule not hitherto applied is now brought forward, the rule of proportion or right measure (TO /xerptov), as distin guished from arbitrary limitations. Nor is formal logical treatment any longer felt to be adequate to the subject in hand, but an elaborate myth is introduced. On the ethico-political side also a change has come over Plato. As he has stripped his ideas of transcendental imagery, so in reconsidering his philosopher-king he turns away from the smiling optimism of the Republic and looks for a scientific statesmanship that shall lay a strong grasp upon the actual world. He also feels more bitterly towards the demagogues and other rulers of Hellas. The author of the Politicus must have had some great quarrel with mankind. But so far as they will receive it he is still intent on doing them good. 1. The king is first defined as a herdsman of men, who as &quot; slow bipeds &quot; are distinguished from the pig and the ape. But the king is not all in all to his charges, as the herdsman is. The above definition confuses human with divine rule. 2. Now the universe is like a top, which God first winds in one direction and then leaves to spin the other way. In the former or divine cycle all was spontaneous, and mankind, who had all things in common, were under the immediate care of gods. They were happy, if they used their leisure in interrogating nature. But in this reign of Zeus it is far otherwise. Men have to order their own ways and try to imitate in some far-off manner the ail-but forgotten divine rule. 3. Therefore in our present definition the term &quot; superintendent &quot; must be substituted for &quot; herdsman. &quot; &quot;What special kind of superintendence is true statesmanship 1 4. By way of an example, the art of weaving is defined. The example shows that kingcraft has first to be separated from other kindred arts, both causal and co-operative. Nine categories are adduced which exhaust social functions. Eight are eliminated, and the ninth, the class of ministers, remains. Of these slaves, (b) hirelings, (c) traders, (d) officials, (c) priests are again parted off , although the last are only with difficulty separated from the king, when (/) a strange medley of monstrous creatures come into view. Some are fierce like lions, some crafty like the fox, and some have mixed natures like centaurs and satyrs. These are the actual rulers of mankind, more sophistical and juggling than the sophist him self. And they too must be separated from the true king. 5. The familiar tripartite distinction of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, is doubled by introducing into each the distinction involved in the presence or absence of wealth, and in the observance or non-observance of law. But no one of the six carries in itself a scientific principle. The true government is the rule, not of many, but of one or of a few. &quot; And they may govern, whether poor or rich, by freewill or compulsion, and either with or without law, so long as they govern scientifically.&quot; 6. The respondent, a youthful namesake of Socrates, is shocked at the remark that the true ruler may govern without law. This leads to a discussion of the nature of law, which is com pared to the prescription left by a physician. If present, he might dispense with his own rule. So the presence of a competent ruler is better than the sovereignty of law, which makes no allowance for nature or circumstance, but tyrannically forces its own way. Imagine medicine, navigation, &c., similarly conducted by time- honoured prescription, with penalties for innovation ; what would become of civilization ? Yet if law is disregarded by rulers who are unscientific and warped by self-interest, this leads to far worse evils. For the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence, in the continued absence of the true ruler, the best course, though only second best, is the strict observance of law. And he who so rules in humble imitation of the scientific governor may be truly called a king, although if the divine lawgiver were to appear his living will would supersede the law. 7. As it is, though cities survive many evils, yet many are ship wrecked because of the ignorance of those at the helm. The order of badness in the actual states is 1. Constitutional monarchy. 2. Constitutional oligarchy. 3. Law-abiding democracy. 4. Law-breaking democracy. 5. Law-defying oligarchy. 6. Tyranny. 8. It remains to separate from the true ruler those who co-operate with him as subordinates, the general, the judge, the orator. His own peculiar function is an art of weaving strength (the warp) with gentleness (the woof), when education has prepared them, and this (1) by administration, (2) by marriage. The four preceding dialogues have shown (1) the gradual transformation of the Platonic ideas (while still objective) into forms of thought, (2) the tendency to group them into series of categories, (3) a corresponding advance in psychological classification, (4) an increasing importance given to method, (5) the inclination to inquire into pro cesses (yeveVei?) as well as into the nature of being. Meanwhile Plato s approach to the Eleatics, though in the way of criticism, has brought into prominence the notions of unity, being, sameness, difference, and has left some what in abeyance the idea of good. To this &quot;highest of Philebu all studies &quot; Plato now returns, equipped with his improved instruments, and ready to forge neAv ones in the same laboratory, or in some other, should occasion serve. His converse with Parmenides ended in his assertion of an element of difference pervading all things, in other words, of an indeterminate element underlying all determinations. This brings him again into relation with the Pythagoreans, who had similarly asserted the combination of finite and infinite in the universe. Taking advantage of their help, he gains a more advanced (but still ideal) conception of the concrete har mony of things, and approaches the definition of that which in the RepiMic he but shadowed forth. With this most serious inquiry there is combined (as in the SopJnstes and Politicus) an ironical and controversial use of dialectic, by which the juggler and false pretender (who is in this case the goddess of pleasure), after claiming the highest place, is thrust down to the lowest. It must be admitted that the style of the Phihlnis is far from brilliant, or even clear. In the effort of connecting abstractions Plato s movement is more laboured than in his first glad realization of them. Instead of attempting here to follow the windings of the dialogue, it must suffice to state the main result. Neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, and the good eludes definition ; but the shrine, or habitation, of the good is a complex life of which the elements are, in order of merit (1) measure, the cause of all right mixture; (2) (a) beauty, the effect, and (b) reality, the inseparable condition ; (3) intellect ; (4) science, art, and right opinion ; (5) pure pleasure unaccompanied with pain. &quot; Not all the animal kingdom shall induce us to put pleasure first.&quot; The Philebus introduces us to the interior of the Academy in the lifetime of the master. More than any other of the dialogues it recalls Aristotle s description of Plato s teaching. But, while his followers seem early to have fallen under the dominance of the latest phase of his doctrine, Plato himself, even in the Philebus, is still detached from any servitude to the creations of his own mind. He manipulates them as the medium for expressing his fresh thoughts, but they are not yet crystallized into a system. &quot;I will remind you,&quot; Socrates, of what has been omitted,&quot; says Protarchus at the conclusion of this dialogue. The last (presumably) of Plato s metaphysical writings thus fitly ends with a confession of incomplete ness. But if, as M. Renan says, &quot; the most fatal error is to believe that one serves one s country by calumniating those who founded it,&quot; neither is. it for the interest of science to ignore these imperfect anticipations. By methods elaborated in the course of centuries, and far more sure than any which Plato had at his command, mankind have gained an extent of knowledge which he dreamt not of. 1 But the Greek metaphysician is none the 1 See, however, Polit., 272 C, D.